THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEOLOGY OF EMIL BRUNNER, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE EARLY PERIOD [1914-1929]

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To Janice,
sine qua non

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Only they who themselves have labored on such an undertaking know the joy which attends its completion. Only they know also the sobering realization of the considerable debt in which the author stands. The expression of public thanks does not repay this debt. But the inability to make any other recompense makes this gesture of the highest importance.

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Third Week of Lent, 1966

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ABBREVIATIONS

In the cases of second or subsequent references to works of Emil Brunner and Friedrich Schleiermacher, the name of the author is omitted from the reference. In addition, the following abbreviations are employed in the case of second and succeeding references to the works which are listed.

Briefe - Schleiermacher, *Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen*.

Dialektik, H. - Schleiermacher, *Dialektik*, Halpern edition.

Dialektik, J. - Schleiermacher, *Dialektik*, Jonas edition.

Dialektik, O. - Schleiermacher, *Dialektik*, Odebrecht edition.

EEG - Brunner, *Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube*, 2. & 3. Aufl.

Glaubenslehre - Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*.

Pünjer - Pünjer edition of *Reden*.

Reden - Schleiermacher, *Ueber die Religion*, all editions.

Reden^1 - 1799 edition of *Reden*.

Reden^2 - 1806 edition of *Reden*.

Reden^3 - 1821 edition of *Reden*.

S.W. - Schleiermacher, *Sämmtliche Werke*.

Sendschreiben - Mulert edition of Schleiermacher, *Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lücke*.

Chapter I

This dissertation is the direct result of a conviction concerning the nature of the theological enterprise which the author holds with great tenacity. Stated in the shortest form possible, this conviction is that the theologian must be responsible. In the broadest sense, of course, a theologian is anyone who attempts to state the meaning of faith, but more specifically I mean the persons whose profession it is to engage in the study of the various systematic and historical theological disciplines. Upon closer analysis, however, the division of theology and theologians into systematic and historical is somewhat arbitrary, for the theologian is properly concerned about both the past (i.e., the tradition out of which he comes and out of which he intends to speak) and the present (i.e., those to whom he speaks).[1] Thus, the theologian, regardless of his special interest, must be responsible for, i.e., critical about, both his own theology and his theological past. In relation to his theological past, the theologian must justify his own theology in the face of that past with which he disagrees, i.e., he must state why that past is inadequate or incorrect. Likewise, the theologian must state why he accepts that part of his past to which he does adhere, i.e., he must state why that past is both adequate and correct. To fail to do either is to abandon the right to be taken seriously as a theologian. When some of the more recent interpretations of the theological position of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher are viewed in the light of this assumption, the present problem becomes apparent.

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[1] Karl Barth stated this graphically and succinctly when he observed that the theologian must read both his Bible and his morning newspaper. See, Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. Thomas Wieser and John Newton Thomas (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1960), p. 90.

Before turning directly to a consideration of contemporary Schleiermacher literature and the problem raised by it, however, a brief survey of the history of Schleiermacher interpretation is necessary as a basis for better understanding of the contemporary situation.[1]

The history of Schleiermacher interpretation suggests a division of that interpretation into at least four periods. The first period extends from Schleiermacher's own lifetime to 1869 and is of rather ambiguous nature. The publication of Dilthey's biography of Schleiermacher[2] in 1870 marks the beginning of a period of rather favorable interpretation which continued through World War I. Following World War I, however, a period of reaction set in and continued, with exceptions, until World War II. Since World War II there has been a revival of interest in Schleiermacher and a general disposition to subject the harshest criticism of the inter-bellum period to reevaluation. I shall consider these periods in turn.[1]

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[1] This is a survey in the sense that it makes no pretense of considering or even mentioning all of the theologians who have interpreted and commented upon Schleiermacher's theology. Rather, as a survey it intends merely to highlight some of the major trends which are a part of the history of that interpretation.

[2] Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers, Band I (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1870).

In the later editions of Rudolf Otto's republication of the first edition of Schleiermacher's Reden he appended a short bibliography of secondary materials relating to Schleiermacher.[2] It is significant that only one entry is made from the years before 1870. Considering the number of universities and the men active in them, any survey of Schleiermacher literature from 1800 to 1869 indicates that many theologians must not have agreed with the remark which Neander made upon learning of Schleiermacher's death. "The man is departed," said Neander, "from whom will be dated, for the future, a new epoch in theology."[1] At least many of the theologians of this period did not bother to comment upon Schleiermacher.

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[1] To my knowledge, there is only one bibliography of Schleiermacher literature which purports to be comprehensive. In detail, this bibliography is both incomplete and inaccurate, but it is still extremely helpful as a whole. In the following sections of Chapter I, I have used it extensively as a guide to finding many of the materials mentioned. See, Terrence Nelson Tice, Schleiermacher's Theological Method With Special Attention to His Production of Church Dogmatics, Vol. III (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc., 1961), pp. 17-90.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ueber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, heraus. von Rudolf Otto (4. Aufl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1920), pp. xiii-xiv.

Not everyone allowed Schleiermacher to suffer in silence, of course, for even before 1870 there were those who contradicted him with varying degrees of venomousnous as well as those who claimed Schleiermacher as the inspiration for or source of their own thought. Among the so-called Hegelians, for example, Marheineke, a colleague of Schleiermacher at the University of Berlin and one who contradicted Schleiermacher as a matter of principle,[2] displayed his characteristic response in an argument over church-state relations. After Schleiermacher had cautioned a newly-formed commission against excessive reliance on the authority of the ruler as a basis for instituting liturgical reform in the recently united church,[3] Marheineke "proved from scripture" that Schleiermacher was wrong.[1] Another one of the Hegelians who wrote during this period was Karl Rosenkranz who published a monograph length critique of Schleiermacher.[2]

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[1] Reported by Friedrich Lücke in "Reminiscences of Schleiermacher," contained in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, trans. William Farrer (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1850), p. 8.

[2] Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte (Zürich Evangelischer Verlag, 1946), p. 444.

[3] Pacificus Sincerus, (pseudonym for Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher), Ueber das liturgische Recht evangelischer Landesfürsten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1824), reprinted in Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, I:5 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1834ff.), pp. 477-535. Hereafter Sämmtliche Werke will be referred to as: S.W.

Among the theologians who are generally classed as extreme supernaturalists there was also considerable and sustained attack on Schleiermacher. In fact, it was a member of this group, Ferdinand Delbrück, who published the first substantial criticism of Schleiermacher in a book on Melanchthon and thereby precipitated a controversy concerning Schleiermacher's "pantheism" which lasted for several years.[3] The most vociferous of this group, however, was not Delbrück, but F. C. Baur with J. C. F. Steudel not far behind.[4] While it is customary to dismiss this group as reactionaries,[1] a careful reading of Baur's criticism, for example, reveals little of the extravagent accusations which are usually said to characterize the entire group. It is true that Baur can speak of the mystical nature of Schleiermacher's statements[2] and of his subjectivism,[3] but Baur also acknowledges that Schleiermacher's "subjective standpoint presupposes a very objective background"[4] which Baur identifies as the "impression" which the individual receives from his religious community.[5] Thus, it is not primarily because Schleiermacher attempts to restate the notion of supernaturalism,[6] but because he makes the unexplained jump from the notion of absolute perfection to the necessary existence of the absolutely perfect man that Baur thinks his Christology and, by implication, the remainder of the Glaubenslehre along with it must be rejected.[7]

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[1] Philipp Konrad Marheineke, *Ueber die wahre Stelle des liturgischen Rechts im evangelischen Kirchenregiment: Pruefung der Schrift, Ueber das liturgische Recht evangelischer Landesfürsten* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1825).

[2] Karl Rosenkranz, *Kritik der Schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre* (Königsberg: August Wilhelm Unzer, 1836).

[3] Johann Friedrich Ferdinand Delbrück, *Philipp Melanchthon: den Glaubenslehrer* (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1826).

[4] For Bauer, see esp., Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1835); *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1838), esp. pp. 614-648, 689-691, 728-734; *Die christliche Lehre von Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 3. Theil (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1843), esp. pp. 842-889, 934-936, 961-969. For Steudel, see esp., Johann Christian Friedrich Steudel, "Ueber die Ausführbarkeit einer Annäherung zwischen der rationalistischen und supranaturalistischen Ansicht mit besonderer Rucksicht auf den Standpunkt der schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre," *Tuebinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, I (1828), Heft 1, 74-199, Heft 2, 74-120.

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[1] E.g., Tice, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 10, and Vol. III, p. 17. In the latter place Tice speaks of "a firm pattern of criticism" which centers "on facile cliches" and of the "reactionary supranaturalism" of this group.

[2] Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung, p. 616.

[3] Ibid., pp. 628-629.

[4] Ibid., p. 629.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., p. 639.

[7] Baur, Die christliche Lehre von Dreieinigkeit, p. 864.

One other group of theologians attacked Schleiermacher during this period, viz., the so-called rationalists who may be represented by K. G. Bretschneider,[1] a critic whom Schleiermacher took special pains to answer near the end of paragraph 19 of the second edition of the *Glaubenslehre*. Bretschneider attacked both the concept of religion and several of the material conclusions of Schleiermacher. Feeling and self-consciousness are not the same contended Bretschneider.[2] Moreover, piety consists not in feeling alone as Bretschneider thought Schleiermacher maintained, but in "knowledge, feeling, and action united"[3] and among these three the primary element is knowledge.[4] True religion begins with "an apprehension, dark or clear, correct or incorrect, of the idea of God which can be attained only through an exercise of the reason."[5] But even if Schleiermacher's definition of religion was to be granted, thought

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[1] Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, *Handbuch der Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, 3. Aufl., *mit einer besonderen Abhandlung: Ueber die Grundansichten der theologischen Systeme in den dogmatischen Lehrbüchern der Herren Prof. Dr. Schleiermacher und Marheineke, sowie über des Herrn Dr. Hase* (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1828).

[2] Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, "Bretschneider's View of the Theology of Schleiermacher," (trans. from Bretschneider's *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, 4. Aufl., pp. 93ff.), *Bibliotheca Sacra*, X (July, 1853), 599.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*., 599-600.

[5] *Ibid*., 600.

Bretschneider, the object of the feeling of absolute dependence is not identical with God[1] nor is the feeling of absolute dependence necessarily limited to God for there are elements of the created order in the face of which we have no power, e.g., the principle of gravity and the necessity of old age and death.[2]

This division of Schleiermacher's critics during the period from 1800 to 1869 into the Hegelians, supernaturalists, and rationalists does not begin to exhaust the list of critics. Men such as D. F. Strauss[3] and Albrecht Ritschl,[4] who did much of his work after 1869 but who represents a transition from this first period to the second, have not been considered, but the fact of negative criticism during this first period should now be established.

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[1] Ibid., 600-601.

[2] Ibid., 601. I have not included Bretschneider's critique of Schleiermacher's material conclusions because his critique seems to me to be based on a mistaken estimate of what Schleiermacher said concerning the relationship of the sensuous and spiritual consciousness. Moreover, Bretschneider's critique of Schleiermacher's concept of religion seems to be an adequate illustration of his position.

[3] One quotation from Strauss will illustrate the sharpness of his critique. According to Strauss, Schleiermacher's Christology "is undeniably a beautiful effort of thought and. . .does the utmost towards rendering the union of the divine and the human in Christ conceivable; but if its author supposed that he kept the faith unmutilated and science unoffended, we are compelled to pronounce that he was in both points deceived." David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus, trans. from 4th German ed., Vol. III (London: Chapman, Brothers, 1896), p. 420.

[4] Four works of Ritschl's are especially relevant. Albrecht B. Ritschl, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, trans. from German ed. of 1870 by John S. Black (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872), esp. pp. 440-493; Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion und ihre Nachwirkungen auf die evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1874); The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive Development of the Doctrine, trans. from German ed. of

Not all of the comment in the period before 1870 was negative, however, even though those who were more favorably disposed never became known as a "Schleiermacher school."[1] Men such as August Neander, Friedrich Lücke, Karl Immanuel Nitzsch, August Twesten, Richard Rothe, and Alexander Schweizer all borrowed something from Schleiermacher. Generally, what they borrowed was employed in the process of moving away from extreme supernaturalism. To take only one example, Nitzsch adopts Schleiermacher's concern for the union of practical and theoretical issues in dogmatics, declaring that his dogmatics adopts "no doctrinal material which may not relate to the confirmation, the nourishment and excitement of Christian consciousness, and co-operate towards the regeneration of a true church system."[2] In true Schleier-

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1888 by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900); and Theologie und Metaphysik (2. Aufl.; Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1887).

[1] This has been a common judgment at least since it was made in 1870 by A. Ritschl, A Critical History, p. 493. It seems to me to be a helpful observation explained in part by the freedom with which Schleiermacher viewed past theological statements and which he also encouraged in his students.

[2] Carl Immanuel Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, trans. Robert Montgomery and John Hennen (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1849), p. vi.

macherian fashion, Christianity, as a "revealed" religion, "is opposed to all others, and yet is incorporated into the unity of the idea and history of religion."[1] And Christ "does not impart himself magically or mechanically,"[2] but through the testimony of the church because Christ, as redeemer, "comes into the world and there develops himself into an *operative principle* of our death unto sin and holy return unto life."[3] Finally, as Kähler so carefully points out,[4] Nitzsch is quite typical of this group in that he feels free to "correct" and to "overcome" Schleiermacher's formulations.

But the predominantly negative tone of the evaluation of Schleiermacher during the period from 1800 to 1869 did not continue for, as Karl Barth points out,[5] he was more highly valued at the start of the twentieth century than during and immediately after his own lifetime. The year 1870[6] marks the approximate beginning of renewed interest in Schleiermacher just as the conclusion of World War I marks the approximate point where a shift in interpretation again occurred. In the intervenient years the evaluations of and comments upon Schleiermacher were much too numerous to recount here. For this reason I shall identify some significant trends in Schleiermacher interpretation during this period from 1870 to 1918 rather than make a vain attempt to present even the chief interpretations of Schleiermacher.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

[3] *Ibid.* Italics mine.

[4] Martin Kähler, *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik im 19. Jahrhundert*, Band XVI von *Theologische Bucherei*, heraus. Ernst Kähler (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1962), pp. 121-124.

[5] Karl Barth, *Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to* Ritschl, trans. Brian Cozens (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 306-307.

[6] As noted above, p. 2, 1870 was selected because of the publication of Wilhelm Dilthey's *Leben Schleiermachers*. This date is approximate, however, in both directions. In

The most striking feature of the literature during this period is its interest in the concept of religion with full acknowledgment of the pioneering work of Schleiermacher. Ritschl, for example, proposed to begin with "the correct and complete idea of the _Christian_ _religion_" which could be ascertained "only by calling the general history of religion to our aid."[1] The aim of the age was to "demonstrate

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1869, for example, Richard A. Lipsius, "Studien über Schleiermachers Dialektik," _Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie_, XII (1869), 4-5, issued a call to his readers to make Schleiermacher not merely a point of departure, but a contemporary by engaging him in theological and philosophical dialogue. And in the other direction, Albrecht Ritschl, _Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion_, p. 19, rejoiced, in 1874, that Luthardt's compendium had relieved theological students of the "unreasonable demand" of reading Schleiermacher's _Glaubenslehre_. Luthardt's compendium is, in fact, very indicative of the first period of Schleiermacher study when theologians tended to think they had understood, summarized, and finished with Schleiermacher. See, Christof Ernst Luthardt, _Kompendium Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre_ (Leipzig: Dörffling und Franke, 1865).

[1] Albrecht Ritschl, _The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation_, p. 8.

religion as a necessary and universal experience, inseparable from the nature of man"[1] so that it could be analyzed and valid conclusions concerning it could be attained "no matter what position the individual who examines it may take up in regard to it, or whether in his own life he values it or not."[2] Schleiermacher's concept of religion as an essential and inescapable part of humanity was analyzed both broadly[3] and narrowly.[4] Johnson's statement "that Nygren's philosophy of religion is dependent completely upon Schleiermacher's and that without Schleiermacher the search for the

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[1] Original statement from Anders Nygren's *Religiöst Apriori*, 1921. Quoted in William Alexander Johnson, *On Religion: A Study of Theological Method in Schleiermacher and Nygren* (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1964), p. x. Even though much of Nygren's work comes after 1918, he is an excellent example of the interest of the age between 1870 and 1918.

[2] Adolf Harnack, *What Is Christianity?*, trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 8.

[3] Eugen Huber, *Die Entwicklung des Religionsbegriffs bei Schleiermacher* (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1901). Huber's very first quotation from Schleiermacher is erroneous. What he lists as a letter from the nineteen year old Schleiermacher contained in Briefe I, p. 70 is actually a letter from the eighteen year old Schleiermacher contained in *Briefe* I, p. 66. But this lapse in scholarship does not really affect Huber's program which is the attempt to document Schleiermacher's development from his student days in 1787 until his death in 1834. *Briefe* is the standard abbreviation for: Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, *Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen*, Bd. I-IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1860-1863).

[4] Emil Fuchs, *Schleiermachers Religionsbegriff und religiose Stellung zur Zeit der ersten Ausgabe der Reden (1799-1806)* (Giessen: J. Richer'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1901).

'religious a priori' itself would not have been undertaken"[1] would be reasonably accurate if applied to the entire age. One must be careful, however, not to interpret these remarks in too narrow a sense for these men generally shared another conviction with Schleiermacher. Since religion is an integral and indispensable part of life, to speak of religion means, therefore, to speak of the whole of life. Thus, Schleiermacher became for these "cultural protestants" not only "the church father of the nineteenth century,"[2] but one of the great fathers of modern education, politics, aesthetics, and ethics as well. In this comprehensive sense, Schleiermacher's concept of religion was one of the foundations of the age.

But the statement that the theologians of this period were indebted to Schleiermacher's theory of religion in the broadest sense possible does not mean that their dependence was, therefore, uncritical. Indeed, a second significant feature of this period from 1870 to 1918 was the tendency to blame Schleiermacher for much of whatever the particular theologian involved despised in the theological development of the past century. Schleiermacher's work was significant, thought Ritschl, but it certainly was not epochal.[3] Moreover, it was so confusing and dangerous, remarked Ritschl at another place, that it is best not to have beginning students study it too closely.[1] In one form or another, the accusation of the men of this period is that Schleiermacher tried to bring together two incompatible entities, e.g., Kantian philosophy and Christian faith[2] or science and faith.[3] The problem, of course, was not so much that Schleiermacher had tried to combine such entities, but that he had failed to keep them in perfect balance, that he had sold out to one of the parties.[4] The program of restoring the correct and necessary balance and, thereby, overcoming the harmful effects of Schleiermacher's failure became the goal of the men of this period.[5]

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[1] Johnson, op. cit., p. x.

[2] Christian Lülmann, Schleiermacher: der Kirchenvater des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1907).

[3] Albrecht Ritschl, A Critical History, p. 493.

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[1] Albrecht Ritschl, Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion, p. 20.

[2] Adolf Schlatter, Die philosophische Arbeit seit Descartes: Ihr ethischer und religiöser Ertrag, heraus. Theodor Schlatter (4. Aufl.; Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1959), p. 186. "Schleiermacher proclaimed Kantian Christianity or Christian Kantianism."

[3] Kähler, op. cit., pp. 86-87. Kähler states that the much misused term "mediation theology" may be applied to Schleiermacher and his heritage and then explains this theology as the attempt to mediate "between historical Christianity and the spiritual culture developed up to that point, viz., in its artistic-scientific form but also as philosophy."

[4] Ibid., p. 89. Schleiermacher placed too much emphasis on the speculative, i.e., cultural, side of the task.

[5] This paragraph and the preceding one must be seen in contrast in order to appreciate the men of this age. They agreed with Schleiermacher's hope, expressed in the second letter to Lücke (S.W., I:2, p. 614), that Christianity

To a considerable extent, these men believed they did carry out their program. Most noteworthy in this respect is Albrecht Ritschl. According to some,[1] it was the positive contribution of Albrecht Ritschl to have overcome Schleiermacher by restoring the proper balance between, in this case, redemption through Christ and the ethically-oriented Kingdom of God.[2] According to Kattenbusch, Ritschl's importance consists in the fact that "more perfectly and happily than any other he has really broken with Schleiermacher's method."[3] While I cannot examine this rather broad claim in detailed

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would not become the property of barbarians and science the property of unbelievers and with many of Schleiermacher's basic presuppositions, e.g., the theory of religion, but they simultaneously and not altogether logically rejected most of Schleiermacher's specific conclusions. (In those cases where critical editions of Schleiermacher's chief works exist and where there is no convenient way to refer to all editions simultaneously, e.g., by paragraph and subdivision, reference will be made to both S.W. and to the critical edition. The above reference to S.W., I:2, p. 614, is also contained in: Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Schleiermachers Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lücke, heraus. Hermann Mulert (Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1908), p. 37. Hereafter the latter work will be referred to as: Sendschreiben.)

[1] E.g., Albert Temple Swing, The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901), pp. 54, 58-59; and Ernest A. Edghill, Faith and Fact: A Study of Ritschlianism (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1910), p. 53.

[2] Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, pp. 9-11. Here Ritschl suggests the image of the ellipse to describe the relationship of these two focii of theology, an image which is used in one of the better interpretations of Ritschl's theology, viz., Gösta Hök, Die Elliptische Theologie Albrecht Ritschls (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1942).

[3] Ferdinand Kattenbusch, Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl (2. Aufl.; Giessen: J. Richer, 1893), p. 70.

fashion within the scope of this work, I must make some brief comments upon it because the third period of Schleiermacher interpretation becomes rather incomprehensible if one proceeds on the assumption that Kattenbusch's judgment about Ritschl is correct. The chief complaint that Ritschl makes against Schleiermacher is that the latter fails to carry through with consistency the teleological, i.e., ethical, aspect of the faith.[1] That this is not completely accurate in relation to Schleiermacher will be maintained at a later point.[2] But just as the wide difference which Ritschl suggests between Schleiermacher and himself cannot be maintained, so it cannot be maintained, as others suggest, that Ritschl is more objective than the subjective Schleiermacher[3] or that Ritschl deals with "the realities of revelation" while Schleiermacher does not,[4] for Ritschl himself admits that at this very point he is indebted to Schleiermacher.[1] Dogmatics, according to Ritschl, if it is to be truly dogmatics, must speak not only of the objective act of God, but also of the subjective appropriation of man, a program which, says Ritschl, "has been already adopted by Schleiermacher."[2] Nor can any real difference be found in the area of epistemology.[3] The claim that Ritschl and his successors had managed to break with Schleiermacher is based, therefore, partly on a mistaken view of Schleiermacher and partly on insufficient critical attention to the texts.[4]

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[1] Ritschl makes this charge many times. The charge is repeated at various places in The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, but the most extended exposition of it is in A Critical History, pp. 452-493.

[2] At this point my statement must stand without the documentation which will be provided later. For a parallel conclusion by another author, however, see, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I: The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part 2, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), p. 786. There he declares that Ritschl was merely developing Schleiermacher's presuppositions when he made ethics a focal concern of his theology.

[3] Edghill, op. cit., p. 53.

[4] Swing, op. cit., p. 55.

Despite the fact that I have expressed the gravest doubts about the success of Ritschl's break with Schleiermacher, the claim of the Ritschlians that this break had been made is indicative of the change in attitude which was to come. By the time the Versailles Treaty had been signed the theological wind was changing direction and the evaluation of Schleiermacher's theology was changing with it. The year 1919 is sometimes given as the start of the dialectical theology which followed the war.[1] This date is selected not only because the war had ended, but because of the publication of several works which were to become highly significant.[2] The length of reign of this new dialectical theology is largely a matter of definition, i.e., it depends upon how broadly one defines "dialectical theology." Since there is no commonly accepted termination point I have selected 1940, i.e., World War II, as the close of this period of theology. It may well be that "dialectical theology" began to ebb some years earlier or that it continued for some time, but for the purposes of this dissertation 1940 marks something of a turning point in the attitude which theologians took towards Schleiermacher. It is this, in the final analysis, that concerns me rather than the history of twentieth century theology. This will become clearer as I proceed.

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[1] Albrecht Ritschl, Theologie und Metaphysik, p. 54. It is from Schleiermacher, says Ritschl, that he learned to exhibit the religious relations "in the frame of the subjective life."

[2] Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, p. 34.

[3] This possibility was suggested by Otto Ritschl, Albrecht Ritschls Leben, Band II: 1864-1889 (Freiburg und Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1896), p. 410, but was effectively laid to rest by one of Ritschl's friendly interpreters, Alfred E. Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1899), p. 53.

[4] Nevertheless, the same sweeping statement is still being affirmed, e.g., Daniel L. Deegan, "Albrecht Ritschl On The Historical Jesus," Scottish Journal of Theology, XV, No. 2 (June, 1962), 133-150, and "The Ritschlian School, The Essence of Christianity and Karl Barth," Scottish Journal of Theology, XVI, No. 4 (December, 1963), 390-414.

While the general tone of Schleiermacher interpretation was different in the period from 1919 to 1940 than it was in the period from 1870 to 1918, some features are common to both periods. For example, while the over-all attitude towards Schleiermacher became more negative, this did not mean a termination of scholarly, even lengthy, studies of Schleiermacher's theology. Beside the work of men such as Bauer, Braun, Mulert, Scholz, Stephan, Süskind, Wehrung, Wendland, and the others who were mentioned in the discussion of the period from 1870 to 1918, there was now added the work of men such as Bartelheimer, K. Barth, E. Brunner, R. Brunner, Jursch, Piper, W. Schultz, and Schütz in the period from 1919 to 1940 as well as the further work of Mulert, Stephan, and Wehrung.[1] But while comment on Schleiermacher did continue, its tone shifted from one of considerable appreciation and emulation to one of considerable disapproval. Barth's comments are, perhaps, best known among English-speaking theologians and they are illustrative of the negative comments which were made.[2] Schleiermacher "forced Christianity, solely for the sake of culture, into a position where the whole was already surrendered."[1] He is one of the "purest and most unambiguous manifestations"[2] of that theology which imagines the Word of God to be a human possibility. It is only Schleiermacher's "good will"[3] which prevents the threatened dissolution of the Word from actually taking place in his theology.

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[1] E.g., John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p. 318.

[2] Especially, Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief (Bern: G. A. Bäschlin, 1919); and Emil Brunner, Denken und Erleben, in Vorträge an der Aarauer Studentenkonferenz 1919 (Basel: Kober C. F. Spittlers, 1919).

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[1] Here and throughout the remainder of this dissertation, wherever authors are merely being listed, the relevant works are not given in the footnotes. Instead, the reader shall refer to the bibliography at the conclusion of the dissertation for the relevant works of each man. In coming upon a list such as this one it is important to remember that I have included only some of the interpreters of Schleiermacher who were active during these various periods. The additional articles, speeches, and obiter dicta, especially since 1870, are legion.

[2] Like any generalizations, this statement has its exceptions, e.g., Piper.

This is not quite the whole story, however, for while most German comments on Schleiermacher's theology were rather negative in flavor, English-speaking theologians were just beginning to awaken to it. During this period English translations were first offered of the Monologen and of the Glaubenslehre.[4] In addition, lectures and articles by several English speaking writers started to appear.[5] But for some reason, perhaps because the works of the dialectical theologians were being read almost simultaneously, the English language commentary on Schleiermacher's theology remained in the exploratory stage during this period, becoming neither violently critical nor uncritically admiring. It was not until after World War II that German and English opinions of Schleiermacher's theology began to parallel one another.

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[1] Karl Barth, Theology and Church, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 198.

[2] Ibid., p. 202.

[3] Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 352. These few sentences would be wholly inadequate and even misleading if they were intended as a full representation of the dialectical theologians' criticism of Schleiermacher or even as a statement of Barth's reaction to Schleiermacher. Barth was much more dialectical in his response to Schleiermacher than these few quotations would indicate. Since the bulk of the second chapter is an exposition of Emil Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher, however, I have decided to let the matter rest here.

[4] In 1926 and 1928 respectively. See bibliography.

[5] Among the more significant names to be mentioned here are J. A. Chapman, H. L. Friess, and H. R. Mackintosh.

I must break into the history of Schleiermacher interpretation at this point in order to say why I have selected Emil Brunner as a representative of the dialectical theologians who were rather critical of Schleiermacher. He was not selected because he represents some kind of a least common denominator among the dialectical theologians' criticism of Schleiermacher. The dialectical theologians were much too varied a group ever to be defined on such a basis. For this very reason, however, some selection was necessary in order to prevent this study from becoming a life's work instead of a dissertation.

In terms of the sheer time and space involved, Emil Brunner is by far the most active of the dialectical theologians in criticizing Schleiermacher. The two editions of Die Mystik und das Wort deal almost exclusively with Schleiermacher. Major portions of Das Symbolische in der religiösen Erkenntnis and Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube are also devoted to Schleiermacher. In addition, there are numerous references to Schleiermacher in most of Brunner's other writings. Only Karl Barth, among the other dialectical theologians, wrote any significant amount of material on Schleiermacher.[1] But while Barth's critique of Schleiermacher is no less significant or incisive than that of Brunner, it could not be presented with the same degree of systematic development or documentation simply because Barth never devoted the necessary time and space to this task. Among the dialectical theologians other than Brunner and Barth, consideration of Schleiermacher is even more limited. The other reasons for selecting Brunner as the representative of this group are not as superficial, but, for that reason, may be more significant. First, Brunner indicates the central importance of his studies of Schleiermacher for the development of his own theology.[2] By selecting Brunner, therefore, I am selecting the one theologian who himself wishes to ascribe as high a degree of importance to his study of Schleiermacher as, in fact, this dissertation does ascribe. In all probability, it is the fact that Brunner did consider his critique of Schleiermacher to be so significant that led him to give the time and effort to the task which enabled him to produce such an extended and well-developed critique of Schleiermacher. A second reason for selecting Brunner is the consistent nature of Brunner's critique. From his very first writing where he proposes to do battle with "the preponderately psychologically oriented Schleiermacher"[1] to the latest works, Brunner has offered substantially the same critique of Schleiermacher.[2] The fact that Brunner has been consistent in the substance of his critique enabled him to offer increasing systematic support for his position over the years. The third reason for selecting Brunner is the conviction of some of his contemporaries that he was the most philosophically mature of the dialectical critics of Schleiermacher and, therefore, the most formidable of the critics.[3] These people felt that if Schleiermacher and his successors were to be defended properly, they had to be defended against Brunner. In the final analysis, this conviction of Brunner's contemporaries may be due to nothing more than the sheer volume of Brunner's fuller systematic development. I do not think this is the case, but in any event, the point is that they did respond to Brunner's critique more than to the critiques of others. These, then, are the reasons for selecting Brunner as a representative of the dialectical critics of Schleiermacher.

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[1] The primary source material for Barth's reaction to Schleiermacher has already been mentioned, viz., Protestant Thought, Theology and Church, and the various volumes Church Dogmatics.

[2] In the autobiographical section of Charles W. Kegley, ed., The Library of Living Theology, Vol. III: The Theology of Emil Brunner (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 9, Brunner states that his "critical assessment of Schleiermacher. . .proved to be an effective weapon for the new theology in the sharpening conflict with liberalism." Indeed, that the scope and strength of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher would ultimately force Brunner to develop his own theology vis-a-vis Schleiermacher was forecast in 1924 by Karl Barth, "Brunners Schleiermacherbuch," Zwischen den Zeiten, Heft VIII (1924), 58.

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[1] Emil Brunner, Das Symbolische in der religiösen Erkenntnis: Beiträge zu einer Theorie des religiösen Erkennens (Tübingen: H. Laupp, jr., 1914), p. 4.

[2] This statement is, of course, so sweeping that only an equally sweeping documentation could support it. This documentation will be provided by Chapters II and III which will show what Brunner's position has been and how it was maintained through his theological development.

[3] Hermann Faber, "Kritische Berichte: Religionswissen schaftliche Literature, 2. Teil," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N. F. V (1924), 232, observes that Brunner is "the most significant philosophical and systematic leader" of that new Swiss theology which grows out of the circle of Ragaz, Barth, and Gogarten. Over the next few years several of the proponents of Schleiermacher vis-a-vis the new dialectical theologians continued to devote parts of

Returning to a consideration of the history of interpretation of Schleiermacher's theology, it soon becomes apparent that the period after World War II is characterized by an even greater interest in Schleiermacher than was true of the inter-bellum period. Evidence of this renewed interest which has been active since the end of the war may be seen, for example, in the increased publication of Schleiermacher's own works. Even while the war was on, in 1942, there appeared a new edition of the Dialektik.[1] Since the war there have been new editions of the Hermeneutik (1959) and of the Glaubenslehre (1960) as well at least one reprint of

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their articles to analysis of and comment upon Brunner's philosophical basis, thereby implying considerable agreement with Faber. A good summary of these considerations appeared, finally, in Johanna Konrad, "Zum Problem der philosophischen Grundlegung bei Emil Brunner," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N. F. XII (1931), 192-216.

[1] All editions of Schleiermacher's writings are listed under Schleiermacher in the bibliography rather than under the respective editors.

an older critical edition, viz., Scholz's 1910 edition of the Kurze Darstellung. Publication of studies of Schleiermacher have also appeared with increasing frequency beginning in English with that of Richard Brandt and in German with several dissertations done during the war. Dissertations have, in fact, accounted for a large part of the post-war literature on Schleiermacher. At least twenty-five doctoral dissertations on Schleiermacher have been published since 1940 with two-thirds of them coming since 1953. In sheer volume, of course, these studies plus all of the other books and articles which have been published since 1940 do not begin to match the productivity during the period from 1870 to 1918 or even that during the period from 1919 to 1940, but the very existence of this work indicates the continuing and, possibly, growing interest in Schleiermacher.

A closer look at this material discloses that the nature of the current interest in Schleiermacher is different than that shown during the two preceding periods. It differs from the 1919-1940 period in that it is more favorable, on balance, toward Schleiermacher than was the comment during that period. It must be admitted that this conclusion is not shared by all. R. R. Niebuhr, for example, thinks that "many men today deeply deplore the motives, the methods and the results" of Schleiermacher's "revolutionary activities," adding that "honesty to the reader constrains me to state

. . .that I am not one of these men."[1] It may be that the second half of Niebuhr's remark is the more accurate for there are also "many men" who do not "deeply deplore" Schleiermacher's motives, methods, and results. Seifert, for example, thinks that "Schleiermacher is a theological teacher not only of the past, but, above all, of the future."[2] Birkner speaks of Schleiermacher's ethical thought as a favorable signpost for the present.[3] And from Horst Stephan[4] to Beckmann[5] and beyond[6] there have been those who have contended that Schleiermacher can be understood only as a Christocentric theologian, meaning by that that Schleiermacher's theology is judged favorably. It would seem, therefore, that Niebuhr is stretching the evidence rather hard when he asserts that "something very nearly approaching a

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[1] Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher On Christ and Religion: A New Introduction (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 6.

[2] Paul Seifert, Die Theologie des jungen Schleiermacher (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1960), p. 201.

[3] Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers Christliche Sittenlehre im Zusammenhang seines philosophisch-theologischen Systems (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1964), p. 147.

[4] Horst Stephan, Die Lehre Schleiermachers von der Erlösung (Tübingen und Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1901).

[5] Klaus-Martin Beckmann, Der Begriff der Häresie bei Schleiermacher (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959). Beckmann contends that Schleiermacher's concept of heresy can be understood only when seen between the twin focii of his Christology and his soteriology.

[6] E.g., Tice, op. cit.

Barthian captivity of the history of modern Christian thought" is responsible for "the evident preconceptions with which the nineteenth century and Schleiermacher are interpreted,"[1] i.e., the preconceptions of those who, to some extent, agree with the dialectical theologians' judgment of Schleiermacher and who, to that extent, differ from Niebuhr. It seems to me that much, though not all, of the recent literature has not been mere repetition of "misunderstanding and misinterpretation" inspired by Barth.[2] I should claim that the general tone of the post-World War II literature has, in fact, been favorable to Schleiermacher, though not in uncritical fashion.

The contemporary interest in Schleiermacher differs from that shown during the previous period in still another respect. Not only is the general tone of contemporary literature more favorable to Schleiermacher, but the focal point of this interest differs from the focal point of previous interest in Schleiermacher. It is here, in fact, that the contemporary interest in Schleiermacher can be seen to be different not only from the interest shown in the period from 1919 to 1940, but also from the interest shown in the period from 1870 to 1918. Stated briefly, the focal point of the interest in Schleiermacher has shifted from an interest in Schleiermacher's theory of religion to an interest in much more specialized Schleiermacherian themes, e.g., interest in Schleiermacher's view of the church (Samson) and of heresy (Beckmann), in his anthropology (Jonges), ethics (Jørgensen, Kimme), dialectics (Pohl), hermeneutics (Kimmerle), pedagogics (Schulze), and politics (Nagel). Even those works which concentrate on methodology rather than on some particular view or doctrine (e.g., Flückiger, Tice) tend to minimize the remarks on Schleiermacher's theory or concept of religion.

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[1] R. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 11. A rather unattractive alternative to this conclusion is the assumption that Niebuhr is unfamiliar with much of the recent Schleiermacher literature.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

One more feature of the contemporary interest in Schleiermacher needs to be added, however, before this increased specialization can be fully appreciated. There is a disturbing tendency in some of the more recent works to bypass Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher either by ignoring it (Birkner) or by accepting or rejecting it without demonstrating either the reasons for or the consequences of that acceptance or rejection (Beckmann, Jørgensen, Niebuhr). Jørgensen, for example, spends two pages in presenting Brunner's complaint that Schleiermacher's Christology must be viewed under the category of natural causality in order to be understood[1] and then eases over it by agreeing that Schleiermacher is inconsistent while maintaining that this fails to get at Schleiermacher's real intention which is quite clear.[1] Thus, while seeming to accept Brunner's critique, he has, in fact, completely vitiated it by not recognizing its scope. Beckmann dismisses this same point of Brunner with a quick reference to Bartelheimer,[2] a procedure which will be seen to be most unsatisfactory when Bartelheimer is considered at a later point. Niebuhr presumes to take care of Brunner's critique largely by deploring the harmful effect which it has had on investigation of Schleiermacher, imagining, I assume, that Brunner's critique can be answered by wishing it had never occurred.[3] While there have been recent works which have attempted an assessment of the validity of Karl Barth's critique of Schleiermacher (e.g., Mehl, Tice), there has been no thorough consideration of Brunner's critique. On the contrary, it has been consistently ignored.

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[1] Poul H. Jørgensen, Die Ethik Schleiermachers (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959), pp. 173-175.

That this situation poses a rather significant problem for the contemporary theologian becomes apparent when one considers the nature of the contemporary interest in Schleiermacher in the light of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher. Stated briefly, Brunner contended that Schleiermacher must be understood and considered as a whole if he is to be understood at all. This is necessary because there is an underlying unity which runs through all of Schleiermacher's work and which conditions every part of his thought. This system, with all parts mutually conditioning all other parts, is so strong that no one part of Schleiermacher's thought can be used apart from its logical concomitants which are, in fact, all other parts of the thought system. Further, when this thought system is considered as a whole it is recognized to be unsuitable for Christian theology.[1] Brunner's claim, it seems to me, is so far reaching that no responsible systematic or historical theologian dare ignore it. Taking only the most obvious implication, if Brunner is correct in saying that Schleiermacher's thought must be taken in context, i.e., must be taken within the context of his whole system, then the currect tendency to value Schleiermacher for some particular part of his thought while ignoring the remainder or even admitting its unsuitability for theology must be called into question. If theology must be responsible, in the sense explained at the beginning of this chapter, and if my analysis of recent Schleiermacher literature is correct, then it is necessary to bring Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher and the contemporary use of Schleiermacher into conversation. While relating Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher to the contemporary use of Schleiermacher, however, I shall also be alert for whatever help might emerge for understanding both Brunner and Schleiermacher. These, in short, are the goals of this dissertation.

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[1] Ibid., p. 176.

[2] Beckmann, op. cit., p. 47.

[3] R. R. Niebuhr, op. cit.

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[1] It will be shown later that this is, in fact, merely the negative side of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher. When viewed as a whole, the critique will be seen to be truly dialectical. But it is the negative side of the critique which gives rise to the present problem.

In order that the reader might better understand the means by which I propose to attain these goals, I shall indicate the several steps which I think are necessary. It is necessary to begin, I feel, by restudying Brunner's critique so that we are again able to understand and to appreciate its nature and its scope. This will be done with an eye to determining both the availability of Schleiermacher's thought for theologians subsequent to Brunner and the role of this critique as an element in the development of Brunner's own theology. Having reexamined and understood anew the claims which Brunner made and the position which he adopted, an effort will be made to determine the effects of this critique, i.e., to determine the effect of this critique in relation to Schleiermacher by attempting to assess the accuracy of Brunner's understanding of Schleiermacher and in relation to Brunner by viewing the critique as an element in the development of Brunner's own theology. When the accuracy of Brunner's critique in relation to Schleiermacher has been determined, some estimation of the relevance of this critique to the contemporary theological situation will have to be made. Finally, the legitimacy of the contemporary use of Schleiermacher will be evaluated in relation to this critique and its relevancy to this contemporary use of Schleiermacher.

If Brunner's critique can be demonstrated to be false, inconclusive or irrelevant to the contemporary situation, then the current use of Schleiermacher is justified as far as Brunner's critique is concerned. If, on the other hand, Brunner's critique can be demonstrated to be accurate and relevant, then current use of Schleiermacher must take account of the limits set by Brunner's critique.

The first task, then, is a reexamination of Brunner's critique for the purpose of ascertaining what Brunner said and the nature and scope of what he said. This is the task of the next chapter.

Chapter II

It is necessary, before proceeding to a direct consideration of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher's theology, to be firmly aware of the exact nature or intent of Brunner's critique. Ever since Horst Stephan first responded to Brunner,[1] there have been those who have misinterpreted or misunderstood Brunner's critique because they failed to acknowledge its scope. To prevent a similar misunderstanding by the reader, I shall make some introductory remarks which, for the most part, will have their actual confirmation only in the succeeding exposition of Brunner's critique.[2]

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[1] Horst Stephan, "Der neue Kampf um Schleiermacher," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N.F. VI (1925), 159-215. Stephan's misunderstanding, which is reproduced to some extent by R. R. Niebuhr, is that he refuses to treat Brunner's critique as a non-biographical one. Stephan, for example, asserts that Brunner has missed the motivations or intentions of Schleiermacher's work (183) and that Brunner never faces up to the question of how it was that the Reden was able to produce "new life" in such men as Claus Harms and Neander (185).

[2] Much of the content and outline of this chapter is based on Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort: Der Gegensatz zwischen moderner Religionsauffassung und christlichen Glauben dargestellt an der Theologie Schleiermachers (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924; 2. Aufl., 1928). This particular work has become the focal point of this chapter because it is the place where Brunner collected and organized his various criticisms of Schleiermacher. Since there are two editions of this book, some explanation is necessary to defend my heavy reliance on the second edition. Reliance on the second edition is permissible since the changes which occur between the first and second editions are not substantive and is actually preferable because of the greater degree of explicit-

It is Brunner's contention that there is one underlying position, usually termed "mystical-identity-philosophy," to which Schleiermacher holds through all of his work and writing. Despite the various noticeable changes which do occur, e.g., the gradual dropping of the term "Anschauung" after the first edition of the Reden, this underlying position can be identified in all of Schleiermacher's work and is, in fact, basic to all of that work. Thus, Brunner's critique is a comprehensive critique in the sense that all of Schleiermacher's work is included, if only by implication.

But while Brunner implies that all of Schleiermacher's work is included within the scope of his critique, he does not, in fact, deal with all of Schleiermacher's work. Some sort of selectivity might be expected not only for reasons of expediency, but also because not all of the writings of

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ness, at points, in the second edition. For example, a footnote on p. 17 of the first edition which proclaims Brunner's lack of interest in the "psychological" problem of what Schleiermacher "really wished at the deepest level" becomes, in the second edition, a short excursus, pp. 361-366. In fact, of the first thirteen chapters, i.e., everything except the conclusion, only chapter eight has extensive changes and these are merely clarifying verbal changes. The final part, i.e., chapters fourteen and fifteen, is reorganized and rewritten, but the second edition differs from the first only to the extent that a different section of each chapter, present in both editions, is made the focal point of organization. Horst Stephan, "Notizen," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N.F. X (1929), 238, also states that the basic content of the first edition of Die Mystik und das Wort remains unchanged in the second edition. Therefore, unless I actually specify the first edition of Die Mystik und das Wort, it may be assumed that I am quoting from or refering to the second edition and that the same statement or position occurs in the first edition.

any man will be equally explicit about their foundation or underlying assumptions. Brunner's selectivity, however, is done for systematic reasons rather than for reasons of expediency. It is Brunner's intention to be "expressly systematic,"[1] i.e., to deal with a position which is presented in or assumed by the _formal_ scientific writings of Schleiermacher and which, because it is present in the formal writings where Schleiermacher made the effort to state what he meant in precise terms, can be considered "without reference to its personal bearer."[2] This is a critique, therefore, of a theological position which, Brunner assumes, can be considered without reference to its author.[3] "Doctrine, exactly as announced," says Brunner, "is a power in itself without the person standing behind it. Once it is spoken it is _juris publici_."[4]

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[1] _Die Mystik_, p. 361.

[2] _Ibid_.

[3] While this must be admitted to be one possible methodology, it may be questioned, as I shall do in Chapter IV, whether this is actually the best methodology in relation to Schleiermacher. Regardless of my personal reservations, however, I am convinced that this point cannot be emphasized too strongly as a first step in understanding Brunner's critique. Moreover, despite the fact that I shall frequently save time and space by speaking of "Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher," this is always meant in the sense of "Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher's _theology_" rather than in the sense of "Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher the man."

[4] Emil Brunner, "Geschichte oder Offenbarung?: Ein Wort der Entegegnung an Horst Stephan," _Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche_, N.F. VI (1925), 267.

In no sense whatsoever, therefore, is this to be understood as a critique of the person of Schleiermacher. On the one hand, there is no attempt to chart or to account for the various changes which did occur in Schleiermacher's statements over the years other than to show that such changes do not affect Schleiermacher's basic position or Brunner's critique.[1] This is not, therefore, a biographical investigation or critique. Says Brunner, "We do not intend to present a new or even the conclusive view of the biographical-historical problem of Schleiermacher."[2] Later he remarks:

> One can engage in the strongest fight against the teachings of Schleiermacher and identify his heritage as an unfortunate one, and yet bow down with respect before the uniform power of his personality, the realm of his spirit and the unblemished purity of his intention. It is not this Schleiermacher whom we battle, but the one who is present in his work.[3]

Just as there is no intention to be biographical, there is, on the other hand, a deliberate effort to avoid the non-scientific writings, i.e., the letters, sermons, and conversations, of Schleiermacher. This is done partly because Brunner has no desire to be biographical, partly because he has no desire to hold Schleiermacher accountable for remarks which might not have been thoroughly considered,[4] and partly because of the freedom of expression which Schleiermacher's own position allowed him.[1] That is to say, Schleiermacher, by his own admission, says Brunner, uses words as symbols in his theology not because all expressions are inadequate as expressions of the divine, but because all symbols are equally indifferent. Since all expressions of the divine are "empty mythology,"[2] it makes no difference whether the unity of the will of God with existing reality is identified as "fate, nature, providence, or divinity."[3] Moreover,

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[1] This will be done, e.g., in reference to the gradual dropping of the term "Anschauung."

[2] _Die Mystik_, pp. 6-7.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 10.

[4] _Ibid_., pp. 361-362.

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 362-364.

[2] Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, *Ueber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (1. Aufl.; Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1799), p. 56. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Reden*. The edition will be indicated with a superscript number in the following fashion: *Reden*^{1} = 1. Aufl., 1799; *Reden*^{2} = 2. Aufl., 1806; *Reden*^{3} = 3. Aufl., 1821. Page numbers following these references refer to these original editions. In addition, references to *Reden*^{1} and *Reden*^{3} will be followed by a second and duplicate reference. In the case of *Reden*^{1}, the reference will be to the reproduction of the text of *Reden*^{1} as it appears in G. Ch. Bernhard Pünjer, heraus., *Friedrich Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion*, Kritische Ausgabe (*Braunschweig*: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1879). Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Pünjer*. Thus, this present footnote in complete form is *Reden*^{1}, p. 56; *Pünjer*, pp. 58-59. In the case of *Reden*^{3}, the further reference will be to the reproduction of the text of *Reden*^{3} as it appears in *S.W.*, I:1. Thus, a typical reference to *Reden*^{3} would appear as: *Reden*^{3}, p. 30; *S.W.*, I:1, p. 172.

[3] Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, *Dialektik*, Kritische Ausgabe herausgegeben von I. Halpern (Berlin: Mayer und Müller, 1903), p. 246. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Dialektik*, H. Two other editions of the *Dialektik* will also be employed. The one is the edition of L. Jonas in *S.W.*, III:4:2 (Berling: G. Reimer, 1839), and the other is the edition of Rudolf Odebrecht (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1942). Hereafter these works will be abbreviated as: *Dialektik*, J., and *Dialektik*, O.

Schleiermacher's own notion of evolutionary progress leads him to make the deliberate attempt to clothe new ideas in old language so that he can maintain contact with his own age and church.[1] The result is the curiosity of paragraph headings in the Glaubenslehre which say one thing while their explanations say the opposite, a curiosity illustrated best in the paragraph dealing with the second coming of Christ for judgment.[2] Now if Schleiermacher, supported by systematic reasoning, was willing to disguise the meaning of his systematic writings for practical-didactic reasnns, how much more willing, wonders Brunner, would he have been to do it in his sermons and letters which were not intended for any professional audience?[3] For these reasons, Brunner maintains his intention, "in principle,"[4] to disregard Schleiermacher's occasional writings.

This is only a critique, therefore, of the Schleiermacher

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 363.

[2] Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, 2. Aufl. ff., #160. "#" is used in connection with this and other works and indicates "paragraph." This method of reference is used whenever possible because the reference can then be traced in any edition in either the original language or in any translation. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: Glaubenslehre. The particular editions of the Glaubenslehre which I use are given in the bibliography.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 364.

[4] Ibid., p. 366.

"who is present in his work,"[1] who is "the modern theologian,. . .the tutor and guide" of nineteenth and twentieth century theology,[2] who is "a contemporary."[3] But, thinks Brunner, it is a considerable honor to Schleiermacher to treat him in this fashion, for the greatest honor that we can possibly give to a man is to admit that, a century after his death, we are still forced to treat him as a contemporary.[4] In no sense, therefore, is Brunner's "systematic" critique an effort to deny or even to evade honoring the good in Schleiermacher himself. And, as will be seen, this does not preclude the acknowledgment of valuable elements even in Schleiermacher's "systematic" thought. Upon the basis of this understanding of the scope of Brunner's critique, I shall now proceed to an exposition of that critique.

The point from which to begin an understanding of Schleiermacher is his "deep rooted faith in the pre-established harmony of all functions of life."[5] This is the idea "which holds together all of his thought construction."[6] Indeed,

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Schleiermacher himself says as much to Lücke.[1] But despite the fact that Schleiermacher repeatedly makes similar assertions in other places and that he wishes to give both religion and philosophy their independent rights, Brunner concludes that Schleiermacher has failed. This conclusion is stated as a thesis which Brunner devotes himself to defending wherever he discusses Schleiermacher. "The program of Schleiermacher. . .viz., the union of immanence-philosophy or mysticism and the Christian faith, amounts to a colossal self-deception since it sees at the basis of the Christian faith a total conception of life which stands in sharpest contradiction to this faith."[2] Schleiermacher's position stands in contradiction to the Christian faith to the extent that a genius is not identical with what the reformers and the disciples meant by a prophet, a religious hero with a redeemer, and human culture with the Kingdom of God. Schleiermacher's proclamation of the equality of religion and philosophy is a mere appearance since, in reality, philosophy quickly subordinates religion to itself.[1] It is the task of speculation, i.e., philosophy, not of religion, to come to an understanding of the relationship between philosophy and religion.[2] Wehrung, an earlier interpreter who agrees with Brunner, said that religion and philosophy are related to one another as are child and adult, i.e., the adult sees through the games (deception) of the child's imagination.[3] Thus, Brunner thinks there is enough doubt about the accuracy of Schleiermacher's own assessment of the formal aspect of his program to warrant an investigation of the material aspects of this program.[4] If the formal part of Schleiermacher's

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[1] S.W., I:2, pp. 648-649; Sendschreiben, pp. 64-65. "I really believe and hope always to believe. . .that both /speculation and piety/ can coexist very well in the same person, that philosophy does not necessarily lead to raising oneself above Christ (and you understand that I mean here the real historical Christ) as if all piety were mere immature philosophy and all philosophy a piety which had only now become aware of itself, but that a true philosopher can also be and remain a true believer, that one can be wholeheartedly pious and still have and retain the courage to dig to the deepest depths of speculation."

[2] Die Mystik, p. 11. Even though Brunner's thesis stands in direct opposition to Schleiermacher's proclaimed program, Brunner was not the first to come to such a conclusion. E.g., in 1911, Hermann Süskind, Christentum und Geschichte bei Schleiermacher: Die geschichtsphilosophischen Grundlagen der Schleiermacherschen Theologie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), p. 196, remarked that "just as certainly as the Glaubenslehre, from a formal-methodological point of view, is not scientific, but churchly theology, so certain is it, in regard to its material position, on the whole not churchly, but scientific theology; it is a reinterpretation in principle of the traditional biblical-christian conceptual world in line with the requirements of the modern scientific consciousness." As I shall indicate near the

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end of this chapter, Brunner did not agree, however, that the methodology was genuinely churchly.

[1] Die Mystik, p. 22.

[2] Dialektik, H., p. 239.

[3] Georg Wehrung, Die Dialektik Schleiermachers (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920), p. 273.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 26. See also, Emil Brunner, The Theology of Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. xix-xx, where Brunner says that "the meaning of the verb believe and the meaning of what is believed belong in the strictest sense together."

theology is amiss, as Brunner suspects, then the evidence should appear in Schleiermacher's material conclusions. This task, to which I now turn, occupies most of Brunner's critique.

When Schleiermacher began his work he was confronted with the problem of a petrified heritage, with the assumption that "religion" meant the objective noetic aspects of faith.[1] It is entirely natural, therefore, that, as a true son of the Enlightenment,[2] Schleiermacher should "concentrate on the subjective, functional side" of religion, that he should identify religion with piety, with religious feeling.[3] Everything that follows results from this view of religion,[4] i.e., from the view of "religion as a fact of experience in history and in the present,. . .something given, present, verifiable, and--even though with difficulty--describable."[5] What immediately follows from that position is, of course, the well-known position which is given its classic formulation in paragraph 3 of the Glaubenslehre: "piety. . .is, considered purely in itself, neither a knowing nor a doing, but a modification of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness." Even though previous interpreters have commented upon this proposition almost ad nauseam, some brief examination of it is still necessary in order to be absolutely sure of Brunner's understanding of it.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 30.

[2] Ibid., pp. 31-32. On p. 31, "To consider the christiana religio as a function of the human psyche is, first, no merit and, second, in any case no merit of Schleiermacher's. In this Schleiermacher is simply the son of the Enlightenment, of its anthropologism." On p. 32, Schleiermacher simply "presupposed and built upon" the Enlightenment's general concept of religion.

[3] Ibid., p. 30, n. 1. Brunner admits the "immense complexity of the question of what Schleiermacher meant by religious feeling," but he feels that the charge of subjectivism must stand "without deleting anything."

[4] Ibid., p. 35.

[5] Ibid., p. 34.

From the very beginning of Schleiermacher's work in the Reden and in common with all romantics, the two negative theses, viz., that religion is neither right knowledge nor right action, are presented in clearer and more forceful fashion than is the positive thesis.[1] Actually, this protest against the banality of the Enlightenment and rationalistic orthodoxy was quite correct and justified.[2] The second speech of the Reden, in all editions, is replete with assertions whose content is carried down to the second edition of the Glaubenslehre. In making these assertions, Schleiermacher did a distinct service for faith.[3] And this applies not only in relation to rationalistic philosophy, but also in relation to rationalistic orthodoxy. "Concepts of the catechism give us a knowledge of God as little as philosophical concepts."[1] But, according to Brunner, Schleiermacher makes the mistake of lumping together two distinct types of knowledge under the one category of knowledge (Wissen), thereby failing to distinguish between them. Schleiermacher takes "knowledge" to mean both "reflection about piety" and "Calvin's 'knowledge of God and of ourselves,' knowledge of sin and grace, of God's saving will."[2] The problem caused by this confusion is shown well at a crucial spot in the first letter to Lücke where Schleiermacher writes, "Do we not have every reason to thank God that he has revealed it excellently to the children of tender age?"[3] This remark leads Brunner to ask, "What is this 'it'? The context gives us no noun for this pronoun. The 'it' indicates a hole which Schleiermacher rapidly covers up."[4] What Schleiermacher has done is gradually to shift from the quite necessary and justified polemic against intellectualism to a polemic against that knowledge which is necessarily involved in faith. The result is that "in religion the content, the what, is insignificant, unessential as opposed to the how."[1] It is this same desire to avoid any hint of objectivity, thinks Brunner, which led Schleiermacher to drop the term "Anschauung" between the first and second editions of the Reden. The reason for dropping this term is that in the interim Schelling had introduced the term "intellektuelle Anschauung" as the principle of his philosophy, thereby giving the term an undeniably "cognitive character" which Schleiermacher wished to avoid.[2] The inevitable logical conclusion of Schleiermacher's line of thinking is the position that "a religion without a God can be better than one with a God"[3] and that whether or not one does, finally, have a God in connection with his religion "depends on the direction of his imagination (Phantasie)."[4]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[2] Emil Brunner, Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1927), p. 51. (E.T., p. 103.) See also, Die Mystik, p. 37, where this protest is "a task which will always and again be necessary from time to time."

[3] Emil Brunner, Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube (2. und 3. Aufl.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), pp. 12, 21-23. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: EEG.

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[1] Denken und Erleben, p. 30.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 39.

[3] S.W., I:2, p. 587. Sendschreiben, p. 16.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 39.

Just as Schleiermacher opposes intellectualism, so his "total view of life" demands his opposition to moralism even though this opposition may be more secondary and even transitory.[5] Action, or the problem of morality, lies in "a foreign realm" outside of religion.[6] Religion leads to a quiet enjoyment[1] which does not produce action.[2] Religion, based in feeling, is the only form of life which remains _totally_ within the self (_Insichbleiben_) while the two forms of consciousness, knowing and doing, go beyond the self (_Aussichheraustreten_).[3] But if Schleiermacher's religion abandons all claim to the imperative, his ethics does not fare much better. Since "the divine will reveals itself in the action of the Holy Spirit much more than in speech,"[4] "merely assertive forms of expression are to be preferred"[5] in ethics. "At a minimum, the form of command is more catholic than it is protestant."[6] This elimination of law and command from all levels of ethics as well as religion, feels Brunner, "must awaken in us the suspicion that the opposition to the law here is motivated quite differently than with Paul and the reformers for whom the moral commandment in its entire imperativistic stringency constituted the necessary presupposition for their doctrine of grace."[1] Therefore, just as Schleiermacher's "contentless religion" goes beyond the legitimate program of anti-intellectualism, so his rejection of claim or command goes beyond the original program of anti-moralism which is legitimate and necessary.[2] Having observed the radical nature of Schleiermacher's denials, I shall now examine Brunner's understanding of Schleiermacher's positive statement that religion is feeling.

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[1] Ibid., p. 40.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Reden^1, p. 126. Pünjer, p. 125.

[4] Reden^1, p. 129. Pünjer, p. 128.

[5] Die Mystik, p. 44.

[6] Reden^1, p. 68. Pünjer, p. 71.

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[1] _Reden_^{1}, p. 69. _Pünjer_, p. 72.

[2] _Reden_^{1}, p. 67. _Pünjer_, p. 69.

[3] _Glaubenslehre_, #3:3.

[4] Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, _Die christliche Sitte_, heraus. L. Jonas, in _S.W._, I:12, _Beilagen_, p. 13. Volume I:12 contains the Jonas edition of _Die christliche Sitte_ as well as the _Beilagen_ whose pages _are numbered separately_. For this reason one must be extremely careful in checking references to this volume. The _Beilagen_ includes four original manuscripts on this subject which Schleiermacher prepared in 1809, 1822, 1828, and 1831. The reference above is to the 1809 manuscript, #38:2.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 12, #38:thesis.

[6] _Ibid._, p. 13, #38:3.

Brunner's analysis of Schleiermacher's assertion that religion is feeling (Gefühl) proceeds through three levels with each of the latter levels intended to show the presuppositions involved in the former. Religion, according to the first edition of the Reden, is primarily intuition of the Universe (Anschauung des Universums).[3]

> Intuition of the universe--I beg you, familiarize yourself with this concept for it is the anchor of my entire speech; it is the most general and highest

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 45.

[2] Ibid., p. 47.

[3] The term "Anschauung" or "Anschauen" might be translated as "contemplation," "intuition," "intuitive vision," "perceptive intuition" in the sense of "Erkennung," or even as "idea" or "notion" in the sense of "Vorstellung." After some thought I have decided to follow the usual practice of translating it merely as "intuition." The other half of Schleiermacher's expression, viz., the term "das Universum," is never fully investigated by Brunner. I shall comment, in Chapter IV, on both this term and the better balance which Brunner might have achieved by investigating it further.

> formula of religion. . . .[1] Everything must begin with intuition. . . .[2] The strength of this feeling determines the level of religiosity. . . .[3]

While this short list hardly exhausts the *Reden*'s lavish supply of definitions of religion, it can hardly be denied that they are central to it. Ritschl's claim that Schleiermacher's religion is really "artistic enjoyment of the universe"[4] is quite right for any more definite definition of religion would represent "the occasions *at* which religion shows itself, not. . .the essence *in* which religion shows itself."[5]

When Horst Stephan read these assertions in the first edition of *Die Mystik und das Wort*, he immediately objected that Schleiermacher's religion was not this at all since *Anschauung* did, in fact, have an objective referend, viz., *das Universum*.[6] Now Brunner agrees that Schleiermacher's aestheticism is not Schleiermacher's most basic characteristic, but he disagrees most decidedly with the conclusion that the subjective character of Schleiermacher's religion is thereby disproved.[1] "Once it was said that 'the strength of the feeling determines the level of religiosity,' the preponderance of feeling over intuition was thereby secured."[2]

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[1] *Reden*^{1}, p. 55. *Pünjer*, p. 52.

[2] *Reden*^{1}, p. 54. *Pünjer*, p. 51.

[3] *Reden*^{1}, p. 68. *Pünjer*, p. 70.

[4] Albrecht Ritschl, *Schleiermachers Reden*, pp. 26-31.

[5] *Die Mystik*, p. 50. See also, *Ibid*., p. 51, where Brunner describes Schleiermacher's religion as "hyperaesthetic experience-impressionism," "cosmic aestheticism," amd "pan-aestheticism."

[6] Horst Stephan, "Der neue Kampf um Schleiermacher," 193-194.

Having pointed out the subjective orientation of Schleiermacher's religion, Brunner moves on to the second level of analysis. He comments:

> The truly religious [for Schleiermacher] is not aestheticism, not the enjoyment of harmony, but is becoming one with the All, hence, it is mysticism, the aspiration towards that 'incomprehensible moment. . .when a holy soul is touched by the Universe.' 'To become one with the Infinite in the midst of the finite and to be eternal in a moment--that is the immortality of religion'--in this confession already the young speaker closes his praise of religion and ascribes to it its peak. That is his proper concept of religion then already and it remained until the end of his days even though in another formulation. By no means do we wish to deny that there were ossilations, significant movements and differences. But all of them lie below the opposition which is important to us.[3]

Thus, Schleiermacher's "mysticism and pan-aestheticism. . . are twin sisters,"[4] says Brunner, pointing to the bridal-sexual passage in the Reden to prove his point.[5] At every important point--and Brunner lists seven--Schleiermacher agrees with mysticism. (1) The divine is preferably called

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 51, n. 3.

[2] Ibid., p. 52.

[3] Ibid. The subquotations are from Reden^1, p. 30, Pünjer, p. 23, and Reden^1, p. 133, Pünjer, p. 133 respectively.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 52.

[5] Reden^1, pp. 73-75. Pünjer, pp. 77-79.

"the Universe" and is left completely undetermined except to say that it is without limit, infinite, or eternal.[1] (2) The relationship of the human and the divine is kept in the indeterminacy of that region which lies between identity, on the one hand, and, on the other, a union of the two on the basis of some underlying unity.[2] (3) The only positive thing that can be said about the relationship between the human and the divine is that it is "a unification, a flowing-into-one-another, a mutual interpenetration."[3] (4) Any seemingly closer definition of the relationship is either a metaphor taken from the realm of art or is taken in normal sense-perception terms.[4] (5) There is the desire for extinction of the personal in the universal.[5] (6) Religion is tied more closely to the unconscious than to the conscious.[6] (7) "The decisive thing, however, is that the intensity of the experience is the determining criterion of the religious process since all specific content is rejected."[7]

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[1] *Die Mystik*, p. 54.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*., pp. 54-55.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 55. Brunner refers to the concluding section of the second speech, *Reden*^{1}, p. 132, *Pünjer*, p. 132.

[6] *Die Mystik*, p. 55. For a parallel statement, see, Huber, *op. cit*., p. 36.

[7] *Die Mystik*, p. 55. See also, *EEG*, pp. 16, 38, 54.

Schleiermacher's theory of religion cannot be adequately accounted for merely on the basis of his mysticism, however, and this leads Brunner on to the third level of analysis where he finds Schleiermacher's "identity-philosophy." It is the Dialektik which presents the program of this identity-philosophy.[1] The world opposites, e.g., subject-object, nature-spirit, willing-thinking, must have some unity which is the inaccessible presupposition of all particular knowing and willing, etc. It is the feeling, "the place of indifference of knowing and willing,"[2] which is both the place where these world opposites are resolved and where the Absolute is experienced. Since the feeling is the point at which the Absolute and the self come into contact, the feeling is also the "place" of religion.[3] When the feeling is recognized as the "place" of religion because it is the point of contact with the Absolute, it will be seen that Schleiermacher's mysticism and his identity-philosophy both contribute to the program of subjectivity outlined in the Reden. Brunner comments on the mutual reinforcement of the mysticism and the identity-philosophy.

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[1] Die Mystik, pp. 58-60.

[2] Ibid., p. 59.

[3] Brunner's analysis in Die Mystik, pp. 58-60, is based almost exclusively on Schleiermacher's Dialektik, H., pp. 216-218. There is one section of Dialektik, H., which is extremely crucial for both this section and the following section of this chapter and is, therefore, reproduced here. Dialektik, H., p. 218: "This resolution (Aufhebung) of the opposites could not be an item in our consciousness if we ourselves would not be and become something conditioned and determined by it. But this does not mean conditioned and determined by something which itself is conceived in opposition for to that extent the opposites are not resolved by it, but by that wherein alone thinking-willing and willing-thinking can be one in their connection with everything else, i.e., through the transcendental ground itself. Now this transcendental determination of the self-consciousness is the religious side of the self-consciousness or, put another way, of the religious feeling and in this, therefore, the transcendental ground or the highest knowledge itself

> From the beginning, philosophy and mystical experience stand in closest relationship with Schleiermacher. The identity-philosophy of the Dialektik is both the child and the father of Schleiermacher's mysticism; it can be conceived as the outworking of the program set down already in the Reden just as, conversely, the Reden can only be understood from a basic conception which is closely related to the Dialektik. The Reden shows the religion of the identity-philosopher Schleiermacher; the Dialektik shows the philosophy of the mystic Schleiermacher. Very early the religion of the Reden was conceived of as "pantheistic mysticism" and his Dialektik as "mystical pantheism." There is a dionysian philosophy just as there is a dionysian mysticism.[1]

This combination, then, is what Brunner has in mind when he speaks of Schleiermacher's "mystical-identity-philosophy." It is, in fact, nothing less than the focal point of Brunner's critique for when he attacks Schleiermacher's theology he

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is represented. It exists, therefore, insofar as in our self-consciousness the being of things is also present, like we ourselves, as working and suffering [i.e., active and passive], i.e., insofar as we identify ourselves with the being of all things and these with us, i.e., as the conditionedness of all being which is involved in the opposites, i.e., as the general feeling of dependence." Brunner, Die Mystik, p. 60, n. 2, remarks that this passage from the Dialektik is the key to the understanding of the "whence" of the feeling of absolute dependence. Moreover, he observes, he never denies the objectivity of Schleiermacher in this sense for it is an important part of mysticism to "have" God.

[1] Die Mystik, pp. 58-59.

means, thereby, to call into question this presupposition of Schleiermacher's theory of religion.

Brunner's critique falls into two categories. The first relatively short set of criticisms is made on the basis of Schleiermacher's own position, asking questions about the consistency of that position. The second set of criticisms, which is much longer and which discloses the reason why Brunner took the trouble to make such a detailed consideration of Schleiermacher, has to do with the relationship of Schleiermacher's mystical-identity-philosophy and the Christian faith as conceived by Brunner. I turn now to those criticisms which have to do with the internal consistency of Schleiermacher's position.

The quotation from Schleiermacher's Dialektik which was given above may serve as a starting point for this purpose.[1] In the first two sentences of this quotation and the sentences which immediately precede it, Schleiermacher is concerned to establish feeling (das Gefühl) as the point of indifference, i.e., the point where the world-opposites are resolved and the Absolute is experienced. But there is a logical leap between the second and third sentences of that quotation for "after the feeling as such had been identified as the point of indifference, he suddenly speaks of

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[1] See above, p. 51, footnote, for quotation from Dialektik, H., p. 218.

'a religious side of the feeling.'"[1] What is involved here is nothing less than a hidden identification of _das_ (transcendental) _Gefühl_ with _die_ (specific, individual, psychological) _Gefühle_.[2] _Das Gefühl_, as the transcendental point of indifference,. . .

> does not live, does not move, _is_ somehow above the realities of the consciousness, is not reflection and not action, not a feeling of triumph and not humility; it is the absolutely contentless and actionless consciousness of a resting deity without properties. Thus, a dogmatic could not be developed out of it. Therefore, before this could be done, motion first had to be introduced into the restfulness.[3]

To achieve the desired independence of religion vis-a-vis science and ethics, to firmly establish the subjectivity of religion and thereby complete the program of anti-intellectualism and anti-moralism, some basis more suitable than the nude _das Gefühl_ had to be found.[4] This more suitable basis was found when _das Gefühl_ was secretly identified with or perfectly reproduced in _die Gefühle_.

Thus, we have involved here not one, but two concepts of religion. The one defines religion as pure subjectivity and the other defines religion as "a mixture of subjective and objective consciousness" with the objective element being

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[1] _Die Mystik_, p. 61.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 60

[3] _Ibid_., p. 62.

[4] _Ibid_.

"that 'pantheistic' world-view of the Reden."[1] In fact, Schleiermacher employs both concepts for while the Glaubenslehre claims to define das Gefühl as pure passivity, total and complete receptiveness,[2] the objective element is brought in by means of the "borrowed propositions." Wherever the Glaubenslehre works with the feeling of absolute dependence, i.e., everywhere, it is also working with the partially objective notion of the Dialektik.[3] The one objection which might be made to Brunner's accusation that Schleiermacher actually operates with a dual concept is that the Glaubenslehre attempts to distinguish das Gefühl from the objective consciousness, which is also partially passive, by asserting that in das Gefühl passivity is complete.[4] But the pure passivity of religion, i.e., the first of the two concepts, begins to crumble as soon as Schleiermacher identifies this pure passivity as a self-consciousness along side of the consciousness of partial freedom and partial dependence.[5] But Brunner's final blow to the notion that Schleiermacher does base religion on pure passivity is still to come.

> Since freedom and dependence are relative, there is no absolute freedom. And now--what follows is the

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[1] Ibid., p. 63.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #4.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 63.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #4.

[5] Ibid., #4:3.

> decisive determination--"the self-consciousness which accompanies our entire self-activity and which negates absolute freedom is, in and of itself, a consciousness of absolute dependence."[1] At first, feeling was something entirely passive and without object; but all of a sudden it changes into a thinker and, indeed, a thinker of highly abstract thoughts. First, it is a negation in the sense of saying that this and that does not occur, therefore, a negation as it occurs in the above formula, an act of thinking. Affirmation and negation are the basic functions which constitute thinking. Second, feeling negates freedom; but freedom is not a feeling, but an idea. Even so, we permit this inconsistency to pass. Third, however,--and here our amazement reaches its peak--feeling is to negate absolute freedom. Thus, we deal not merely with a purely passive feeling, but this purely passive feeling now has a content, viz., absolute freedom does not occur. But absolute (either schlechthinin or absolut) is certainly an idea, the last abstraction of thought; then how can it be the content of a feeling and, indeed, of a purely passive feeling?[2]

Even this is not the end, of course, for that same sentence of the Glaubenslehre asserts that this self-consciousness which negates absolute freedom "is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence."[3] All of this, contends Schleiermacher, is the content of immediate feeling, not of reflection upon it. Brunner concludes that. . .

> Schleiermacher knows quite well why he freights his feeling of absolute dependence so heavily. How else could he draw the entire Glaubenslehre out of it! What we have here is a kind of story of the Trojan

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[1] The subquotation is from Glaubenslehre, #4:3. The original contains one additional phrase, but this does not change the meaning of the sentence. Schleiermacher wrote: "the self-consciousness which accompanies our entire self-activity and, since this is never zero, our whole being, and which negates freedom. . . ."

[2] Die Mystik, pp. 64-65.

[3] Glaubenslehre, #4:3. Italics mine.

> horse; under the guise of darkness which is created by the word "self-consciousness," the fully armoured knights of thought are put into the infinitely spacious--because it was constructed by the philosopher for this purpose--vacuum of feeling in order that, at the light of day, they may be brought out again as a wonderful surprise by means of reflection.[1]

The vast complex of the Glaubenslehre can only be explained, therefore, on the basis of the presence of two different concepts of religion.

But there are at least two other criticisms which must be made concerning the internal consistency of Schleiermacher's position. The one problem has to do with relative and absolute freedom and dependence and their interrelationships, a problem which was intimated in the last section. When Schleiermacher asserts the negation of the feeling of absolute freedom he goes on to identify this with the affirmation of the feeling of absolute dependence.[2] But, thinks Brunner, this does not necessarily follow for there is a third possibility, viz., the conjunction of a feeling of relative freedom and a feeling of relative dependence.[3] Thus, even if we were to grant the negation of absolute freedom, this does not mean that we are forced to admit that our entire self-activity is "from outside," but only that we never quite escape the relationship of partial freedom and partial dependence.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 65.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #4:3.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 66.

But even if we were to grant Schleiermacher's assertion that the negation of the feeling of absolute freedom is identical with the feeling of absolute dependence, there is still another problem. For, shortly after asserting this, Schleiermacher goes on to claim that not only does this feeling of _absolute_ dependence _change_, but that it develops, i.e., it moves in a direction.[1] This purely passive feeling of absolute dependence turns out to be "a direction or tendency or at least the expression of a tendency. And, to be sure, a higher tendency! It is not only productive, therefore, but also selective, direction-giving, normative."[2] This can be described only as a "_deus ex machina_" since development and direction are said to have arisen "in the point of indifference between knowing and willing, in that consciousness where all opposites and, therefore, all becoming is excluded from the beginning!"[3] It is nothing less than "the productive phantasy or imagination, the 'ego' of Fichtian speculation,"[4] the creative, striving "principle of becoming-Spirit itself."[5] It was only because expressions of feeling are equal to products of imagination[1] that Schleiermacher was able to make the shift[2] from the subjective feeling to the objective "whence" of the absolute dependence.[3] It is this active Fichtian ego that Schleiermacher has in mind when he uses expressions such as "Absolute as object," "tendency," "development," "the higher self-consciousness," "the whence of the feeling of absolute dependence."[4] We "stand with both feet on the soil of ego-speculation, of immanence-philosophy, of ontologism."[5] Brunner finally concludes his charge by noting that. . .

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[1] _Glaubenslehre_, #5:4.

[2] _Die Mystik_, p. 68.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_.

[5] _Ibid_.

> It would be rather naive, therefore, to believe that we have really learned anything when we have said that Schleiermacher understands religion as the feeling of absolute dependence. For in this seemingly simple formula we have before us the finest, most concentrated extract from the most different, most complicated, and most contradictory ideological content.[6]

A word of warning needs to be added, however, lest the force of Brunner's critique be blunted at this point. According to Brunner, one should be quite clear that the feeling of absolute dependence, as presented in the Glaubenslehre, "has nothing to do with that feeling of unconditional reverence which has so often been read into Schleiermacher's formula."[1] The feeling of reverence is one of die Gefühle; it is not das Gefühl which operates in both the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. Schleiermacher himself, in the Psychologie, describes the feeling of reverence or devotion.

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[1] Ibid., p. 70.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #4.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 69.

[4] Ibid., p. 71. Brunner indicates, Ibid., p. 72, that this activity of the self had to be partially concealed in the Glaubenslehre in order to make the vain attempt to preserve the independence of religion vis-a-vis speculation or philosophy.

[5] Ibid., p. 70.

[6] Ibid., p. 72.

> [Devotion is] a finding of oneself as subordinate to another, a simultaneous absorption into the inexhaustability of the object and being attracted by the same. It is a losing of oneself in the Infinite combined with the consciousness that here any reaction is totally. . . inadmissible.[2]

There are several ways in which this feeling of reverence differs from the feeling of absolute dependence. Here any reaction is inadmissible, i.e., inappropriate, while the feeling of absolute dependence supposedly makes reaction impossible.[3] The object of reverence is something "which stands over against us as norm and bids our recognition and claims obedience" while the total passivity of the Glaubenslehre precludes any reciprocity with the whence of the feeling of absolute dependence.[4] In short, the object of devotion in the Psychologie is an "Other" in a sense in which the whence of the Glaubenslehre can never be.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] S.W., III:6, p. 211.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 73.

[4] Ibid.

I am now in a position to draw some conclusions which shall serve as guides in the further considerations of this chapter. According to Brunner, there is no significant change in Schleiermacher's concept of religion from the first edition of the Reden to the second edition of the Glaubenslehre. The only possible change would be that "what was said earlier with lack of clarity is later repeated in a more definite, clearer manner. For that is the relationship between the Glaubenslehre and the Reden."[1] The real program of the Reden, carried to its logical conclusion, is "the union of the consciousness of God and the consciousness of self in religion, i.e., identity, mysticism."[2] The term "Anschauung" was dropped to protect the pure subjectivity of the program. In fact, the objective connotations of Anschauung were split off completely so that the final result was the wholly subjective religion of the Glaubenslehre and the objective highest knowledge of the Dialektik.[3] But the only reason that religion could calmly stand aside and permit the question of truth to be decided elsewhere is because the religion is, in fact, already a mystical religion.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 75.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 76.

[4] Ibid., p. 77. This may appear to be somewhat of a curious conclusion after the trouble to which Brunner went in order to demonstrate the fact that the feeling of absolute dependence was far from being purely passive. It must be

But the presence of certain internal problems and inconsistencies in Schleiermacher's thought is not the major reason why Brunner took the time and effort to make such a massive critique of Schleiermacher. Brunner is convinced that Schleiermacher has totally misunderstood Christian faith and that he has, in fact, presented a thought system which is diametrically opposed to this faith. It is as a theologian concerned to defend faith that Brunner attacks Schleiermacher, not as a philosopher concerned to expose logical inconsistencies. For this reason, I now turn to a consideration of the second and major group of criticisms which Brunner makes of Schleiermacher, this group being concerned with the relationship between Schleiermacher's thought and Christian faith. In one form or another, this task shall be my concern through the remainder of this chapter.

Brunner begins his comparison of Schleiermacher's thought and Christian faith by inquiring into the meaning of the Christian faith. According to him, the proper place from which to begin an understanding of Christian faith and human existence is the word.[1] "The word is the basic fact of human existence, i.e., that which makes man human."[2]

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remembered, however, that Brunner always means that mystical religion which is the reverse side of identity-philosophical speculation. Even so, in Chapter IV I shall contend that this is one example of Brunner's overstatement of his case.

[1] Ibid., pp. 88-100.

[2] Ibid., p. 88.

The closest we can come to explaining this "word" is to give an approximation, viz., meaning, sense, import (*Sinn*).[1] "What has no meaning (*Sinn*) is nonsense (*Un-Sinn*) and is, therefore, something unhuman."[2] But the analysis can be carried still another step: meaning means context. "Only that which has context is meaningful. Speech without context is senseless babbling; action without context makes us conclude immediately that there is mental disturbance."[3] Meaning "is" the context or unity in the multiplicity of brute facts surrounding us.[4] Now if meaning is this context or unity in the facts which confront us, then this meaning is not "given" in the same sense in which the facts are given. "Context 'exists' only for the creative one; better, for him whom the meaning-grasping spirit recreates it. Meaning can only be appropriated actively and freely; it cannot be 'posited' 'like things are posited in us by means of [sense] perception.'"[5]

This meaning, which comes by re-flection or re-collection, takes two forms for us: the playful form and the serious form.[1] The playful form of meaning can be illustrated by the unity which we find in a work of art, a unity which is more than the totality of brush marks, or by the unity, i.e., the cosmos, which we find in the scientific data which confronts us but which is more than the total of available data.[2] It is not the chaos of unordered data, but the meaning of it which in-lightens, i.e., enlightens. Meaning is enlightening because it discloses to us something which necessarily belongs to the subject matter. Our spirits are calmed and we find joy in finding the meaning which necessarily belongs to a meaningful subject. "Only the necessary gives joy, only the necessary is 'correct.' The spirit seeks this bond; it finds itself only in this being-bound. Finding the necessary connection or unity constitutes the essence of the intellectual and artistic genius or of aesthetic freedom."[3] But it is precisely in this act of contemplation, i.e., as a spectator, that man objectifies the spirit, makes it external to himself. "In both art and science man is 'outside of himself'; the self is forgotten in the form of intellectual as well as artistic creativity. Therefore, it is only a game, not serious."[1] "The necessity of creativity is a merely hypothetical one."[2] "If" one wishes to learn, "then" meaning must be found. But there is another realm which also deals with meaning and where the hypothetical nature of the necessity is suddenly and incomprehensibly removed. This realm is the ethical. "In the ethical realm also. . .meaning is the basic fact" because "an action attains the character of the ethically good first through the meaning, i.e., the context, in which it is willed."[3] The new element is that the hypothetical necessity of the aesthetic realm becomes a categorical necessity in the ethical realm. "In the moral realm the Absolute itself steps up to me and grasps me. Here is a personal address: Thou shalt. I am answerable."[4] "The game becomes serious. In place of the 'if you want to do it,' is the 'thou shalt now!' The urgency and the personal nature of the necessity is the mark of the ethical."[5] There are no holidays from the meaning or law which grasps me as an individual man and makes me an ethical man. "The transition from the aesthetic to the ethical is the transition of meaning from being my toy to being my master, i.e., now it is important and no longer I."[1] This meaning is objective (acting-under-meaning) as well as subjective (acting-toward-meaning). Thus, it is a paradox which is discovered and not invented that freedom exists only under this necessity. "'The truth will make you free.' Only him who 'can do no other' acts freely and humanly. The contradiction of necessity and freedom is solved only in meaning. Only there is obligation not compulsion and freedom not arbitrariness."[2]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 89.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*., pp. 89-90.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 90. The subquotation is from *Dialektik*, H., p. 218.

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[1] This does not mean the "playful" form of meaning is insignificant or unimportant, but merely that there are meanings which are not ultimate in their seriousness. This will become clearer as the paragraph is developed.

[2] _Die Mystik_, p. 90.

[3] _Ibid._, pp. 90-91.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Emil Brunner, "Das Grundproblem der Philosophie bei Kant und Kierkegaard," *Zwischen den Zeiten*, Heft VI (1924), 40.

[5] *Die Mystik*, p. 91.

While the divine and the human spirit share the ability to posit meaning,[3] we must acknowledge that the human ability is only relatively creative in comparison with the divine. In reality, the human ability is recreation rather than creation, reception rather than establishment.[4] It is precisely here that misunderstanding begins for it is here that we must decide whether, when we speak of meaning, we have in mind the logos, i.e., the Greek, idealist principle which is immanent within man and by means of which man climbs to Promethean heights, or the word, i.e., accidental, time-bound meaning which comes from outside of man and is transmitted to him and given to him. The logos, as the product of reason, is timeless and solitary. The word comes as a communication which demands the acknowledgment of limits.[1] Now the ethical realm can be described in no other way than as word, i.e., this word which simultaneously identifies and grounds us as finite spiritual beings. Indeed, "it is address, the imperative, being-spoken-to which constitutes the ethical."[2] Only address, not timeless ideas, grasps me personally and makes me a responsible person. "The conversation has begun. The ad-dress demands re-sponse."[3] But, it must be asked, is it not possible that this law which comes as address is really my law given by the intelligible self? Actually, this ambiguous possibility cannot be denied rationally. In reality, it remains until conscience limits us, i.e., until the consciousness of sin and guilt. "The dream of an autonomous humanity and ethic, an autonomous culture and immanent development to divinity"[4] comes crashing down when man stands coram Deo, when, sinful and guilty, man is confronted by a God who is over against him.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* Brunner goes so far as to identify this ability to share in the establishment of meaning as man's *imago Dei*.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

But not only does this meaning come to us "by God's initiative" "as something revealed,"[5] as the "immensely intrusive" word which reveals sin and guilt,[1] but it also comes as the solving and healing word of meaning which cancels "the meaninglessness of that which should be full of meaning."[2] This is "meaning which is unveiled"[3] as well as the damming revelation of meaninglessness. "Therefore, the word must be taken in a dual sense: it must be understood and accepted" as well as feared.[4] This word is the Word of God which is not a humanly thinkable word but which "is recognizable in, with, and under the human word."[5] Therefore, "promise, Word, and faith are inseparable. For there is no Christ for the stone, only for the man to whom it is given to understand the Word."[6] While we must give the "simple minded" their due,[7] we must also admit, in spite of all the dangers connected with this admission, that faith is also a thinking and a knowing, i.e., a "grasping the meaning of divine meaning, reflecting the divine thoughts, knowing the self from the point of view of the divine calling."[8]

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[1] Ibid., p. 93.

[2] Ibid., pp. 93-94.

[3] Ibid., p. 94.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 95.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 94.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 95.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_.

[5] _Ibid_., pp. 96-97.

[6] _Ibid_., p. 96.

[7] _Ibid_., p. 100.

[8] _Ibid_., p. 99. Indeed, the clarity of our thinking at this point "determines the degree of spirituality."

Our humanity "rests only and alone in [our] ability to perceive, in [our] ability to understand, accept or reject the Word."[1] Man becomes man when. . .

> he hears the call out of the Eternal. That truth creates man a self. Our I is grounded in the divine saying, "Thou"; it is response to this call. You are man as the person addressed, as the second person; one can observe a meaning of existence within the obvious meaninglessness of existents by virtue of accepting the meaning in what you receive which, in contradiction to all experience, you can only believe. Therefore, nothing less than everything hangs on the Word.[2]

Having arrived at some understanding of the Word, we are now ready to appreciate the misunderstandings of the Word, viz., intellectualism, and the reaction to that misunderstanding, viz., romanticism. Intellectualism is "the confusion of the human and divine word,"[3] "deterioration of the word; it is word which no longer knows its origin and meaning."[4] Intellectualism replaces the concrete I with the abstract subject, thereby viewing truth merely objectively and forgetting the nature of truth.[5] Intellectualism can and does appear either as dogmatism or as orthodoxy, i.e., the transformation of the divine proclamation into a human doctrine, or as rationalism, i.e., that self-misunderstanding of reason whereby truth is thought to be a function of human nature.[1] Thus, intellectualism is not an excessive emphasis on the word, but a neutralizing of the word by forgetting it and making it into a thing which no longer addresses us.[2] The height of the folly of intellectualism comes when we finally and rationally "prove" God.[3] Now the "historical justification" of romanticism[4] is that it serves as a protest against this deadly intellectualism.[5] That Schleiermacher, in particular among the romantics, has shown the utter inadequacy of the identification of Word and word by intellectualism is his "great service."[6] The validity of his protest cannot be denied. But romanticism, in addition to being a protest or a reaction to the deterioration of intellectualism, "also attacks the Word itself and thereby injures or destroys the backbone of the spirit."[7] Knowing that the Word is not identical with human words, romanticism "falls prey to the temptation. . .to view the Word as something secondary and to conceive the primary as something wordless."[1] The search for truth is rejected along with dogmatism; truth is replaced by intensity of feeling.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 97.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 100.

[4] Ibid., p. 89.

[5] Ibid., p. 101.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 100.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 102.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 103.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 102.

[6] _EBG_, p. 12.

[7] _Die Mystik_, p. 89.

This is the point at which we return to Schleiermacher, for Schleiermacher was, above all, concerned to protect religion from the stain of intellectualism. Near the beginning of this chapter the fact that Schleiermacher's religion is generally indifferent to truth assertions was presented largely in relation to the Reden where "everything is one and everything is true."[3] The truth is, of course, the personal truth of experience rather than some "opinion" about God. Actually, this indifference to difference of opinion[4] and the assertion that religion is feeling "belong together as necessarily as left and right. They are correlates."[5] But one must not imagine that this position is characteristic of the early Schleiermacher only. The Glaubenslehre, at the other end of Schleiermacher's career, does not really change this position. What it presents is a confusing "combination of mysticism and faith," something whose kernal is mysticism and whose form is the Christian faith.[1] Paragraph 15 of the Glaubenslehre is the place where these two are brought together and this will have to be investigated in a moment. But before this can really be appreciated I must pay some attention to Schleiermacher's theory of reflection. Having done that I shall return to this point and show how the Glaubenslehre also fits into Schleiermacher's program of anti-intellectualism.

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[1] Ibid., p. 103.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Reden[1], p. 64. Pünjer, p. 68.

[4] Recall, e.g., the statements that one's idea of God makes little difference in religion. Indeed, religion can get along quite well without any notion of God whatsoever.

[5] Die Mystik, p. 79.

According to the Glaubenslehre,[2] the statements of dogmatics are non-objective, i.e., they do not point to or intend any object outside the self, but refer simply to the subject.[3] Their objectivity would be in pointing to real states of the self-consciousness about which they are reflections.[4] But, says Brunner, to identify the assertions of dogmatics as "conception" or "reflection" is to give them an arbitrary and artificial value "roughly equivalent to assigning value to paper money."[1] There is, of course, an objective knowledge which contrasts with the assertions of dogmatics, but this objective knowledge belongs to the realm of speculation or philosophy, not to the realm of religion or dogmatics. It is the "highest knowledge" of the *Dialektik*. "Knowledge, the objective consciousness-of-something-other-than-self lies outside of religion in the sphere of philosophy. The fact remains that religion is and has no knowledge, no recognition; and if one views those reflections which it does form as genuine knowledge, then this is 'empty mythology.'"[2] Here is a case where philosophy has assigned theology to its place. All conflict is precluded because philosophy, with its theory of reflection, has assigned the value of dogmatic statements.[3] Actually, there are apparently two notions of reflection at work in the *Glaubenslehre*. The one would be represented by the thesis of paragraph 15 where statements of faith are

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[1] Ibid., p. 109.

[2] I have in mind especially Glaubenslehre, #30, with its discussion of the three forms of dogmatic propositions. Moreover, I think Schleiermacher's comments on this passage support this assertion. See the second letter to Lücke, S.W., I:2, pp. 627-629, Sendschreiben, pp. 47-49.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 111.

[4] Dialektik, H., p. 245, explains this very well. "The consciousness of God in feeling which accompanies the higher levels of self-consciousness, i.e., the religious, produces reflections about this feeling which are theological concepts. These concepts have always been attacked by speculation and rightly so insofar as one can always show that they are inadequate to the degree that we isolate them. They are reflections about an individual element in our self-consciousness and only if one adds everything else to them are they adequate. But if one says they are to be nothing other than representations of the way in which the consciousness of God is present in our self-consciousness,

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then one can allow them since they do not wish to be immediate representation, but only mediate ones."

[1] *Die Mystik*, p. 109.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 113.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 114. Moreover, the fact that philosophy decrees the place of theology is the reason why it is impossible to treat Schleiermacher merely as a theologian, i.e., to deal with the *Glaubenslehre* apart from any consideration of the *Dialektik*.

described as conceptions (Auffassungen). Now to conceive something implies that our conception is made with the intention of remaining faithful to the thing conceived. Hence, reflection means "to bring to clear consciousness."[1] But if reflection is making clearly conscious that which was not so clearly conscious or even unconscious, then "it would be the aspiration and duty of every pious person to make the content of his piety as fully conscious as possible."[2] But there is a second notion of reflection which also functions in the Glaubenslehre. Beside this first one Schleiermacher places "the general romantic theory of reflection" which views reflection as "a dissolution, a disintegration, destruction of living unity, decomposition, death."[3] What is destroyed or dissolved is the unity which exists in feeling alone. While these two theories differ violently, Schleiermacher treats them as interchangeable, alternating from one to the other with the second theory about reflection being "the dominant and more consistent use of the word."[4] This theory of reflection is "the bond which ties everything together,"[1] the "scientific joint" of his theology.[2] But it is really a bridge of mist, a bridge of clouds which only seems "to unite the mystically conceived concept of religion with the content of faith which is totally foreign to it."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 115.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 116.

[4] Ibid.

> Behind the word "conception" is hidden the romantic theory of reflection; therefore the statements of faith have no noetic value. They have, properly speaking, i.e., understood in Schleiermacher's sense, no noetic content either. They say "God's attributes" but they mean "human conditions." They suggest the possibility that they, like other sentences, refer to truth but in reality they are only for the believer "to conceptualize his varying conditions and to establish them in noetic form."[4]

At last we are able to understand why Brunner found it necessary to utter such a hard word against Schleiermacher. For Brunner, what Schleiermacher presents is nothing less than a complete reevaluation of the Word.[5] "The word is not mere word in the sense of truth, but it is the form, the means of expressing inner emotions. It is a means of artistic expressionism; it is mere utterance, discharge of tension, ejaculation, glossolalia."[6] This word of

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[1] Ibid., p. 109.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 117.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Thus, it is not enough to ask merely whether Schleiermacher says that faith is based on the Word of revelation. Schleiermacher does indeed say this. The important question becomes, therefore, the meaning of these words in Schleiermacher's context. Emil Brunner, Philosophie und Offenbarung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925), pp. 16-17.

[6] Die Mystik, p. 117.

Schleiermacher "has only a whence, not a whither; it designates only the condition _out_ of which it comes, but not the truth _toward_ which it points."[1] Art and religion are able to go forth as partners because they have at their basis the same experience, viz., "the absolute individuality of feeling."[2] Lest there be any confusion, however, it must be emphasized that this individuality is not the individuality which is posited by word in the freedom-necessity paradox.[3] Instead, this individuality is the individuality which merely differentiates one member of a series from another member. Where one would expect to find qualitative, dynamic, personal images, e.g., in dealing with notions such as sin, repentence, forgiveness, justification, one finds, instead, only quantitative and mechanical images.[4] While some categories must be used, the category of causality, with its decrease and increase, strengthening and weakening, would seem to be rather poorly suited for discussing Word and the free interplay of Spirit and spirit.[5] But this is the price which Schleiermacher paid to ward off the evil of intellectualism. Word as meaning under which we live and toward which we live has been replaced by word as the (pejorative) reflection of inner feeling. While Schleiermacher did avoid objectivistic intellectualism, he avoided it only at the price of a curious combination of subjectivism and mechanistic naturalism.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 118.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 119.

[3] Schleiermacher's doctrine of individuality is discussed more fully in a later section of this same chapter.

[4] _Die Mystik_, p. 86.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 85. The role that the category of causality plays in Schleiermacher's thought will be more fully illustrated in connection with most of the later items in this chapter.

Just as Schleiermacher's legitimate opposition to religious intellectualism lapsed into misunderstanding of the legitimate Word and truth of faith, so his legitimate opposition to bourgeois culture and morality presenting itself as faith concludes in an equally significant misunderstanding of the legitimate obedience of faith. Therefore, I shall make some investigation of Brunner's understanding of Schleiermacher's anti-moralism to determine the relation of Schleiermacher's "no" to the "no" which faith itself offers to this bastard union.

Upon beginning a consideration of the relationship of ethics and religion we are immediately confronted by the presence, in Schleiermacher, of two quite contradictory views of that relationship. On the one hand, Schleiermacher attempts to establish the autonomy of the ethical realm with religion being a third element along side of science and ethics or thinking and acting. But there are also statements in which Schleiermacher seems to establish religion as the one true source of both thinking and acting so that any one of the three is incomplete without the others.[1] But since religion and ethics cannot be both fully autonomous and integrally related to one another, we must decide which of the two views is the basic view of Schleiermacher and which is the intrusion. Brunner is ready to provide the answer to this problem.

> Religion is, in itself, not action. Moreover, it is the opposite of action; it is passivity. The manner in which this is closely determined and grounded differs in the different works; however, that religion is receptivity is completely agreed upon.[2]

In the second speech of the Reden the origin of religion is considered under the category of receptive feeling or perception (Empfindung, Wahrnehmung). In the Dialektik we learn about religious feeling "whose origin is posited in us just as much as things are posited in our perception."[3] Likewise in the Glaubenslehre, religion, as feeling, is purely passive. It "simply takes place in the subject," "is not effected by the subject," "belongs altogether to the realm of receptivity."[4] To this "psychological" proof[5] there is added the metaphysical consideration that absolute dependence means the exclusion of all and every feeling of freedom and reciprocity.[1] Thus, the question of the activity or passivity of religion is decided "unequivocally, simply, undialectically, directly" for the passive side.[2] "Piety is a frame of mind, not an act."[3] And since religion is, in the last analysis, passive, the real relationship between religion and ethics is that of equal and autonomous spheres of life standing beside one another. The ethical man acts and the religious man is acted upon. But religion does not give rise to action or to anything else.

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[1] Ibid., p. 149.

[2] Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[3] Dialektik, H., p. 218.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #3:3.

[5] Die Mystik, p. 151.

Another question must now be raised, viz., how does Schleiermacher's concept of religion and his view of the relationship between religion and ethics compare with what the gospel terms faith? "Faith," says Brunner, "has infinitely more to do with freedom than with natural receptivity."[4] Faith is, in fact, the answer to the question, "What shall I do?"[5] "The gospel is not only a gift of God, but at the same time a command," i.e., a command to decision.[6] The imperative, "Believe!," is this call to reflection and decision, to say yes or no, to obey or disobey. But for

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[1] *Glaubenslehre*, #4:3,4.

[2] *Die Mystik*, p. 151.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 68.

[6] Emil Brunner, *Die Absolutheit Jesu* (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1926), p. 18. (E.T., p. 24.)

Schleiermacher, faith is a habitus rather than a command; it is given, simply there. The imperative quality of faith has been lost because all connection has been severed with the will.[1] For the reformers, faith was the first and highest of good works, obedience to the first commandment, but for Schleiermacher there is no first commandment.[2] While the Reden is relatively clear and consistent in its assertion that an aesthetic religion and ethics stand side by side with no dominance of the one over the other, the Glaubenslehre has two notions which tend to confuse the issue.[3] The first is the notion of direction or tendency, which is introduced as a part of the feeling of absolute dependence, according to which the increasing dominance of the feeling of absolute dependence is made normative, i.e., in some sense, at least, imperative.[4] But this has its problems. If this direction or tendency is the same as the feeling of absolute dependence, then das Gefühl, i.e., the point of indifference is not really the point of indifference after all. Instead, it is direction and movement and, moreover, quite specific direction. Or, if this direction or tendency is not the same as feeling, then something other than feeling would seem to be the chief element of religion. The second notion which confuses the issue is the notion of a teleological religion.[1] This notion is also something of an illegitimate marriage. "The feeling of absolute dependence is in itself perfectly simple and the conception of it provides no basis of differentiation."[2] It is when this feeling is made concrete in different individuals and in different groups that it shows up in different manners. The differentiation which Schleiermacher makes is between the combination of the feeling of absolute dependence and passive self-consciousness, on the one hand, and, on the other, the combination of the feeling of absolute dependence and more active self-consciousness. "Only, of course, this so simply conceived distinction remains a merely fluid /I.e., temporary/ one between a more and a less."[3] But there is a logical leap between #9:1 and #9:2 because in the latter this purely psychological temporary difference has suddenly become a normative evaluation. The result is that Schleiermacher neither remains completely true to his starting position nor does he seem willing to abandon it for some other.[4]

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 153.

[2] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

[3] Ibid., p. 154.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #5:3.

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[1] I have in mind here the whole development of Ibid., ##7, 8, and 9, with the climax of the argument coming in #9:1,2.

[2] Ibid., #9:1.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Brunner, Die Mystik, p. 155. accuses Schleiermacher of trying to make square circles.

Rather, we have only "sophistry which demonstrates the impossibility of the task. . .of combining the mystical-aesthetic concept of religion with the ethical character of the Christian faith."[1]

Schleiermacher's inability or refusal to acknowledge any integral connection between ethics and religion points in two directions. On the one hand, it points back to his notion of word. "Whatever does not stand under the category of 'Word' cannot have the quality of 'seriousness.' What is not heard (Hören) cannot be obeyed (Gehoren)."[2] Faith is decision, not merely having the power to decide or even merely being conscious of God.[3] For faith, the mere consciousness of God is highly dialectical; it can lead either to faith or to unfaith. But Schleiermacher's God-consciousness is undialectical, straight-line causal, quantitative.[4] The word "volkommen" in the phrase "to complete faith" entails this quantitative, i.e., relative, difference between faith and unfaith. The consciousness of God is, ipso facto, more religious than the lack of this consciousness. Since Schleiermacher replaces the word relationship of address-obedience with the natural, causal, passive being-impressed, his religion "lacks both content and seriousness."[1] But the lack of an integral connection between ethics and religion also points forward, viz., to the notion of person, for "word, seriousness and personality belong inseparably together. Lacking the first, Schleiermacher lacks all three.[2] Put simply, it is the divine Word, the divine call, the divine law which calls for our response, our decision and thereby "makes us responsible and posits us as free, spontaneous, autonomous spiritual beings."[3] It is "the mark of humanity," i.e., that which distinguishes us from the animals.[4] This lawful word is, in and of itself, a word of grace or love for it establishes community when God's claim is *perceived by* me.[5] Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence, on the other hand, is *placed* in us which has more to do with universal cause than with personal relationship. But faith's word of law which establishes community also judges.[1] Indeed, "the Christian understanding of grace consists in the knowledge of the paradoxical unity of the divine characteristics: holiness and love."[2] Thus, while faith does not arise out of the ethical, it stands in the closest connection to the ethical for it is in faith that the shipwreck of our willing is pulled to the saving shore.[3] Faith does not arise out of the ethical but it must be practiced as "the chief of all good works." Certainly, faith is "not enjoyment of self, enjoyment of God, not holy music which accompanies life, not rest, but empowerment to go, to act, to struggle."[4] Thus, Schleiermacher's dominant category of natural causality or personal passivity proclaims the one thing that is most certainly denied to a believer, viz., the privilege of being a spectator.[5] In his mistaken anti-intellectualism and mistaken anti-moralism, therefore, Schleiermacher lost the word which meant he lost address and seriousness which meant he lost responsibility and personality. But even so, I have still considered only one half of the community which the word establishes, viz., the human half. I must now consider the effect of Schleiermacher's position on the other part of that community, viz., God, the Creator Lord who seeks, in his Word, to establish community.

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[1] Ibid., p. 158.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 163. Recall the biblical word about the devils who also believe in God's reality but do not, thereby, have faith.

[4] Ibid., p. 164.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 159. See also, *Philosophie und Offenbarung*, p. 12.

[2] *Die Mystik*, p. 159.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 160. Brunner feels that Schleiermacher's failure to value word as address is exemplified in his failure to appreciate the Old Testament with its word of law. In fact, thinks Brunner, the Old Testament notion that God *speaks* as absolute *Lord* is the presupposition for understanding the New Testament.

[4] Emil Brunner, "Gesetz und Offenbarung," *Theologische Blätter*, IV, No. 3 (March, 1925), 54.

[5] *Die Mystik*, p. 162.

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[1] Ibid., p. 166.

[2] Emil Brunner, "Gnade Gottes: V. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Bd. II (2. Aufl.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928), 1262.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 167.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 168.

What Schleiermacher has done, in effect, is to give classic expression to the subjectivism of his age. He "conceived the subject, the self, the spirit as the principle of all reality and truth."[1] Thus, he shares with his contemporaries the tendency "to anchor religion in the depths of the spirit" and then "to identify the depths of the spirit somehow with the divine itself."[2] To protect religion from being swallowed up by speculation Schleiermacher had equated religion with feeling, but since "feeling is pure subjectivity, being-with-oneself, not-going-out-of-oneself,"[3] the result is the division of life into two spheres: one (speculation and activity) is objective and deals with truth and the other (religion) is subjective and deals with states of mind.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 172. Schleiermacher provides documentation for this at several places in his *Dialektik*. In *Dialektik*, H., p. 216, "We can say that God is also given to us along with our consciousness as an object of our self-consciousness." *Ibid.*, p. 222, "God is given to us, therefore, as an object of our being. The indwelling being of God in us constitutes our essential being." *Ibid.*, p. 224, "We have God, therefore, only insofar as we have a concept of him, *as we are God*, i.e., have him in us." Italics mine.

[3] *Die Mystik*, p. 174.

Again we must pause to protect ourselves from a misunderstanding. The fact that Schleiermacher's concept of religion is subjective in the sense that is being described in this chapter does not mean that Schleiermacher had no contact with the world outside the self. The very fact that religion is feeling, is neutral, does rest within the self permits and even requires some empirical recognition of religion.[1] The fact that religion is speculatively said to be feeling corresponds directly to Schleiermacher's own mystical experience of religion.[2] Christian doctrines, says Schleiermacher, "have their ultimate ground so exclusively in the emotions of the religious self-consciousness, that where these do not exist the doctrines cannot arise."[3] Thus, Schleiermacher's empiricism is always a speculative-subjective-empiricism just as his subjectivism is always an empirical-speculative-subjectivism.[4]

As was indicated above in connection with the consideration of the obedience of faith, this subjective religion has no reach beyond itself, but only an abiding-in-self.[5] This is religiosity, i.e., "the religion which posits itself as its goal, which therefore, enjoys itself."[1] What this amounts to is the localization of religion in "holy places" and "holy times."[2] "Religion is now a function beside other functions and has its realm beside other realms."[3] Religion now has its "place" in the great cultural life, but for this it must pay the price, viz., submission to the highest tribunal which is culture itself.[4] Religion is, of course, an essential part of this culture and one will be a genuine man, therefore, only to the extent that he is also religious.[5] Nor does it help to justify Schleiermacher by pointing out that religion always appears in reciprocal relationship with the other spiritual functions and that its pure isolated form is a logical abstraction, for this merely confirms that Schleiermacher is not talking about Christian faith. For the Christian, faith does ground life, but it also judges life. Genuine reciprocity is precisely the meaning of isolation.[1] The real cultic character of this religion is shown, for example, in the fact that "the highest tendency of the church is the formation of an artistic treasure in which the feeling of everyone can edify itself."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 175.

[2] Ibid., p. 176.

[3] Glaubenslehre, #15:2.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 176.

[5] Glaubenslehre, #3:3.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 179.

[2] Ibid., p. 180.

[3] Ibid., p. 179.

[4] The description of culture as this highest tribunal is the discipline of "Ethik," a discipline which will later be discussed as Schleiermacher's philosophy of history.

[5] Die Mystik, p. 182. Brunner, Ibid., pp. 181-182, compares this state of affairs to a "well-ordered state" in which the monarch passionately respects religion and wants it in its "place." Of course, the other aspects of culture must respect its boundaries just as it respects theirs, but all aspects of culture are, in the final analysis, subjected to the monarch who is the final authority and arbiter. This highest monarch is reason or intellect or spirit (Vernunft or Geist).

In the final analysis, it makes no difference whether this isolated religion is expressed outwardly in priestly cultic activity or inwardly in cultic mysticism, for in both cases "something which is human and given is addressed as the divine."[3] Now, finally, we are able to see the full effect of equating religion with feeling, for this isolated religious element which "is not separated from the profane life but *is* clearly distinguished from it" is not some reference to the divine, but *is* the divine itself.[4] This religion of feeling is "faith in the God within us,. . .in God-consciousness as the deepest self-consciousness, in the coming-to-God as a coming-to-self of man. It believes, therefore, in the unbroken continuity between God and man."[1] "This religion is a relationship of man to his own ground of his soul, but not a relationship of man to the God who reveals himself to man and addresses man."[2] This unbroken continuity between God and man is, in fact, the most direct of all mystical ways of continuity for here feeling is what it intends; it does not move toward God or intend God; it is God.[3] Thus, the fact that religion is feeling and that feeling is God not only explains why this religion enters into reciprocal relationships with other areas of culture instead of judging them, but it also explains why this religion lacks another feature of Christian faith, viz., hope.[4] It is meaningless to await and hope for God when one has him. But I shall return to this later.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 182.

[2] *S.W*., III:5, p. 322; *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, #290. For another statement of the same position, see, *S.W*., I:12, *Beilage* A, p. 29, #86.

[3] *Die Mystik*, p. 184.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 180. Italics mine. On the identification of the religious and the divine, see above, this chapter, p. 85, n. 2.

One can only conclude that Schleiermacher's religion with its ultimate identity of the human and the divine in feeling is unalterably opposed to Christian faith. For while faith also declares that we are one with God, it means and states that we are made one with God because God wills it and in spite of an absolute and unbridgeable gulf between God and man.[1] We believe God because he speaks in his Word. Naturally, faith has its subjective aspect in this believing, but the decisive thing is "the content, the objective meaning."[2] "Reformation faith is the dependence on an other-than-self, relationship to the 'foreign,' 'external' Word which does not come from me, but only comes to me."[3]

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[1] Die Mystik, pp. 186-187.

[2] Ibid., p. 186. This is Brunner's version of the more popular charge that Schleiermacher is pantheistic. See, e.g., Christian A. Thilo, Schleiermachers Religionsphilosophie (Langensalza: Hermann Beyer & Söhne, 1906), p. 27. "This distinction between God and the world is merely that of a logical abstraction. God is only the name for a concept which is logically higher than that of the world."

[3] Die Mystik, p. 187.

[4] Ibid., p. 185.

> Thus, in all points in which we have compared the two, the evangelical faith is the opposite of that which Schleiermacher calls Christian piety; it is not an immanental possession and essential basis of the soul, but the receiving of the foreign Word; it is the critical cancellation of every religionism, the crisis of all religion and piety as well as of all human morality; it is not the experience, possession and enjoyment of God, but an "in spite of" on the basis of the divine promise and proclamation; it is not the internal coming-to-oneself and being-conscious-of-oneself, but, on the contrary, it is the looking away from oneself to the Other, moreover, to the Other One in whom alone--extra nos et aliena nobis--the joy and certainty of arriving at the goal is grounded.[4]

Just as Schleiermacher misunderstands the very nature of faith as this has been discussed in connection with his misunderstanding of the Word of faith, the obedience of faith and the Other of faith, so he misunderstands, feels Brunner, the nature of history and faith's relationship to history. In line with the romantic-idealistic strain in Schleiermacher's thought, individual historical phenomena are seen and valued, ultimately, only as concretizations of the whole. To this idealistic, historicistic view of history and historical phenomena there is added the scientific notion of evolutionary development. Under the category of causality, therefore, every individual phenomena is related back to the whole. But real history, thinks Brunner, leads to riddles and secrets rather than to simple explanations. "No theory seems to be appropriate for it, above all not the theory of historical continuity."[1] It is to this conflict between Schleiermacher's understanding of history and faith's understanding of history that we now turn. It will be discussed in five sections: (1) the misunderstanding of the Christ of faith, (2) the misunderstanding of sin and guilt, (3) the misunderstanding of justification, (4) the total absence of eschatology, and (5) Schleiermacher's philosophy of history.

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[1] EEG, pp. 36-37.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 190.

[3] Ibid., p. 191.

[4] Ibid., p. 192.

Unlike most of his immediate predecessors, Schleiermacher did wish to value Christ quite highly.[2] But when he speaks of Christ he speaks of "a Christ who has been completely altered by the romantic concept of religion until he is almost unrecognizable."[3] To say that Schleiermacher has a romantic Christ is to say that Schleiermacher views Christ as one of the geniuses or heroes of religion.[1] This Christ "strengthens, by the the influence of his person, the piety, the God-consciousness which, as such, belongs 'naturally' to human nature."[2] He speeds up the process by which the final end of human development is attained.[3] To fully understand what Schleiermacher means when he adopts this position, we must be firmly aware of the categories under which he places the person and work of Christ. The category which Schleiermacher employs should come as no surprise after our consideration of Schleiermacher's misunderstanding of faith, for this misunderstanding is, after all, the same misunderstanding. Schleiermacher's misunderstanding of faith was identified as psychologistic subjectivism, i.e., that subjectivism which changes something not-given into something given, which views relationships as temporal-psychical functions and therefore subordinates spiritual relationships to temporal-psychical ones, which views truth and knowledge under the category of cause-effect.[4] Now if that analysis was correct we might legitimately expect the same cause-effect category to be employed here. That is exactly what we find. Christ's significance is causal-dynamic.

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[1] Ibid., p. 195.

[2] Emil Brunner, Der Mittler: Zur Besinnung über den Christusglauben (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1927), p. 27. (E.T., p. 47.)

[3] Die Mystik, p. 197.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 197-198.

[2] Ibid., p. 138.

[3] Der Mittler, pp. 67-68. (E.T., pp. 91-92.)

[4] Die Mystik, p. 199.

> In contemporary language we must say that Jesus is the incomparable *instigator* of piety, a piety, moreover, whose essence is everywhere and always the same, viz., the feeling of absolute dependence. . . . He is *merely* the *cause* of--or, more correctly, the one who releases and strengthens--"faith"; faith does not relate to him as its content so that it would be what it is only be cause of him, but it relates to him merely as its historical cause, to his "impulse". . . . He is merely one factor on whose effectiveness rests the power and the easy appearance of the God-consciousness which dwells in man. The believer does not receive something fundamentally new through Christ, but merely an increased measure of what he already had. At stake is not the quality, therefore, but merely the quantity of the consciousness of God.[1]

Christ has become the historical power of a temporal psychological process[2] or, to use Schleiermacher's own word, the "impulse" which sets everything in motion.[3] Faith is a "corporate life" and Christ is the temporal power which causes this temporal process.[4] In short, Christ "is just as completely historicized as faith was psychologized."[5]

Now if this summary statement of Schleiermacher's concept of Christ is correct, if what Schleiermacher says concerning Christ is actually dominated and conditioned by the category of causality, then certain predictable consequences of this dynamic mode of thinking ought to be identifiable in Schleiermacher's presentation. The fact that these consequences are present and that they could have been predicted ahead of time will serve as evidence for the correctness of the preceding paragraph.

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 138-139.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 199.

[3] *Glaubenslehre*, #88:3.

[4] *Ibid*., ##87-88.

[5] *Die Mystik*, p. 200.

Since the "first law" of the causal-dynamic mode of thinking is the law of continuity, we might expect "that a past cause can affect me only through historical mediators and that I can have a direct relationship only to these mediators, but not to that first cause."[1] The real cause for me, standing in the midst of the historical process, will be the historical tradition itself. Schleiermacher does affirm just this. The Glaubenslehre specifically excludes. . .

> the idea that one can share in the redemption and be made blessed through Christ outside the corporate life which He instituted, as if a Christian could dispense with the latter and be with Christ, as it were, alone. This separatism disregards the fact that what owes its origin to divine agency can nevertheless be received only as it appears in history, and also can continue to function only as a historical entity. We can therefore only describe it as fanatical. . . . It destroys the essence of Christianity by postulating an activity of Christ which is not mediated in time and space. . . .[2]

Die christliche Sitte also asserts "the the community is primary throughout and that we can never isolate the individual for, according to Christian principles, the individual in no way stands alone over against divine grace."[1] It is interesting to note that in both places Schleiermacher feels compelled to defend himself against the charge of Catholic reliance on tradition,[2] a charge which Brunner feels he avoids only by a logically inconsistent denial of this consequence.[3] Logical consistency would have forced Schleiermacher to admit that the relationship to the community and the tradition is primary and that the relationship to Christ himself is quite secondary and even questionable.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #87:3.

The second predictable consequence, if Schleiermacher does indeed present the work and person of Christ under the category of dynamic causality, is the diminution of the power of Christ with the passage of time. This diminution would be due both to the effects which it creates and the opposition which it overcomes. Since power is, by definition, of a specific magnitude, it cannot go on being spent forever. There are several places where Schleiermacher recognizes this consequence. According to Die christliche Sitte, it is no longer possible for us to get as clear an impression of the personality of Christ as did the apostles. The church must compensate for the loss of Christ's own effectiveness by increased education from generation to generation.[1] The Glaubenslehre notes that. . .

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[1] S.W., I:12, p. 173.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #87:3, and S.W., I:12, pp. 174-176.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 202.

[4] Ibid., p. 201.

> it is natural that the more the Christian communion recruits and renews itself out of its own resources, the more does preaching itself take the form of popular teaching or doctrine, and the more does this doctrine. . . become the most important means to promote the living circulation of the religious consciousness.[2]

Again the church has compensated for the loss of its original power by adding increasing amounts of its own power in the form of education to the otherwise diminishing supply. According to Brunner,[3] Schleiermacher avoids the worst ramifications of this notion only by resorting to another contradiction, viz., the notion of an "infinite power."[4] Since Christ's power is infinite it cannot be exhausted, but this contradictory concept is mere camouflage for the dynamic scheme.[5]

A third predictable consequence, if Schleiermacher does indeed present wth work and person of Christ under the category of dynamic causality, is the relativism of Christ since what has been thoroughly historicized must necessarily be relativized. There is, of course, the line in the Reden which notes that Jesus "never claimed himself to be the only mediator, the only objectification of his idea and he never confused his school with his religion."[1] But the crucial paragraph 11 of the *Glaubenslehre* also points, at least in part, in the same direction. "Jesus is Founder of a religious communion simply in the sense that its members become conscious of redemption through Him."[2] Christ is the leader leading toward faith, the contageous example of faith, i.e., substantially the same as in the *Reden*.[3] The nautral-historical power has been subjected to the condition of history, viz., relativity.[4]

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[1] S.W., I:12, p. 325.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #18:3.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 203.

[4] E.G., S.W., I:12, p. 324.

[5] Die Mystik, p. 203.

It must be admitted that the untenability of using the category of causality to describe the relationship between Christ and the Christian is recognized, to some extent, by Schleiermacher himself. One of the reasons why Schleiermacher employs the category of causality is to facilitate the distinction between faith and knowledge, but the category of causality now proves inadequate by itself.[1] The crucial passage occurs in paragraph 88 of the *Glaubenslehre* where the ambiguous concepts of transmission and impression (*Mitteilung* and *Eindruck*) are introduced. Schleiermacher's own presuppositions commit him to the position which, in principle, he does maintain, viz., that we are dealing with something natural, given, at hand.[2] But not even Schleiermacher can quite bring himself to say that "sinless perfection"[3] and an "absolutely powerful God-consciousness"[4] are causally transmitted or that they are, in fact, even present in believers. Against the all-too-easy observation that there is indeed much sinfulness still remaining, "faith alone can prevail; it must consequently assume that all this

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[1] *Reden*[1], p. 304. *Pünjer*, p. 285. This passage remained substantially the same through all editions of the *Reden*.

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, #11:3.

[3] *Die Mystik*, p. 207.

[4] For want of a better place, I shall note here that Schleiermacher's description of Christian faith, which also operates under the natural-historical category of causality in the transmission of the new corporate life of blessedness, also comes to this conclusion, i.e., Christian faith is also relativized. *Glaubenslehre*, #11, indicates that what differentiates Christianity from other religions, in addition to its historical (accidental) founder, is that in it the feeling of redemption is made the focal point while in other religions it merely is one among other feelings. Christianity is an individual historical religion which concretizes the constant "essence of religion" which is simultaneously its ideal and its criterion, but which can always be distinguished from the historical-accidental manifestations of it (*Die Mystik*, p. 123). And, as Schleiermacher assures us (*Glaubenslehre*, #10:3), the individual manifestation is accidental. This matter of the accidental and relative nature of the individual historical phenomenon will be treated again later in this chapter in connection with Schleiermacher's philosophy of history and the principle of individuation.

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[1] *Die Mystik*, pp. 203-204.

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, #88:3, speaks of the "impulse given by his [i.e., Jesus'] historical lige," an "impression. . . capable of being experienced," which "corresponds to its origin." But, on the other side, *Die christliche Sitte*, *S.W.*, I:12, p. 88, after denying the so-called naturalistic view of ethics, states that "through Christ something has come into human nature which was not in it earlier."

[3] *Glaubenslehre*, #88.

[4] *Ibid.*, #89.

[sin] represents only the non-existence of the new corporate life, and so the existence of the sinful life in which the new really exists but only in hidden fashion."[1] The transmission or communication has suddenly become a truth-knowledge relationship instead of a causal-transmission one. Faith is suddenly the acceptance of something hidden. But when Schleiermacher has gotten over this rough spot in his progress by means of terms which actually hide a meaning contrary to his principles, he immediately goes back to talking about "an impression. . .capable of being experienced" and an "impulse."[2] Despite the hesitation and the confusion, therefore, Brunner concludes that "Christ is no more than a disturbance of [Schleiermacher's] theological system of doctrine."[3]

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[1] Ibid., #88:3.

[2] Ibid. Brunner, Die Mystik, p. 205, terms this section of the Glaubenslehre "an impermissible toying with words."

[3] Die Mystik, p. 196. This section of the dissertation is intended to present Brunner's argument rather than to repeat everything he said about Schleiermacher. For this reason much has been and will be omitted. But lest this created the impression that Brunner sees in Schleiermacher only one line of argument with no wavering to one side or the other, it should be noted that there are other places where Brunner also detects some vacillation, confusion, or deliberate obfuscation (depending on Brunner's mood) in Schleiermacher's presentation. For example, Ibid., pp. 129-136, identifies two different views of religion in Schleiermacher and, Ibid., pp. 139-147, identifies two views of revelation. The two views of religion are connected in Glaubenslehre, #88, and actually parallel the ambiguity identified in connection with the two views of the relationship between Christ and the Christian. That is to say, the

"Biblical-reformation faith" has little to do with all of this because it "deals with absolute matters and it can do that because it is not bound by the scheme of nature and of relativism, viz., cause-effect. . . . Reformation faith 'depends on the Word.' *Verbum solum habemus*."[1] Faith lives by the Word and that means by truth. It is only in truth, i.e., truth which is eternal, that the fragmentation of history is overcome. In *this* respect rationalism is correct over against historicism, i.e., it perceives truth as eternal, as *semper et ubique* and it sees Christ as this eternal Word (*logos*) of truth.[2] It is this eternal

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mystical-natural-causal religion is confronted by religion defined as the acknowledgment of truth. Likewise, the mystical view of revelation, i.e., the originality of the fact which lies at the basis of each religious community, is suddenly confronted, *Glaubenslehre*, #11, by the concept of revelation as the noetic consciousness of something, viz., the *consciousness* of Jesus' absolutely perfected God-consciousness which has unexplainedly been transformed from something accidental into something normative. There is a shift from "the objective fact of historical revelation to the consciousness of it" (*Die Mystik*, p. 142). In both cases, however, Brunner thinks the confusion represents the perception, to some degree, by Schleiermacher, that his mystical-natural-causal concept of religion was not quite sufficient to the task at hand. Therefore, he attempted to bring in what he needed via terms which were really Trojan horses. Thus, rather than raising any questions about the legitimacy of his interpretation, Brunner thinks the confusion at these and other places actually confirms his interpretation.

[1] *Die Mystik*, p. 208.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 209-210. This does not mean that Brunner wishes to adopt rationalism as his own position. He states the opposite in this and other contexts. Since rationalism views the Word as a human possession it is abstract, impersonal, and illusory. But Brunner is concerned

Word of truth in Christ, indeed, the truth which is God himself, which Christianity proclaims.[1]

> That this Word has been spoken in Jesus Christ in the fullness of time, i.e., as a yonder-historical word breaking through into history, revealing eternity in time and bringing eternity to temporal man--that, the obedient hearing of this address which is a powerful claim to salvation, is the Christian faith.[2]

Thus, the claim of Christianity, thinks Brunner, is not that a historical individual set in motion forces which effect salvation to this very day, but that this historical person, who is like every other historical person in all appearances, is the Word, the incognito Son of God, the eternal truth which is perceived by the eye of faith alone.[3]

> The "lowliness," the divine incognito, the "kenosis" is a category which has no place in historical understanding. For historical understanding requires directness because cause and effect are always direct. The dialectically or paradoxically indirect, that which is expressed by means of contradiction is to be found only in the sphere of truth. There is no indirect "impulse."[4]

But faith, in proclaiming Christ as the eternal logos,

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to protect the eternality of truth, something which rationalism does perceive in distorted fashion and which historicism can never see.

[1] Ibid., p. 209.

[2] Ibid., p. 211.

[3] Der Mittler, published in 1927 between the two editions of Die Mystik und das Wort, is wholly given to protecting Christology from various misunderstandings. Thus, much of Der Mittler is an expansion of the position outlined in this paragraph. Der Mittler should be consulted, therefore, for a fuller understanding of this section of the dissertation.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 214.

does not proclaim an abstract truth; rather, it is truth about me and for me. I must now turn, therefore, to the consideration of the point where this truth does affect me, to "the middle-point of the Christian faith, viz., the doctrine of sin and redemption."[1] Here again we shall find that Schleiermacher, in Brunner's view, has misunderstood the relationship between faith and history. In this case I shall begin by examining Schleiermacher's view of sin.

From the beginning of his career, Schleiermacher spoke of an opposition (Gegensatz), but this is the opposition which exists in the disruption-reunion of an identity philosophy rather than the opposition of sin and grace about which the Glaubenslehre speaks.[2] In and of itself, this evil amounts to nothing other than a becoming.[3] It is "no real being," but only "a non-being."[1] Good and evil are the positive and negative factors in the process of unification of nature and spirit with evil being merely "the original not-being-rational of nature."[2] When the spirit encounters earthly existence it too "must become a quantum" and be subjected to the oscillations of this process of becoming.[3] When Schleiermacher comes, then, to the Glaubenslehre, he does not explain how the Christian doctrine of sin is to be connected with this purely negative view of evil; he merely asserts that the one *is* the other.[4] Sin, in the *Glaubenslehre*, is the failure of the God-consciousness to be fully dominant; it is the lack of something.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 216. Schleiermacher would hardly wish to contradict Brunner's claim that the very center of the Christian faith is involved when the discussion turns to the problem of sin, for the major portion of the Glaubenslehre is divided on the basis of sin and redemption. Moreover, Glaubenslehre, #11:thesis, says the same thing.

[2] Reden^1, p. 291. Pünjer, p. 278. "Corruption and redemption, hostility and mediation are the two inseparable and intertwined sides of this intuition [I.e., the peculiar intuition which constitues Christianity] and the structure of all the religious matter in Christianity and its whole form are determined by them." This statement persists through all editions of the Reden with only two minor verbal changes.

[3] S.W., III:5, p. 53. The reference is to a revision of Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, #91, which Schleiermacher made in lecture notes from 1832. The notes are expressly identified as a correction of #91.

Before completing the account of Schleiermacher's view of sin by examining his view of original sin, I must indicate some of the problems which are already evident. The dynamic scheme which Schleiermacher adopts in declaring sin to be a becoming, a not-yet-having-completed a process which is under way, forces Schleiermacher to posit two complementary powers which work together, viz., the God-consciousness and the world-consciousness.[1] But what Schleiermacher actually does, in order to be able to explain why it is that man sometimes orients himself toward God and somtimes toward the world, is to destroy the unity of the self. The spiritual life has now become a game of powers which are held together by the _physical organism_, but not by a self, for that which is most truly human, viz., the "higher" self-consciousness or God-consciousness, is completely free of sin and not in the least responsible for it.[2] "Just as the God-consciousness was localized, so now sin is localized and, therewith, made harmless."[3] Thus not only has the self been split into two contending parts, but the higher part is completely absolved of any responsibility for sin. It is in this context that ##66ff. of the _Glaubenslehre_ must be seen. When #66 speaks of sin as "a positive antagonism of the flesh against the spirit," "flesh" is promptly defined as "the totality of the so-called lower powers of the soul."[4] Sin is "everything which impedes the free development of the God-consciousness,"[1] "a restriction of the determinative power of the spirit occasioned by the independence of the sensuous functions."[2] Even here, where Schleiermacher's words, viz., "a positive anatagonism of the flesh against the spirit," sound Christian, he persists in splitting asunder the self and ascribing sin to inevitable sensuality, thereby ultimately absolving the "higher" God-consciousness of any responsibility in the matter.[3] Rather than ascribing sin to any "lower powers," the Christian faith raises sin to the highest degree possible by declaring that we sin *coram Deo*. Sin is "fully conscious opposition of the self-will to the will of God," "guilt before God, in the sight of God, the Lord; it is, therefore, positive defiance."[4]

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[1] Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, *Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik*, heraus. A. Twesten (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1841), p. 27, #93. (For some reason, *Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik* was never published as part of *S.W.*)

[2] *S.W.*, III:5, p. 53, correction of #91:b.

[3] *S.W.*, III:2, p. 415. "Ueber den Unterschied zwischen Naturgesez und Sittengesez," lecture to the academy on January 6, 1825.

[4] *Die Mystik*, p. 219.

[5] *Glaubenslehre*, ##66ff., might be interpreted by some as being in opposition to this conclusion, but I shall deal with these paragraphs shortly.

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[1] _Ibid_., #5.

[2] _Der Mittler_, p. 109. (E.T., p. 133.) It is interesting to note that in the _Psychologie_, _S.W._, II:6, p. 8, Schleiermacher identifies the self with the organism as the unity of spirit and sensuousness.

[3] _Die Mystik_, p. 222.

[4] _Glaubenslehre_, #66:2.

Once more I must return to Schleiermacher, for it might possibly be that in discussing the concept of original sin, the mere mention of which separated him from much of

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[1] *Ibid*., #66:1

[2] *Ibid*., #66:2.

[3] Brunner concedes that Schleiermacher's position shows his courage and consistency in upholding a rather unpleasant implication of his starting point. Once religion has been localized, sin cannot be central and, therefore, not, finally, serious. Brunner writes, *Die Mystik*, p. 226, "In the conception of sin we recognize not how Schleiermacher was occasionally able to depart from Christian knowledge, but how anti-Christian his entire system is. For that is its ripe fruit."

[4] *Ibid*., p. 224.

Enlightenment thought, he made the break from the dynamic scheme in which we have found him operating elsewhere. But that is not the case. Schleiermacher's doctrine of original sin is "nothing more than the introduction into the dogmatics of the naturalistic doctrine of development," a position which is best termed "atavism," i.e., "the after-effects of older levels of development in the consciousness of the present."[1] Sin, i.e., the opposition of the flesh, i.e., of the lower powers, "is due to the advantage gained by the flesh during the prior time," i.e., during that time before the God-consciousness began to develop.[2] It is "a result of the unequal development of insight and will-power."[3] To be trivial about the matter, original sin indicates the head start achieved by one of the two parties in this contest. From another point of view, however, original sin has reference to the corporate nature of sin, i.e., the transmission and reinforcement of sin by the community. Original sin "expresses the connection of the later generations with the earlier, as well as with the process by which the race is preserved" and "indicates that inherent quality of the acting subject which is a part condition of all his actual sins and is anterior to all action on his part."[1] Schleiermacher's doctrine of original sin, says Brunner, "amounts to the triviality that sensuality is an inherited presupposition of human spiritual life and to the questionable anti-spiritual assertion that the origin of sin must be sought in it [i.e., this sensuality]."[2] The "moral-spiritual point of view" has been replaced by "the biological-psychological, i.e., the causal-naturalistic, point of view with its developmental monism."[3] The lack of seriousness which characterizes this dynamic view of sin, original sin, and the developing God-consciousness can be shown in one final conclusion of Schleiermacher. While acknowledging that the progress of the God-consciousness is always an irregular one, Schleiermacher notes that the consciousness of sin "will be more and more attenuated" as the progressive ascendency of the spirit over the flesh takes place, i.e., as sin itself decreases.[4] Thus, sin and the consciousness of sin have been equated. In some sense at least, when one is not conscious of sin, then one is not sinful.

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[1] Ibid., p. 226.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #67:2.

[3] Ibid., #68:thesis.

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[1] Ibid., #69:postscript. Here Schleiermacher indicates that he had some idea just how far he was from the traditional usage of the term "original sin" because he terms it one of those "inexact designations" which one might well wish was changed.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 230.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #67:2.

This marks a good place to begin the comparison of what Schleiermacher said regarding these matters and what other parts of the Christian heritage have had to say about them. The difference is immediately apparent. For faith, consciousness of God is accompanied not by a decrease in the consciousness of sin, but by a drastic increase in the consciousness of sin. It is precisely the man of faith who is most conscious of the magnitude of his sin.[1] Nor is the opposite of faith to be thought of as sensuousness. Rather, the opposite of faith is unfaith, i.e., the arbitrary destruction of a harmony created by God,[2] the attempt to take our place beside God and to deny the created order of subordination.[3] It is the opposition of wills, viz., God's will and man's will, not merely a natural part of life insofar as life is engaged in a process of development through opposition.[4] While Schleiermacher's "original sin" is merely "the natural first level of the process of development,"[5] faith views the doctrine of original sin as the ultimate statement of the seriousness of the problem of sin.[6] In making the sin and guilt of the race to be the sin and guilt of the individual, faith speaks in paradoxical fashion of contemporaneity with both Christ and Adam, this contemporaneity being "an absolutely anti-historical category."[1] In the final analysis, therefore, Schleiermacher has done what faith never dares to do, viz., he explains sin.[2] But "to the degree that one explains sin. . .one denies it."[3] Faith does not explain sin in terms of history as does Schleiermacher; for faith, sin is the presupposition of history, not an outcome of history. According to the Bible, sin begins in an anti-divine act of will, not in some natural cause.[4] This primordial wrong relationship, this break between God and man is taken so seriously by faith that it can do no other than speak in absolute terms, viz., hell and damnation, for behind the Father God there always stands the horrible possibility of eternal damnation.[5] But Schleiermacher has historicized all of this; sin and original sin are parts of the natural order, guilt has become self-activity as opposed to external influences, and punishment is ignored altogether.[1] Having lost the presuppositions of the justification and redemption of which faith speaks, there seems little chance that Schleiermacher will appreciate what faith says about these. Nevertheless, it is to a consideration of these that I now turn.

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[1] The Theology of Crisis, p. 64.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 231.

[3] Der Mittler, pp. 118-119. (E.T., pp. 142-143.)

[4] Die Mystik, p. 231.

[5] Ibid., p. 230.

[6] Ibid., p. 226. See also, Philosophie und Offenbarung, pp. 23-24.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 229.

[2] Der Mittler, p. 109. (E.T., p. 133.)

[3] Die Mystik, p. 229.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Emil Brunner, "Der Zorn Gottes und die Versöhnung durch Christus," Zwischen den Zeiten, V, Heft 1 (1927), 98-101. On pp. 100-101, God's wrath, i.e., "the reaction of the divine holiness against sin," is directed "not only against 'sin' for sin has its seat in the person of the sinner himself and is inseparable from him. Therefore the wrathful will is directed against the sinner himself." See also, Die Mystik, pp. 232-233.

According to Schleiermacher, Christianity is characterized by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus.[2] The important thing for us to consider, however, is not the fact that this religion is concerned about redemption for, in one sense or another, most religions are concerned about redemption, but the nature of the redemption which is proclaimed. In this section I shall reverse the process again by first considering what the Christian faith has normally said about this redemption and then considering what Schleiermacher says about it.

Redemption, according to faith, is the moment of faith in which both God and man are taken seriously. Man is taken seriously because redemption is, for him, the answer to his deepest need. Of course, all men are in need, perhaps even desperate need, but the problem finally focuses on whether or not we recognize our deepest need, i.e., the fact that man has, by self-determination, broken the original God-Creator--man-creature relationship.[1] Since this deepest of needs wherein we know ourselves dammed by God is, in fact, the deepest truth about ourselves, redemption takes man seriously by assuming his responsibility for his own plight and by granting him the honor of not having to take anything as finally serious which does not concern his free self.[2] On the other hand, redemption takes God seriously by regarding this break and opposition to his will and order as the ultimate evil.[3] Now this break, having been made, cannot be unmade. "Even God cannot undo what is done. But he can declare it undone."[4] Thus, God cancels the fact of our break with his order only in the highest of paradoxes, only in the declaration that his willed order is both valid and invalid, i.e., only in forgiveness. For faith, redemption means just this: forgiveness.[5] And yet, in another sense, it means even more than this, for faith declares not the mere possibility of forgiveness, but the fact that God forgives, a fact which is as real as the fact of sin.[1] Faith declares that the paradoxical authoritative Word which declares something both valid and no-longer-valid has been spoken and that this word is: Christ.[2] When faith speaks of forgiveness, therefore, it means *this* Word, *this* truth, i.e., "something which can only be perceived, heard, understood, and believed as true."[3] This is what the reformers meant by justification by faith alone, i.e., justification by the Word of forgiveness which is not experienced but which is heard when God himself chooses to speak it. Despite the bad connotations which the phrase has accumulated, therefore, this is *justitia forensis*.[4] This Word of forgiveness is what Christian faith means by redemption.

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[1] Philosophie und Offenbarung, pp. 17, 22. Brunner feels so strongly about the nullification of sin in the historicizing of it that he identifies this as the most fundamental difference between the humanistic-idealistic-mystical religion and Christian faith.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #11.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 236.

[2] Ibid., p. 237.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 238.

[5] Ibid.

But while faith declares that justification is first spoken by God and then believed by man *in spite of* experience, Schleiermacher begins by asserting that the sequence of justification and conversion is a matter of some indifference.[5] It is not long a matter of indifference, however, for his exposition "derives justification wholly from conversion,"[1] an order which is quite necessary since God justifies the one who is converted to him.[2] In one act, justification, faith, and grace have been removed from the realm of Word and truth and put, instead, in the sphere of causality, of natural process. "Redemption is conceived as a simple continuation of the work of creation."[3] Justification is an experience[4] in the gradually progressing development of life. Grace is infused rather than given.[5]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 239.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 240.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] *Glaubenslehre*, #107:2. "The order seems, in view of the symmetry of the definition, a matter of entire indifference; many considerations, however, make it more convenient to begin with conversion."

But then Schleiermacher's failure to appreciate redemption in the sense of justification by faith, i.e., in the sense of forgiveness, is understandable, thinks Brunner, since Schleiermacher lacks the presuppositions for such an understanding, viz., the knowledge of man's sin-guilt as the only truly serious description of man's situation.[6] Only where man gives up his pretensions in the realization that God does not permit himself to be mocked is God able to speak his Word. But in the midst of his discussion of redemption Schleiermacher reiterates his understanding of sin as lack of something and of original sin as atavism. The Christian regrets his sin butthis regret is "simply the retention in consciousness of something that is past."[1] Of sin there is nothing left "except its inert echo in feeling."[2] While admitting the lack of continuous and steady progress in the new life in Christ, Schleiermacher observes that "the longer and more uninterruptedly we are under the sway of Christ, the sooner do we forget sin, because it no longer emerges."[3] "Sin in the new man is no longer active; it is only the after-effect of the old man."[4] Once more the progressive causal scheme reigns supreme.

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[1] Ibid., #109:3.

[2] Ibid., #109:thesis. "God's justifying of one who is converted to him includes. . . ."

[3] Die Mystik, p. 242.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #109:1.

[5] Die Mystik, p. 243. Brunner indicates that by infusio gratiae he means the notion of a causal empirical relationship between man and God which lies at the basis of Schleiermacher's conception of religion.

[6] Ibid., p. 244.

> Just as sin itself is not a break, but only a not-yet-being-spirit, so also the consciousness of sin is nothing positive, not a position, not an act of judgment, not a desperate cancellation of the self, not a throwing oneself down before the judge, but only a subsequent suffering in the feeling, a kind of melancholy sadness as it was described earlier in the *Reden* for which reason it is possible, through the feeling of God, "by ourselves to transform penitence from bitterness into joyful self-sufficiency."[5]

We are now in a position to make a full assessment of Schleiermacher's concept of salvation vis-a-vis the Christian concept of salvation. It was stated above that the Christian faith in salvation is a faith in the Word of salvation, a justification by faith, forgiveness.[1] The Christian is simul justus et peccator and this means that it is the power of sin, not salvation, which is experienced. Our salvation is hidden in Christ until the last day and that means it is only believed now. In contrast to this, Schleiermacher speaks of more complete approximation to the condition of blessedness,[2] this approximation being sometimes due to divine grace[3] and sometimes due to the continuous progress which is native to humanity as such.[4] Schleiermacher tries to solve this problem by emphasizing the notion of a turning point while speaking of the constancy of both the old life and the new life.[1] The turning point is defined in terms of the disappearance of sin[2] and the non-effectiveness of the continuing sin of the believer.[3] But the first explanation, viz., the disappearance of sin, is purely quantitative and hardly, therefore, represents a "turning point." The second explanation, viz., the non-effectiveness of the continuing sin of the believer, does intorduce a new element, but its truth would seem to be highly questionable.[4] Apart from the logical difficulties, we are left with the pietistic notion of the holy realm, viz., the holy community, where salvation is experienced and enjoyed.[5] The ecclesia triumphans has replaced the ecclesia militans; the theologia gloriae marches on.[1] As a member of Schleiermacher's holy community, one does not hope for salvation because one has it. Once more Schleiermacher has reduced to a historical phenomenon what Christian faith proclaims as something to be believed on the authority of the Word. Salvation has been transformed from forgiveness into religious virtuosity.[2]

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[1] *Glaubenslehre*, #108:2.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, #109:2.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Die Mystik*, p. 246. The subquotation is from, *Reden*$^{2-3}$, p. 94; *S.W.*, I:1, p. 237.

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[1] See above, this chapter, pp. 110-112.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #87.

[3] Ibid., #87:1.

[4] Ibid., #88:4. The new corporate life is "simply the supernatural becoming natural." #88:4 also contains a footnote referring the reader to Ibid., #13:1, where Jesus' appearance and the absolute potency of his God-consciousness are described as being completely within the normal range of human capabilities. In #13:1, "the appearace of such a life is the result of the power of development which resides in our human nature." "The temporal appearance [of the perfect God-consciousness] in one particular person must at the same time be regarded as an action of human nature, grounded in its original constitution and prepared for by all its past history, and accordingly as the highest development of its spiritual power."

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[1] Ibid., #106, especially #106:1.

[2] Ibid., #80:2.

[3] Ibid., #74:4.

[4] How often, for example, has the sinfulness of professed Christians been given as an excuse for avoidance of all contact with the Christian church or the message which it proclaims? On the basis of just this one example, Schleiermacher's distinction between "causative sins" and "non-causative sins" would seem to be rather difficult to maintain.

[5] Recall that above, this chapter, pp. 94-96, in connection with the discussion of Christology, it was pointed out that the community replaces Christ as the effective agent of salvation. Christ himself is the founder of the saving community. In discussing the communication of Jesus' sinless perfection, wherein salvation consists, Schleiermacher notes, Glaubenslehre, #88:2, that "there is given to us, instead of his personal influence, only that of his fellowship, insofar as even the picture of him which is found in the Bible also originated in the community and is perpetuated in it."

At every point which has been examined thus far, Schleiermacher attempts to portray faith in historical categories and this effort has consistently been identified, by Brunner, as historicizing, i.e., the reduction to history and historical categories of that which cannot legitimately be reduced to history. The time has come, therefore, to confront the problem directly by inquiring into the legitimacy of an assumption which, up to this point, has received little independent examination. If Schleiermacher is to be criticized for reducing faith to history, this assumes that such a reduction is illegitimate. It must be asked, therefore, whether faith does insist on remaining open to categories which cannot, finally, be reduced to history. This question must be asked, moreover, in such a way as not to preclude the fullest possible meaning of faith for history and historical existence. After examining Brunner's answer to this question, I shall relate his answer to Schleiermacher's theology.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 251.

[2] In this section, as in most others, Brunner notes the presence, especially in the Glaubenslehre, of certain remarks of Schleiermacher which point in an altogether different direction. For example, Schleiermacher remarks that real redemption is looking to the person of the redeemer himself (Glaubenslehre, #100:3), that redemption depends on the Word-from-beyond-us rather than on feeling (Ibid., #101:2, where we have blessedness because Christ wills it, i.e., because of Christ's Word, i.e., because of the Word-from-beyond-us). But Brunner concludes, Die Mystik, p. 256, that these random observations of Schleiermacher "are erratic blocks whose strangeness in context forcefully expresses the distance between his conception and the Christian conception of faith. He himself remained with the doctrine of becoming blessedness, the doctrine of endless approximation and its boundless relativism, its purely immanent and this-sided historicism and psychologism."

Brunner frequently begins to answer this question by referring to Calvin. According to Calvin, faith does not deal with the things of this life, i.e., with "either length of years or honor or riches in this life."[1] Rather, "the chief assurance of faith rests in the expectation of the life to come, which has been placed beyond doubt by the Word of God."[2] Faith depends on this "freely given promise."[3] Moreover, hope and faith belong together for hope strengthens and refreshes faith; "hope is nothing else than the expectation of those things which faith has believed to have been truly promised by God."[4] Both faith and hope, which words the scripture sometimes uses interchangeably, have the same foundation which is, in fact, God's Word of mercy.[1] Moreover, Calvin would seem to be correct in claiming, as he does, that his analysis is merely an exposition of scripture. According to scripture, faith is the firm assurance of that for which one hopes.[2] Christianity means being "born anew to a living hope."[3] Even the creation hopes for release from travail.[4] Brunner observes that what faith hopes for is deliverance from sin and that means from the realm controlled by sin, i.e., faith hopes for redemption _from_ history, not _in_ history.[5]

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[1] John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III:II, 28. See bibliography under "Calvini" for editions used.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., III:II, 29.

[4] Ibid., III:II, 42.

> Faith which deserves the name is just as necessarily eschatological as it is necessary that a man must have a head. History is the realm of relativity. But faith has to do with the absolute. Therefore, it is oriented not toward history, but toward the end of history. This is not something which is peculiar to a particular faith, but it is the essence of faith in distinction to mere humanism or mysticism.[6]

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[1] _Ibid_., III:II, 43.

[2] Hebrews 11:1.

[3] I Peter 1:3.

[4] Romans 8:19-21.

[5] _Die Mystik_, p. 258. If the worst possible interpretation is put on this statement, Brunner could be accused of a hopelessly pessimistic and unchristian dualism. But he tries to prevent any such misinterpretation in _The Theology of Crisis_, p. 86.

[6] _Die Mystik_, p. 258. When discussing the problem of eschatology Brunner generally uses the term "_Endgeschichte_." He explains that this term is employed to convey end in two senses: (1) end as _terminus_, the point beyond which there is no more history in the normal sense, and (2) end as

Thus, hope, which is the realistic side of faith,[1] "the necessary and exclusive correlate of objective faith,"[2] may not be given up without abandoning faith itself. "End-historical hope is given together with the transcendental character of faith."[3]

That Schleiermacher stands opposed to this eschatological orientation of faith has been indicated at almost every point in this chapter, but I must still consider his remarks about some "specifically" eschatological proclamations of faith.[4] There is no longer any need for surprise at what we shall find for Schleiermacher's "'eschatology' is just as necessarily a consequence of his concept of religion as his doctrine of sin."[5] I shall begin, therefore, by observing that Schleiermacher suggests nothing comparable to the reality which faith intends by such terms as eternal life, resurrection, etc. Schleiermacher talks of dissolving

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ultimate, that which alone is of final worth. But he is also careful to point out that he does not intend the word in a chiliastic sense.

[1] Ibid., p. 259.

[2] Ibid., p. 261.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Brunner remarks, Ibid., p. 257, that it is significant that there had to be a special "eschatological school" to recover eschatology following Schleiermacher. Modern theology, following in the footsteps of Schleiermacher, he contends, had lost ultimate history (Endgeschichte) because of its concentration on history (Geschichte).

[5] Ibid., p. 262.

the finite in the infinite, a position which prompts him to acknowledge that most people fail to view death as the doorway to this "immortality" because they are entirely too concerned about their own personality[1] or individuality.[2] The first edition of the Reden, with all of its emphasis on individuality, says essentially the same thing.[3] While the reformers speak of death, i.e., our death, being devoured by death, i.e., the death of Christ, Schleiermacher speaks of sinking into as much of the universe as possible so that a greater and more holy longing arises within us[4] and of being one with the Infinite in the midst of the finite.[5] And according to the Glaubenslehre, faith is interested in neither "the facts of the resurrection and ascension of Christ" nor "his prediction of his return to judgment."[6] On the point of eternal life, therefore, Schleiermacher's denials seem so consistent that it is difficult to imagine that he retained the reality which is intended by faith's hope.

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[1] Reden$^{2-3}$, p. 119. S.W., I:1, p. 263.

[2] Reden^{1}, p. 131. Pünjer, p. 131.

[3] See especially, Reden^{1}, pp. 130-133; Pünjer, pp. 130-133. See also, Reden^{1}, p. 52; Pünjer, p. 49, where man robs feeling of its infinity and divinity when he does not realize the quite accidental nature of his form. See also, Reden^{1}, p. 105; Pünjer, p. 106, where the point at which man is immediately related to the universe and that for which religion strives is higher than man's mere humanity.

[4] Reden$^{1-3}$, p. 133. Pünjer, p. 132.

[5] Reden$^{1-3}$, p. 133. Pünjer, p. 133.

[6] Glaubenslehre, #99:thesis.

Actually, Schleiermacher could do little else than abandon the hope of faith in view of the methodological difference which exists between his theology and Christian faith, a difference that becomes clear once more when we consider the meaning of the concept eternity. While faith views eternity as end-history, Schleiermacher views it "as the direct extension of historical reality."[1] While faith hopes for something which is end-historical, because it dares to believe the Word of promise, Schleiermacher enjoys something historical because normal human development has been greatly aided by Jesus. Thus, Schleiermacher considers the doctrine of eternity as a part of the doctrine of the church.[2] Eternity means the consummation of the church, i.e., that time "when all opposition is so completely overcome that in the field of the Holy Spirit's activity nothing in time remains which is hostile."[3] While continuing to think that it is unlikely, Schleiermacher admits that "it is an undeniable possibility that this might take place in the course of human history."[4] The concept of the church, therefore, is the means by which he exchanges, at this point, what is eschatological and individual for what is historical-philosophical and general.[1] But having presented this analysis as Schleiermacher's general position, I must turn more specifically to paragraph 158 of the Glaubenslehre in order to note several particularities. Translated as accurately as possible, paragraph 158 reads:

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 266.

[2] Glaubenslehre, ##157-159.

[3] Ibid., #157:1.

[4] Ibid.

> Just as the belief in the continuance of the human personality is also contained in the belief in the immutability of the union of the divine essence with human nature in the person of Christ, so, for the Christian, there arises out of this the tendency to conceptualize the condition after death.[2]

Several things must be noted. First, eschatology and the hope for eternal life are defined in terms of a tendency, thereby not only reducing the whole matter to naturalistic categories, but also opening it to considerable doubt and counter-argument. Second, by talking in terms of conceptuality (Vorstellung), Schleiermacher provides himself with adequate reason to declare the whole area of eschatology to be of lesser value than most other doctrines of faith.[3] But, notes Brunner, even the New Testament deemphasizes conceptuality, but then does go on to indicate that "in spite of the lack of conceptuality /Unvorstellbarkeit, i.e., a lack of conceptual representation in the sense of mental picture/ the concept /Begriff, i.e., concept in the sense of insight/ of eternal life is identical with the content of faith."[1] By arguing a side-issue, viz., Vorstellung, Schleiermacher hid his denial of the content of faith. Third, paragraph 158 once more shows the inadequacy of Schleiermacher's causal-dynamic categories because again Schleiermacher is forced into some equivocation about his logical basis. Having already stated that the "idea of the consummation of the church is rooted in our Christian consciousness,"[2] Schleiermacher now bases his argument on what Christ says about this matter.[3] Suddenly we are confronted with truth which must be acknowledged.[4] If this position would be carried through with consistency it would mean nothing less than the collapse of the entire structure of the Glaubenslehre.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 266.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #158:thesis.

[3] Ibid., #159:thesis. "We cannot ascribe the same value. . ./to/ ecclesiastical doctrines of the last things . . .as to the doctrines already handled."

Thus, we are again forced to the question of methodology, i.e., does Schleiermacher base his argument on a possibility of human history[5] whose idea is rooted in our self-consciousness[1] or does he base it on Christ's word?[2] The answer is clear, for even where Schleiermacher refers to what Christ says, this position is immediately qualified by the general-philosophical one.[3] What Christ says is true because he is discussing a natural possibility of humanity. Other considerations point to the same conclusion. Whereas faith views earthly existence as wearying, as a paradise lost, as a sickness unto death, Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre might well be viewed as "a theodicy whose goal is the demonstration that we live in the best of all worlds."[4] Whereas faith views sin as a chasm, Schleiermacher views it as a normal stage in the developmental process.[5] Death is transformed from "the last enemy to be conquered" into a part of the natural perfection of the world which is ordained by God and which only the impious one views as evil.[1] While faith hopes "in spite of the given," Schleiermacher is "optimistic, on the basis of what is, about finding the divine in the given."[2] While faith trusts in the paradoxical truth of the divine promissio, Schleiermacher already has the present experiencable possession and enjoyment of God.[3] One can only conclude that whereas faith must employ end-historical categories, Schleiermacher deliberately avoids speaking in these categories. His methodology has precluded any eschatology.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 267.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #157:2.

[3] Ibid., #158:2-3.

[4] But this precise possibility was already denied in Ibid., #158:1.

[5] Ibid., #157:1.

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[1] Ibid., #157:2.

[2] Ibid., #158:2-3.

[3] Ibid., #158:2. "Nothing remains therefore but to say that if we take the utterances of the redeemer about his eternal personal survival as being imbued with his perfect truth, as his disciples undeniably did, then all who are of human race can look forward to survival too. Even so the redeemer continues to be the mediator of immortality, only not exclusively for those who believe on him here, but for all, without exception; in this sense, that if personal immortality did not belong to human nature, no union of the divine essence with human nature to form such a personality as that of the redeemer would have been possible; and conversely, that since God had determined to perfect and redeem human nature through such union, human individuals must all along have possessed the same immortality as the redeemer was conscious of. Such is the true Christian assurance concerning this belief. . . ."

[4] Die Mystik, p. 271.

[5] Ibid., p. 272.

The time has finally come for a shift in emphasis. Until this point, all of Brunner's criticisms have been directed at rather specific items in Schleiermacher's theology. The common conclusion has been that while Christian faith refused to abandon categories which pointed beyond history and historical experience, Schleiermacher insisted on speaking only in categories which limited themselves to history and historical experience.[4] But faith is also concerned about history itself and historical existence as much as it is concerned to preserve the beyond-historical references. Thus, I must examine and compare faith's view and Schleiermacher's view of history. In asking about Schleiermacher's view of history, however, I shall have shifted from concentration on specific elements of Schleiermacher's theology to a consideration of Schleiermacher's theology as a whole since his view of history is so pervasive and dominant that nothing escapes its confines. Brunner's thesis can be stated easily. In reducing everything to history, Schleiermacher has adopted not only a developmental evolutionsim, but a consistent monism. For Schleiermacher, "philosophy of history is thinkable only on the basis of the presupposition of the identity of nature and spirit, on the basis, therefore, of a radical monism."[1] In opposition to this unqualified yes to history, faith's view of history is best summarized in the parable of the tares within the wheat, i.e., history is ambiguous, broken, dialectic.[2] To fail to appreciate the ambiguous character of history is to misunderstand history itself.

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[1] Ibid., p. 273.

[2] Ibid., p. 274.

[3] Ibid.

[4] This statement is subject to the qualification, of course, that there are random statements of Schleiermacher which do point in another direction. While Brunner acknowledges the presence of these statements, he thinks they can be viewed only as exceptions whose presence emphasizes the main thrust of Schleiermacher's argument.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 278. Brunner acknowledges, Ibid., pp. 276-277, the usefulness and necessity of this evolutionary and historical-continuity thinking in dealing with the space-time world. What Brunner objects to is not the scientific use of this presupposition, but the transformation of it into a philosophy of history which treats as one the world of fact and the world of principles, the given and the non-given. It is in this light that Brunner, The Theology of Crisis, p. 102, after considering evolution as a doctrine for the interpretation of history, says that "the teaching of the gospel and the theory of progress are irreconcilable opposites."

[2] Die Mystik, p. 296.

As the Kurze Darstellung informs us, to ask about Schleiermacher's view of history is to ask about his Ethik for Ethik is "the science of the principles of history."[1] Ethik is identified, in principle, with philosophy of history since "all ethical knowledge. . .is the expression of the becoming-nature of reason which has always been begun but has never been completed."[2] As the science of the principles of history, Ethik is related to history as physics is related to nature.[3] Within the realm of Ethik, nature and reason not only are becoming one, but, as presupposition and goal of this process, are one.[1] And when nature and reason are one, is and ought are also one. Thus, "the statements of /Ethik/ dare not be commands, either conditional or unconditional; but insofar as they are commands they must express the real action of reason on nature,"[2] i.e., they must express what is rather than what ought to be. One can say, therefore, that Ethik deals with the is and physics with the ought with as much justification and validity as one can say that Ethik deals with the ought and physics with the is.[3] In the final analysis, "Ethik is physics and physics Ethik."[4] Reason also becomes a given quantitative part of nature.[5] Just as nature moves from the vegetable to the animal,[6] so it reaches its highest level in intellect or humanity.[7] Ethik, then, is a description of the natural process. Good and evil are relative points within this process; good is what is gradually becoming and evil is the lack of this which is gradually disappearing.[1]

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[1] Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen, Kritische Ausgabe heraus. Heinrich Scholz (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1910), #35. Ethik, for Schleiermacher, does not mean primarily the study of morality, but rather it is the basic science of the spirit under which everything from aesthetics to paedogogy is subordinated and finds its place. Thus, for example, the Glaubenslehre acknowledges the subordination of religion and dogmatics to this comprehensive Ethik in the form of the "borrowed" propositions with which the Glaubenslehre begins. See, Glaubenslehre, ##2-6.

[2] Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, #81:thesis; S.W., III:5, p. 47. After considering the argument of this work, Brunner concludes, Die Mystik, pp. 281-282, that despite the formal symmetry between the various elements of Ethik, reason, through its "organizing activity," gradually comes to dominate everything else. While this is, in itself, an interesting and not insignificant conclusion, I have omitted Brunner's remarks because they do not seem essential to his argument.

[3] Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, #95:b; S.W., III:5, p. 58.

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[1] Ibid., #82:thesis, p. 48.

[2] Ibid., #95:thesis, p. 58.

[3] Ibid., #63, p. 39.

[4] Ibid., #61:c, p. 37. For other references confirming the identity of is and ought, see, Ibid., #69:thesis, p. 42; #96:thesis, p. 59; #123, pp. 85-87.

[5] Ibid., #123:b, p. 87. The original formation of reason in human nature is "a part of the evolutionary process of nature."

[6] "Ueber den Unterschied zwischen Naturgesez und Sittengesez," S.W., III:2, p. 414.

[7] Ibid., p. 462.

We are now at the point where Ethik and the Glaubenslehre unite, for Schleiermacher's doctrine of religion also concludes in this "ever increasing becoming-one of the consciousness of God and the consciousness of the world."[2] In the realm of Ethik this is called "organizing activity" and in the realm of religion it is called "religious virtuosity," but the process is the same. Understanding this relationship between the Ethik and the Glaubenslehre clarifies much in the latter that would otherwise be obscure. For example, this explains the otherwise unexplained automatic emergence of the higher self-consciousness which, "as an original and innate tendency of the human soul, strives from the very beginning to break through into consciousness."[3] This higher tendency "unfolds itself," "is born," "steps forward,"[4] i.e., all natural processes. Religion has become one moment in the natural process of development. This understanding also explains why sin can be subsumed under an early stage of development.[5] It explains why the church becomes one sphere within the whole cultural life.[1] What the Glaubenslehre presents as Christianity, concludes Brunner in the face of this evidence, is nothing but "evolutionism masked as Christianity."[2]

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 285.

[2] Ibid., p. 287.

[3] Glaubenslehre, #5:3.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., #67:thesis. "We are conscious of sin as the power and the work of a time when the disposition to the God-consciousness had not yet actively emerged in us."

Viewing this developmental evolutionism as the principle of history, as Schleiermacher does, gives rise to problems which become apparent even before it is compared with Christian faith. First, Schleiermacher has the problem of reconciling his own notion of the "gradual, undisturbed, unbroken upward climb"[3] of history with the facts of real life, facts which have led others to unrelieved pessimism instead of sustained optimism.[4] But, then, actualities need not bother this notion of progress since it is postulated.[5] The "organizing activity" of the Ethik has resulted in a neat and constant progression of thought and work with "no retrogressions, no contradictions, no paradoxes, no dialectic. Here the second phase is simply more complete than the first and the third than the second."[1] A second problem which faces Schleiermacher is identification of the good with the result of the historical process. Schleiermacher's highest good is not a transcendental goal, but the highest level and summation of all partial immanental goods.[2] One participates in producing this compounded highest good by practicing (Uebung) much as one would practice the piano with the result that the whole process becomes increasingly easy.[3] As we shall see below, this way of thinking has considerable consequences for ethics.

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[1] Kurze Darstellung, ##47-48.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 288.

[3] Ibid., p. 291.

[4] Living in the second half of the twentieth century, I am sure we find it just as hard to understand Schleiermacher's optimism about history as did Brunner in the 1920s. But I am also sure that for one living in the age of Metternich and the Congress of Vienna, when the scourge of Napoleon had been lifted from the face of Europe and Britain was insuring the peace, optimism about history was not intellectually unrespectable. But while this may help us to understand Schleiermacher, it does not excuse him for failure to see the disturbing elements of life which persisted even in the age of Metternich.

[5] Die christliche Sitte, S.W., I:12, p. 374. When speaking of the history of the church which progresses from age to age, Schleiermacher says, "We postulate continuous progress." What serves as the guarantee of this continuous

The problems which most concern Brunner, however, are not those which any critic could discover in Schleiermacher's thought, but those problems which emerge when it is compared

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progress is "the idea of the Holy Spirit." Brunner comments on this, Die Mystik, p. 292, n. 2, by saying that the "everything is in flux" of Hereclitus, with no further explanation, becomes "everything moves forward!" Still another example of this postulation is to be found in Kurze Darstellung, #268, where Schleiermacher says that practical theology presupposes a general increase in the religious energy of the community.

[1] Die Mystik, p. 293.

[2] "Ueber den Begriff des höchsten Gutes: Erste Abhandlung," S.W., III:2, p. 457. Schleiermacher says that he employs the expression "highest good" "in the sense in which every whole is greater and more complete than its individual parts."

[3] Die christliche Sitte, S.W., I:12, p. 103.

with the Christian faith. For faith, history is highly ambiguous; it certainly is not unilaterally progressive. History is the place where there are both tares and wheat. Thus, history is the place where we must decide, where we must say either yes or no.[1] One may grant the reality of advance within history, but this is not the significant thing about history. The significant thing is that we always stand over against the divine word of claim, responsible to it.[2] We also know that there is an "end" to history even though we cannot describe this end. But the certainty of this end does not make history itself any less confused or less contradictory.[3]

> Thus, here also Christian thinking and Schleiermacher's system stand over against one another in sharpest opposition. . . . Where Schleiermacher is optimistic--in regard to man in his natural existence, in regard to death, sin, and evil--the gospel is pessimistic. Where he is pessimistic--in regard to the absoluteness and reality of the completion--the gospel proclaims the most reckless optimism.[4]

The significant thing about history is that we always stand over against the divine word of claim, responsible to it, forced to decide. "Without the claim, the categorical imperative, without the call, 'Adam, where are thou?,' which calls us to account and relates us to the Eternal-Right, simultaneously giving meaning to our life and threatening it to the extreme, the gospel is not to be understood. . . ."[1] And this claim which confronts us is: the law. "Ethics, claim, responsibility, law, and crisis are concepts which belong strictly together."[2] But it is precisely the ought, the law which Schleiermacher negates by identifying law with non-being.[3] Laws, therefore, dare not be imperative if they are to be meaningful, for the statements of *Ethik*, we learned, are indicative rather than imperative.[4] Thus, it is a matter of indifference whether the is or the ought is assigned to physics or to *Ethik*[5] because, in the final analysis, physics and *Ethik* are the same.[6] Freedom, now, becomes a matter of power, i.e., having the power to do something.[1] Thus, freedom extends as far as life itself; "even the plants have their freedom."[2] By insisting on the continuity of nature and spirit, on the evolutionary interpretation of historical life, on the indicative nature of law, on the naturalization of freedom, Schleiermacher's underlying philosophy of history forces us to question his ability to understand the ethical realm just as it forced us to question his ability to understand real historical events.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 296.

[2] Ibid., p. 297.

[3] Ibid., p. 299.

[4] Ibid., pp. 299-300.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 300.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 301.

[3] *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, #93:thesis; *S.W*., III:5, pp. 55-56: "If ethical knowledge is expressed as law or ought, this expresses. . .only a non-being." *Ibid*., #95:a, p. 58: "Ought exists only where and insofar as it is a non-being." *Ibid*., #95:d, p. 58: "The style of ethics is the historical for only where appearance and law are given as the same is there a scientific view. Its style, therefore, can be neither imperative nor advisory."

[4] *Ibid*., #95:thesis, p. 58. "The statement of /Ethik/ dare not be commands, either conditional or unconditional; but insofar as they are commands they must express the real action of reason on nature."

[5] *Ibid*., #63:a, p. 39.

[6] *Ibid*., #61:c, p. 37. See also, *Dialektik*, H. p. 211, where the ethical human is merely a "final member" of the whole natural process.

Questionable as the notion of continuity between all of life may be in other realms,[3] it is even more so in the ethical realm, Brunner makes his point as follows:

> Ethical thinking is possible only on the basis of the presupposition, "there is good and evil"; and the idea of good or being related to the good is absolutely different from the idea of evil or being related to the evil. The opposition between the two is not only an ideal one, but is also an existential one, i.e., disobedience and obedience, correspondence and contradiction as fact, as decision.[4]

To attempt to define ethical freedom in terms of nature, power, natural causality, as Schleiermacher tries to do, is to attempt the impossible. One can relate natural causality and genuine ethical freedom as little as one can hear colors or see tones or speak of the squareness of love or of the color of the multiplication tables.[1] Quality and quantity stand opposed to each other just as obedience and disobedience. But in Schleiermacher's thought, ethical terms come out sounding like technical terms.[2] The ground of genuine ethical freedom as well as the ground of our knowledge of freedom is the ought which confronts and addresses us,[3] but Schleiermacher has abandoned the ought in his demonstration of the continuity of the natural and the spiritual. Pushed to its final conclusion, this means nothing less than that Schleiermacher has lost ethics itself. For Schleiermacher, the actions of a Napoleon or a Hitler cannot be differentiated from the actions of a St. Francis or a Bonhöffer. But while Schleiermacher speaks of bearers of differing quantities of energy and is forced to judge all equally, faith insists on placing ethical decisions in the context of law and that means coram Deo.[1] But to place actions before God means that those actions are either obedient or disobedient and to be disobedient means to be a sinner. Once more Schleiermacher's thought, viz., his ethics as effected by his philosophy of history or Ethik, stands in the strongest possible opposition to the Christian faith.

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[1] Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, #104:a; S.W., III:5, p. 64.

[2] Dialektik, H., p. 198.

[3] Not only is it questionable in the realm of historical events as was indicated immediately above, but it is equally questionable in the area of logical truth. What continuity is there, for example, between "A" and "not-A"? Or, to take another instance, it is certainly not novel to point out that even the claim "everything is relative" presupposes some absolute validity which cannot be relativized on the scale of continuity.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 309.

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[1] Ibid., p. 310.

[2] Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, #112:thesis; S.W., III:5, p. 75. Duty is defined as "the procedural manner" (Verfahrungsart) in which a good is brought into being. See also, Ibid., #111:thesis, p. 74, where virtue is defined as the way in which reason, as power, enters nature.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 307.

[4] Strictly speaking, of course, the actions of the one may be more efficacious than the actions of the others but this brings Schleiermacher no closer to the ethics which speaks of norm and claim.

In this consideration of the ethical realm as it is influenced by Schleiermacher's Ethik or philosophy of history, the outlines of still another issue begin to emerge. The fact that Schleiermacher's Ethik makes reason (Vernunft), i.e., reason acting on nature, the subject of ethics leads to the question of whether Schleiermacher's philosophy of history does not also force him to abandon the individual person in favor of the impersonal.. In short, does Schleiermacher see the human as an individual person or does his philosophy of history force him to view the human as an item of differentiation?

Ethik, we learned, deals not with the actions of individuals, but with the action of reason on passive nature.[2] The entrance of reason into nature, including human nature, is completed only in the fragmentation of nature into a multiplicity of individual essences.[1] This fragmentation, in turn, illustrates the "principle of differentiation" by which reason is fully embodied only in this differentiation.[2] This means that the individual is a moment, a stage in the process of the becoming-nature of reason. Knowing that individuals are necessary but that every given individual is quite accidental helps to explain, for example, why Schleiermacher is able to subordinate concern for personal life after death to "the consciousness of the human race and nature."[3] This also helps to explain the concern of the fifth speech of the Reden for "positive" religions, i.e., to be fully real the essence of religion must be embodied in some concrete individual form, but the individual form is quite accidental.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 314.

[2] Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, #80; S.W., III:5, p. 47.

It will be noticed that the immediately preceding quotations all come from later works of Schleiermacher. The same conclusions must be drawn, however, in regard to his earlier works for they too express the same principle of individuation. Despite the fact that the first edition of the Reden seeks to contemplate the infinite in the particular finite, this multiplicity and individuality is merely the "symbol" of infinite and living nature.[4] Schleiermacher urges his readers to note "how all differentiation and all opposition is merely an empty name."[1] While the shift from the first edition of the Reden with its joy in the inexhaustability of forms to the later works with their view of individuality as quite accidental may be regrettable from an aesthetic point of view, the shift is inconsequential from an ethical point of view.[2] In both cases, "the species is higher than the individual because it is species; the impersonal world-goal is higher than some personal goal because it is impersonal."[3]

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[1] Ibid., #157, pp. 116-118.

[2] Ibid., #163:b, p. 124.

[3] Reden^3, p. 140, n. 21 to Speech II. S.W., I:1, p. 282.

[4] Reden^1, p. 53. Pünjer, p. 50.

Once again we find Schleiermacher's philosophy of history to be in opposition to the reformation-evangelical view. While the former is concerned about individuation and only passingly concerned about the individual, the latter is greatly concerned about the individual and only passingly concerned about individuation.[4] Faith is concerned about the individual because it is the individual, not the historical process, which stands before God. Indeed, this standing before God is what makes the individual a person, i.e, a responsible person.[5] Of course, the same claim of God which confronts me and makes me an individual also makes all others to be individuals.[1] But this is far removed from the principle of differentiation of the Ethik or even the more romantic individualization of the early Reden. While the man of faith is confronted, claimed, and made a responsible person, the individual of the Ethik is submerged in some impersonal greater whole. Thus, Schleiermacher's philosophy of history caused him to lose first history itself, then the ethical, and now the responsible individual who is the subject of ethical actions.

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[1] Reden[1], p. 86. Pünjer, p. 91.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 320.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 321.

[5] Ibid., p. 313. "I is a second person, the other name for the thou which God speaks to us." Brunner does

This rather lengthy analysis of Schleiermacher's theology was necessary in view of Schleiermacher's manifest desire to establish religion independent of any philosophy or science.

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admit, Ibid., p. 321, that Schleiermacher is correct in subordinating the individual to the whole when one considers man as a part of nature. It is only in the realm of the ethical, i.e., being claimed by God, that the individual attains full seriousness. Brunner develops this notions of the unique individual with much greater clarity in other places. E.g., in "Das Einmalige und der Existenzcharakter," Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie, III, No. 3 (1929), 268, Brunner proposes that neither philosophy nor mythology can truly conceive the individual, but only a faith in creation in the Judeo-Christian sense, i.e., faith "that the one God is the Lord of the world, its creator." This leads Brunner to say, Ibid., 269, that "history, in the narrow sense of the word, is the nation of Israel." Also in Der Mittler, Brunner operates with the principle that only a revelation, once for all, can be a basis for genuine uniqueness. This last principle is stated succinctly in, "Das Einmalige und der Existenzcharakter," 272ff.

[1] Die Mystik, p. 322. Because ethics sees all men standing before God as equally responsible individuals, it opposes the egoism of a false aristocracy. But because ethics sees all men standing before God as equally responsible individuals, it opposes the commonality of a false democracy.

The evidence which Brunner has gathered leads him not only to doubt the accuracy of Schleiermacher's claim of independence or lack of any philosophical system, but also to conclude that "the whole theory of Schleiermacher is conditioned by such a system in its form, content, and method and this system is nothing else than a religious-philosophical system disguised as Christianity."[1] For Schleiermacher, "religion and philosophy are the two coordinate sides of the one and the same God-consciousness."[2] True, there are places, especially in the Glaubenslehre, where another contrary element seems to assert itself, viz., the presentation of the Christian faith as a matter of Word, truth, perception, acknowledgment, decision,[3] so the final problem becomes one of determining the relationship between these two elements of Schleiermacher's thought. Which one is basic?

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[1] Ibid., p. 325.

[2] Ibid., pp. 325-326. This is an appropriate place to warn the reader against at least two misinterpretations of what Brunner actually says about Schleiermacher. First, Brunner is not saying that Schleiermacher's religion is the product of his philosophy or that his Glaubenslehre is the product of his Dialektik or Ethik. As true coordinates, neither side of Schleiermacher's thought could manage without the other. The "system" underlies both the philosophy and the religion. Second, it is inaccurate to select one of what Brunner identifies as the two sides of this system and then to present this as "Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher." Thus, it is inaccurate to say that Brunner calls Schleiermacher a "mystic"; Brunner calls him an "identity-philosophical-mystic" by which he means to include both sides of the system. Beyond all of this, of course, there is always the additional reservation that Brunner is attempting to deal only with Schleiermacher's thought and not with the man. Brunner is always willing to admit that the man is much more complex and more contradictory (and, therefore, more Christian) than his formal thought.

[3] It will be recalled that at numerous places throughout this chapter I indicated that Brunner was aware of and

> Our answer is: the basic idea and the system conditioned by it are not burst asunder by the Christian element, but are merely disturbed by it so that at some places there is maximum disturbance and at other places minimum disturbance. The point at which the disturbance is at a maximum is the doctrine of Jesus Christ; the closer a specific theological notion approaches this central point, the greater the deformation of the original basic idea becomes, while farther away from this point the disturbance is slight and often not noticeable at all. But in spite of the disturbance, the inner construction, the method and the content of the theological concepts remain in unbroken connection with the basic idea and, therefore, in spite of all attempts at approximation, remain in opposition to the Christian faith. The Christian matter is, so to say, assimilated by the system without essentially changing it.[1]

In view of this strong conclusion which has been the goal of Brunner's investigations from the very beginning, it is necessary to begin the conclusion of this chapter with a consideration of "the system" of Schleiermacher as seen by Brunner. This system will be discussed according to its two obverse sides: the noetic-philosophical-theological system which Brunner terms the "system of equilibrium" and the emotional-individual side termed "mysticism." The sense in which Brunner uses these terms will become clear as they are discussed.

The basic part of Schleiermacher's system of

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identified divergent motifs in Schleiermacher's thought, but for the most part these remarks of Brunner have appeared here as qualifying footnotes.

[1] Die Mystik, pp. 326-327.

equilibrium is his "identify-philosophy." By "identify-philosophy," Brunner means that system which ultimately resolves such opposites as thought-being and spirit-being into some state of identity. Two ideas characterize this system.

> [The first characteristic idea is] *the unity of opposites* or oppositionless unity, the "indifference" of nature and spirit, ideal and real in that unknowable X which is here called God. By the term "God" nothing else shall or can be understood than the oppositionless but, precisely because of that, unknowable unity of all opposites, the point of identity.
> [The second characteristic idea is] *the relativity of all opposites*. If God is the identity of opposites, then these opposites cannot, in the last analysis, be opposite. . . . Spirit and nature, ideal and real, freedom and necessity, good and evil, godlessness and piety, sin and redemption are not counter-theses (Gegen-sätze), but poles which are bound up by an unbroken chain of intermediate points. . . . The great watchword of this philosophy or religion is: "both. . . and. . . ."[1]

Schleiermacher, of course, puts his own stamp on these two logically correlative ideas which comprise his identity-philosophy. For Schleiermacher, we come to know the absolute identity or unity, in which opposites are resolved and grounded, through feeling in which the absolute God and the self are "somehow" identical.[2] But even this does not seriously alter the nature of a general identity-philosophy. The really unique Schleiermacherian element is the idea of "hastening towards a goal."[3] Here the tranquil state of identity is invaded by the notion of goal which implies rank and non-neutrality. The combination of these two ideas which, in the final analysis, are contradictory is accomplished in the notion of "constancy," i.e., the steady unbroken progress of the world-process toward its goal of identity.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 328.

[2] *Dialektik*, H., p. 217.

[3] *Der Mittler*, p. 18. (E.T., p. 37.)

The longer Schleiermacher continued with his system of equilibrium, however, the more still another element intruded, viz., "the Christian faith as it is developed in the churchly reformation doctrine."[2] Schleiermacher tried, with varying degrees of success, to assimilate this element into his system also by means of the idea of constancy.[3] Brunner can express only amazement at the task which Schleiermacher has set himself. The system of equilibrium cannot begin to comprehend the break which the Christian faith sees running through all of reality, a break which can only appear as dualism to a system of equilibrium.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 329. Above, this chapter, pp. 80-81, when the notions of identity and goal-orientation were first presented side by side, I indicated some of the logical difficulties involved in the attempt to combine them. Since that time various other phenomena have appeared which must ultimately find their proper place of reference at this point, e.g., the objectification of the spirit and the reduction of spirit to nature, the understanding of norms as mere indications of the difference which remains between present accomplishment and ultimate goal, and the evolutionary progressive philosophy of history with its various problems. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, the important thing is not the problems that Schleiermacher might have in attempting to hold together the notions of identity and goal-orientation, but the fact that he does attempt to hold them together by means of the notion of constancy.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 333.

[3] Ibid.

> Between Creator and creature, sin and grace, election and dammnation, wrath and reconciliation there are no continuous transitions, no transitions at all. Here the opposition yes-no has increased a thousandfold because it has become existentially personal. Between salvation and lack of salvation there is no continuity, no both. . .and. . ., but only either-or.[1]

Schleiermacher's system of equilibrium must be examined, therefore, in the light of the Christian faith with which Schleiermacher tries to combine it. Moreover, since "it belongs to the essence of the Christian faith that the how of faith (*fides qua creditur*) and the what of faith (*fides quae creditur*) are absolutely inseparable,"[2] both the material and the formal aspects of the system of equilibrium must be compared with the Christian faith.

The what of the Christian faith (*fides quae creditur*) has a definite and irreversable internal relationship, a relationship based on the irreversability of time.[3] This does not mean that Christian faith bases itself on normal and experienceable time or history, but on the limits of time and history, on the "back" of primal-history, i.e., creation and fall, and on the "forward" of end-history, i.e., eschatological final redemption. Therefore, the material comparison of the system of equilibrium and the Christian faith will proceed by means of a comparison at the points of creation, the sinful fall, reconciliation, and final redemption. The comparison of the two on these four points will be an exposition of this thesis:

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 334.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 335.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 336.

> Because the "back" has no place in the thought of Schleiermacher, the four characteristic points and, with them, the whole "eschatological" primal-end-historical character of the faith must completely disappear. The basic structure, the innermost meaning of all of Schleiermacher's theses, even though they may look ever so Christian, is, therefore, wholly and completely non-Christian.[1]

What Schleiermacher says about the Creator-God is actually the presentation of the "X" which is the identity of all opposites.[2] According to Schleiermacher, what we know about God refers either to this fact[3] or to the relationship between our feeling of absolute dependence and God as its "X."[4] But not only does the God of the system of equilibrium lack all attributes,[1] but his relation to the world is conceived quite differently than in Christian faith. Instead of a Creator who freely chose to create, Schleiermacher presents a God who cannot be thought of apart from the world; God and the world are correlative.[2] The only thing that seems to prevent them from collapsing into one another is the fact that God is the unity of multiplicity while the world is the multiplicity of unity.[3] The climax comes with the destruction of the distinction between reality and possibility in God,[4] a position which the Dialektik confirms by admitting that it makes no difference whether this unity of will and reality is called "fate, nature, providence, or divinity."[5] It must be emphasized that Schleiermacher's "Christian" doctrine of God does not alter this; it merely confirms it.[1] Schleiermacher's willingness to identify creation and preservation[2] sounds more like *creatio continua* than like *creatio ex nihilo*.[3] Indeed, to speak of an *act* of creation is anthropomorphism,[4] a position which is quite understandable in view of the fact that there are several reasons why creation should be conceived as eternal rather than as temporal.[5] In dealing with the doctrine of God, therefore, we must conclude that the "disturbance" which the Christian faith creates in Schleiermacher's system is almost zero.[6] "The living God of the Bible and the reformation faith is unknown in the *Glaubenslehre*."[7]

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[1] Ibid., p. 337.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #55:2. "We have often attempted already to present the divine mode of existence above the opposition by means of a gathering up of opposites."

[3] Die Mystik, p. 337. At this point Brunner quotes from the first (1821/1822) edition of the Glaubenslehre, #64:1, but I was unable to locate a copy of the first edition of the Glaubenslehre to verify his reference.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #50:thesis. "All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to him." Also, Ibid., #50:3, Schleiermacher remarks, after rejecting several false ways of trying to describe God, that even in "the purely dogmatic presentation" "nothing can be taken as fundamental save that in the divine essence which explains the feeling of absolute dependence."

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[1] Brunner concludes, Die Mystik, p. 338, that the Glaubenslehre with its denial of attributes differs only in degree of sophistication from the Reden with its assertion that all representations are "empty mythology" (Reden[1], p. 56; Pünder, pp. 58-59.

[2] Dialektik, J., ##216-225. S.W., III:4:2, pp. 154-168. The burden of this entire section is to say that there is "no world without God and no God without world" (Ibid., #215, p. 167).

[3] Ibid., #219:1, p. 162. "The two are not identical. For God is always thought of as unity without multiplicity and the world as multiplicity without unity; the world fills space and time, divinity is spaceless and timeless; the world is the totality of opposition, the divinity is the real negation of all opposition."

[4] Glaubenslehre, #54:2.

[5] Dialektik, H., p. 246.

Turning to the problem of sin as it is seen by the system of equilibrium, we come to "the point where the Christian or non-Christian nature of a *Glaubenslehre* is to be decided."[1] The Christian doctrine of the fall and of sin is meant to emphasize the radical inexplicability of evil and the break in God's good creation, not to explain it. It has already been established that Schleiermacher does the precise opposite,[2] so the problem here becomes one of determining how he was able to assimilate the Christian doctrine into the system of equilibrium. He does this by reinterpreting traditional Christian notions in an evolutionary sense, an evolution with no gaps or breaks, but only smooth consistency. The Christian status integritatis becomes the goal of the natural process which even now is not totally absent.[3] The status corruptionis becomes the negative side of God-given nature, i.e., the later beginning of the higher self-consciousness.[4] The notion of divine wrath is rejected[5] and punishment is promptly subjectivized into the sinful human's interpretation of certain things in the world which, in themselves, are quite neutral.[1] Under the verbal shell of Christianity, therefore, is hidden the most complete and unbroken evolutionism; it is the system of equilibrium.[2]

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[1] Recently, Paul Frederick Mehl, Schleiermacher's *Mature Doctrine of God as found in the Dialektik of 1822 and the second edition of the Christian Faith (1830-31)* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc., 1961), made a rather detailed defense of the thesis that the philosophical doctrine of God and the dogmatic doctrine of God are, in fact, the same doctrine.

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, #38:1.

[3] *Die Mystik*, p. 340.

[4] *Glaubenslehre*, #41:thesis, #41:1.

[5] *Ibid*., #41:2.

[6] *Die Mystik*, p. 340.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 341.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] See above, this chapter, pp. 102-110.

[3] Glaubenslehre, #57:1. "By the perfection of the world nothing is to be understood here except. . .that the totality of finite existence, as it influences us,. . .works together in such a way as to make possible the continuity of the religious self-consciousness." Also, Ibid., #60, defines the original perfection of man as the capacity of the human organism to entertain and to express the God-consciousness.

[4] Ibid., #67:2. Sin "is due to the advantage gained by the flesh during the prior time," i.e., during that time before the God-consciousness began to develop.

[5] Ibid., #85.

On the face of it, the Christian faith would seem to have fared somewhat better in its encounter with the system of equilibrium at the point of reconciliation in Jesus Christ. After all, the Glaubenslehre is constructed somewhat "Christocentrically" with the first part describing the condition of man apart from redemption in Christ and the second part describing this redemption in Christ.[3] But unfortunately this external form is not based on and supported by any comparable internal content, for Christ too fits into the dynamistic unbroken system of equilibrium.[4] Considered by himself, Jesus is a quite special man, but he differs from other men merely quantitatively and gradually rather than qualitatively and essentially. Jesus' God-consciousness (the being of God in him) was perfect while our God-consciousness (the being of God in us) is imperfect.[1] Nor does he fare much better as the initiator of faith where he is the historical impulse who tremendously speeds up the process of redemption.[2] Having thus transformed Christ, Schleiermacher completes the reinterpretation of the Christian concept of reconciliation by reversing and reinterpreting the Christian concepts of reconciliation and redemption. For Christian faith, reconciliation proceeds from the sacrificial Word on the cross and is the basis for redemption which is a new creation beyond history.[3] For Schleiermacher, however, redemption is the empirical effect which Christ has on the religious self-consciousness[4] and reconciliation is the secondary and subjective matter of being released from the unpleasantness connected with the dominance of the flesh, i.e., being released from sin.[1] Now the problem is not so much that Schleiermacher gives a new definition to familiar words. New definitions may be confusing at first, but they are constantly being formulated, partly out of necessity. But the disguising of a totally new thought pattern under old words dare not go unnoticed. While faith proclaims that God synthetically declares the sinner to be justified, Schleiermacher treats justification as something subsequent to giving up sin and entering into communion with Christ.[2] Despite the fact, therefore, that the notion of constancy is broken here to the extent that there is "one man who, contrary to the usual conditions of human existence, has completely perfected his God-consciousness,"[3] the system of equilibrium is not, finally, broken through. In the end and despite the superficially Christian form of the Glaubenslehre, the content of the Christian faith has been completely exchanged for the content of the system of equilibrium.

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[1] Ibid., #84.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 341.

[3] Once more I must emphasize that Brunner is criticizing the theology of Schleiermacher and not Schleiermacher the man. Thus, Ibid., p. 346, Brunner acknowledges the "Christocentric" construction of the Glaubenslehre and concludes that "doubtless this external construction is the expression of a genuine desire to grant to Christ the position which is ascribed to him in the Christian faith."

[4] Ibid.

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[1] After rejecting any use of the notion of "two natures" in Christ, Schleiermacher asserts, Glaubenslehre, #96:3, that "the distinction between the redeemer and us others" is best described in the observation that, "instead of being obscured and powerless as in us, the God-consciousness in him was absolutely clear and determined each moment, to the exclusion of all else, so that it must be regarded as a continual living presence, and withal a real existence of God in him." But the possibility of the appearance of an absolutely clear and powerful God-consciousness has been present all along. Thus, Ibid., #94:1, Schleiermacher notes that "sin is so little an essential part of the being of man that we can never regard it as anything else than a disturbance of nature. It follows that the possibility of a sinless development is in itself not incongruous with the idea of human nature; indeed, this possibility is involved, and recognized, in the consciousness of sin as guilt, as that is universally understood."

[2] See above, this chapter, pp. 91-99.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 347.

[4] Glaubenslehre, #100:thesis. "The redeemer assumes believers into the power of his God-consciousness, and this is his redemptive activity."

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[1] Ibid., #101:thesis. "The redeemer assumes the believers into the fellowship of his unclouded blessedness, and this is his reconciling activity." Also, Ibid., #101:1, "if we think of the redeemer's activity as an influence upon the individual, we are bound to make the reconciling factor follow upon the redemptive and issue from it."

[2] Ibid., #109:thesis. "God's justifying of one who is converted to him includes the forgiving of his sins, and the recognizing of him as a child of God. This transformation of his relation to God, however, follows only insofar as he has true faith in the redeemer." Brunner is finally led to say, Die Mystik, p. 348, that what Schleiermacher presents is merely a Roman Catholic infusio gratiae.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 350.

The Christian eschatological orientation and hope of redemption is hardly to be noticed in Schleiermacher's system of equilibrium. There is no problem here of determining whether the content of the system has filled the form of the expressions of faith simply because, as was noted above,[1] there is an almost total absence of eschatology. What "prophetic doctrines" there are deal with the completion of the church, i.e., with the continuity of the progress of history and not with personal existence or end-historical reality.[2] We can only conclude, therefore, that in reference to its content, "Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre is not to be reckoned a product of the Christian faith in spite of its Christian terminology, but is one of the forms of mystical-identity-philosophical thought."[3]

To a certain extent, however, Brunner's efforts to demonstrate a difference of content between Schleiermacher and "normative" Christianity were unnecessary, for there have long been those who were willing to grant this while, however, going on to maintain that Schleiermacher's methodology, i.e., doing theology as an exegesis of the pious self-consciousness, represented a move from scholasticism to genuine reformation faith and that his methodology would have to be normative for the future.[1] But this overlooks the inseparability of methodology and content both in theology in general and in Schleiermacher's theology in particular. It is necessary, therefore, to make some investigation of the methodology of the system of equilibrium and to show that, as a methodology, it is opposed to Christian faith.

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[1] See above, this chapter, pp. 117-126.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #157.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 352.

I shall begin with Schleiermacher's concept of religion. As has been pointed out above in several contexts, religion, for Schleiermacher, is basically general, i.e., the religion in all religions, independent of any particular embodiment, but grounding and supporting all embodiments. In the Glaubenslehre this general religion is the "feeling of absolute dependence." Now it would be a mistake to imagine that this general religion or feeling provides no content for the particular religions[2] since "the content of theology should be nothing but the noetic unfolding of just this feeling."[1] There is, therefore, the most intimate relationship between the content of Schleiermacher's theology and the subjectivistic method of reflection by which this content is derived. In Schleiermacher's case, of course, this relationship is complicated by the combination of a "mystical-general (historyless) concept of religion" and the reference to Jesus of Nazareth.[2] The problem is that something which is basically general and not knowledge cannot be more closely defined by reference to the knowledge of a historical fact. Since the essence of religion must be unaffected by any such concrete reference, the effect occurs only within the individual. Thus, Schleiermacher is able to retain the subjective method of reflection even when considering the significance of Christ.

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[1] Albrecht Ritschl is a good example of someone who did just this. While commenting rather unfavorably on Schleiermacher's efforts (e.g., The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation and A Critical History), Ritschl still praised both the scientific nature of Schleiermacher's theology (Schleiermachers Reden, p. 18) and Schleiermacher's decision to exhibit the religious relations "in the frame of the subjective life," a point at which Ritschl acknowledges his own indebtedness to Schleiermacher (Theologie und Metaphysik, p. 54; see also, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, p. 34).

[2] Brunner's analysis here is based on Glaubenslehre, ##32-35.

> This combination is possible, therefore, because the essence of religion, viz., the feeling of absolute dependence, remains unchanged by the reference to Jesus. Religion remains mystical; only now reflection about its eternal ground is also accompanied by reflection about the historical cause of its efficacy.[3]

From the point of view of the content, this has already been confirmed by the discovery that piety is related only causally to Jesus.

The contrast of this method of reflection with the

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 353.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 354.

Christian faith could hardly be stronger.

> Faith, in its essence, is nothing other than the relation to the Word of God in Jesus Christ. Christ is not the cause, but the ground and content of this faith; faith is not a feeling, but precisely the relation to this Word just as knowledge is relation to the truth and personal community is relation to a person.[1]

While, for Schleiermacher, one is first aware of one's pious state and only then does one inquire about its cause, for faith one can say nothing without talking about this reference to Jesus Christ. The method of reflection is an essential part of Schleiermacher's notion of religion in a way in which this can never be said of faith. A few examples will illustrate this conclusion. For Schleiermacher, we learned, justification is the empirical justification of the empirically pious man while for faith justification is the declared justification of the empirical sinner. Theology, for Schleiermacher, then reflects upon this experienced justification. The other contents of the Glaubenslehre are equally counterparts of Schleiermacher's methodology, e.g., the non-objective nature of God's characteristics, the lack of interest in any doctrine of creation, the subjective nature of evil, punishment, and the wrath of God.[2] For faith, however, the fides qua creditur is always a secondary matter to the fides quae creditur. Indeed, faith concerns itself with the fides qua creditur only as one of contents of the fides quae creditur.[1] Thus, rather than being the reaffirmation of reformation faith, "the religious-psychological subjectivism of Schleiermacher is just as irreconcilable with Christian faith as his speculative identity-philosophical metaphysics."[2]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 354-355.

[2] Among the exceptions to this statement, Brunner notes, Glaubenslehre, #74, where Schleiermacher suggests that the believer has something genuinely new which only faith can perceive, and, Ibid., #104:3, where, for a moment, forgiveness is based on Christ's desire for community with us.

At the start of this section[3] it was stated that Schleiermacher's "system" actually had two obverse sides, viz., the noetic-philosophical-theological system which was termed the "system of equilibrium" and the emotional-individual side which was termed "mysticism." By this time it should be apparent that in considering the formal methodological aspect of the system of equilibrium, Brunner was actually crossing the bridge to a consideration of the other side of the system. Having made this transition, the next step is a more specific investigation of Schleiermacher's "mysticism." The preliminary steps in this investigation are a consideration of the concept of mysticism and of the possibility of a "Christian mysticism."

There are at least two possible ways to ascertain the nature of mysticism. One can make an empirical identification of what it is that various forms of mysticism have in common or one can attempt to identify the "inner essence" of mysticism, i.e., what it is that "makes mysticism tick." Both ways will be pursued here. Examining various forms of mysticism, Brunner finds that they share "the tendency toward immediacy of the soul with the infinite, the overcoming of all boundaries, finitude, limits, of all ambiguity."[1] Or, in the words of Evelyn Underhill, mysticism seeks to establish "immediate communication between the spirit of man. . .and that 'only Reality,' that immaterial and final Being, which some philosophers call the Absolute, and most theologians call God."[2] To be more precise, mysticism is present only. . .

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 358.

[2] Ibid., p. 359.

[3] See above, this chapter, p. 142.

> (1) where this goal is defined as the divinization of the soul or, since there is also godless mysticism, absolute removal of barriers, absolutization of the soul, (2) where this goal is felt to be attainable, (3) where one knows a way to the attainment of this goal, and (4) where one knows a last and highest experience of the soul where this goal is attained.[3]

Mysticism, then, is the obliteration of all subject-object distinction, complete unification with the Absolute. And despite the multiplicity of mystical forms, there is a "way" in which this goal can be attained.[1] As Rudolf Otto has taught us, the "way" may differ from mysticism to mysticism and it may be replete with hinderences and unexpected turns,[2] but there is a continuous way from present reality to that future experience where one no longer hopes for his goal because he has it as a present experience.[3] This experience, moreover, inasmuch as the "negative aspect of 'deification'"[4] or unification with the Absolute is the "unselfing" of the self, the submergence of the self to the Absolute,[5] is a solitary experience, for to admit the finality of the boundaries of one's self or the self of others would be to deny the possibility of absolute removal of all barriers.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 369.

[2] Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness (12th ed.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1930), p. 4.

[3] Die Mystik, p. 369.

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[1] Underhill, op. cit., p. 81. "Living union with this One. . .is arrived at by an arduous psychological and spiritual process--the so-called Mystic Way. . . ."

[2] See especially, Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West, trans. Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932).

[3] Underhill, op. cit., p. 81. "Living union with this One. . .is a definite state or form of enhanced life." Also, Ibid., p. 418, "In the words of the Sufi poet, the mystic's journey is now prosecuted not only to God but in God. He has entered the Eternal Order; attained here and now the state to which the Magnet of the Universe draws every living thing. Moving through periods of alternate joy and anguish, as his spiritual self woke, stretched, and was tested in the complementary fires of love and pain, he was inwardly conscious that he moved towards a definite objective. In so far as he was a great mystic, he was also conscious that this objective was no mere act of knowing, however intense, exultant, and sublime; but a condition of being. . . ."

[4] Ibid., p. 401.

[5] This is the thesis of one whole chapter in Ibid., Part II, Chapter IX.

The mere identification of some common characteristics of various types of mysticism does not, however, necessarily answer the question of whether there is some unifying inner bond, some "essence" of mysticism. But the empirical investigation has provided a starting point in seeking an answer to this question. Brunner begins by considering the common tendency toward immediacy or direct unity. On the one hand, this immediacy, this union, this divinization, as the removal of all limits, cannot take place in either thought or will, but must have its "place" in feeling.[1] There is a type of mysticism, therefore, which seeks the ecstatic experience of oneness with the divine. On the other hand, immediacy means that the goal of mysticism is not to become one, but to be one. This is the precise opposite of a momentary experience. Thus, there is a second kind of mysticism which tends toward the transcendence of the particular moment in knowledge.[2] Now while "ecstatic mysticism" and "speculative mysticism" may appear to be opposed to each other, they are, in fact, complementary poles of the same mysticism, for the mystic wants his goal to transcend the particular moment

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 377. Logically, says Brunner, it must be admitted that feeling itself is not a final resting place since one always feels--something! Therefore, many mystics move on to the unconscious. But feeling, vis-a-vis thinking and willing, is one of the indispensable poles of mysticism.

[2] Ibid., pp. 377-378.

(knowledge, speculative mysticism) in which he experiences it, but he also wants to experience and live in (feeling, ecstatic mysticism) his knowledge rather than have it as a mere bit of knowledge.[1] On the basis of this analysis, Brunner thinks it is possible to differentiate the inner essence of mysticism or normative mysticism or "pure mysticism" from broken or slightly adulterated mysticism.[2] Pure mysticism inevitably drives on to a monism which destroys the boundary between God and the world, between God and the self, between the self and other selves. To the extent that mysticism admits the reality, i.e., boundary, of the world or of the self or of other selves, it is broken. The true mystic, therefore will be led to deny the personality of God, his sovereignty, his holiness, since these represent boundaries between God and man which cannot be crossed and also guarantee the personality of the self and its will. In the final analysis, therefore, mysticism is broken only where the independence of personal will and the holiness of God are taken with complete seriousness, i.e., where evil is qualified by the concepts of sin, guilt, and the wrath of God.[3]

The Christian faith differs radically from all of this. While mysticism could be described apart from its particular manifestations with these manifestations being employed merely as illustrations, faith _is_ a relationship to a particular Word, viz., Jesus Christ, in time. While mysticism speaks of becoming one, faith speaks of a spoken justification of the sinner. While mysticism has its goal in experience, faith has only the Word of promise and waits for the experience of its goal. While mysticism speaks of a Christ who is immediately present in the soul, faith speaks of a presence "on the basis of belief in the Word of Christ, i.e., not an immediate presence, but, on the contrary, faith in the mediator, faith in that which now and again happens and confronts us. . . ."[1] "Thus, every continuity from man to God is made impossible by the dual limit of creatureliness and sin. The thing which characterizes all mysticism, therefore, does not exist in faith, viz., a way, a gradual approximation."[2] In view of this strong opposition between Christian faith and mysticism, it is not surprising that Brunner should identify so-called "Christian mysticism" "as a stylistic confusion, as a misunderstanding, as a powerful synthesis of that which does not belong together."[3] There may be a bastard union when both parties are broken or adulterated, i.e., when mysticism has admitted some boundary, some limit for the world, self, or other selves and when Christian faith misunderstands the nature of justification, but in their pure form mysticism and faith stand in open opposition. What is called "Christian mysticism" is really "the recasting of the doctrine of justification into that pseudo-mystical doctrine of grace, viz., the infusion of grace, which has, as its correlate, the road to the perfection of the saints."[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 378-379.

[2] _Ibid_., pp. 379-382.

[3] _Ibid_., pp. 382-383.

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[1] Emil Brunner, "Theozentrische Theologie?: Eine Bemerkung zu Schäders 'Geistproblem der Theologie'," _Zwischen den Zeiten_, IV, Heft 2 (1926), 183.

[2] _Die Mystik_, p. 384.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 386.

This is the point at which Schleiermacher must be considered. His "Christian mysticism" is also a recasting of faith into a mystical way. And yet, his "mysticism" is not mysticism in the grand style, i.e., his mysticism is not allowed to be the totality of life as it would normally be, but is adapted to the modern secular world by being assigned to its "place."[2] Moreover, Schleiermacher's mysticism is qualified, it has been learned, by the introduction of a teleological factor. While identity-philosophy and mysticism are compatible and even complementary, an identity-philosophy combined with a teleology, can hardly be further united with classical mysticism.[1] But by combining mysticism with a teleology, Schleiermacher was able to provide the positive, even optimistic, outlook on culture and history which the modern world demands. Then, in the Glaubenslehre, this mysticism which has already been weakened by its union with teleology, is further weakened by combining it with Christian faith. That the resulting mixture is far from classical mysticism can hardly be denied, but that it is even further from Christian faith can hardly be denied either. The question remains, however, and now becomes the chief question: "Why, in view of the double weakening which had to occur, did Schleiermacher choose mysticism as one partner in this compromise?" Brunner's answer is quite simple. It is only on the basis of the mystical principle that it is possible for modern man to justify himself.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 388. Brunner feels, Ibid., pp. 388-391, that Catholicism, because of its weaking of the Christian concepts of faith and justification, is especially susceptible to some broken or truncated form of mysticism which is mysticism nevertheless. As long as grace is not recognized as a matter of forgiveness, as long as grace is infused, it is mysticism, with its way, which reigns and not Christian faith.

[2] Ibid., pp. 391-392.

From the Christian point of view, then, mysticism is the last truly great opponent of faith and will remain such until the end of time. Like all great opponents, however, its danger resides in the corruption of the considerable truth which it does possess. In fact, mysticism is to the religious side of Christianity what moralism or legalism is to its ethical side. But just as the Christian opposes the righteousness of the Pharisee more than the unrighteousness of the publican, so he opposes the religiousness of mysticism more than the lack of religiousness of some of the other non-Christian religions.[1] Mysticism has frequently kept alive the question of God in the midst of priestly, churchly, and theological petrification. This cannot and should not be denied.[2] Schleiermacher must be given his due.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 392-393.

[2] Ibid., p. 393.

"But the dangerous and destructive element of mysticism is the assertion of its possession of God."[3] The human soul has God and to whatever degree it might not have him at the moment, it is the human soul which initiates the movement, along a secret path which it knows, which finally arrives at God. In short, mysticism divinizes man by removing all obstacles and limits between man and God. But in doing this, mysticism betrays its lack of seriousness, i.e., its refusal to acknowledge limits which do exist.[4] Sin and guilt are replaced by finitude and imperfection. Broken community is replaced by continuity.

The fact that the Christian does acknowledge sin and guilt does not mean, however, that the Christian is a more acute observer of human nature than the non-Christian mystic. Rather, it is God's own revelation in the cross of Christ which discloses to the Christian the actual gulf between himself and the Creator.[1] This revelation takes man seriously by telling him that he, not some part of him, is responsible for sin and that this sin is a personal affront to the personal God. But this same judging word creates community as well as distance.[2] It creates distance by informing us that we do not know God apart from his revelation. But it also creates community by informing us that the one who speaks speaks a word of forgiveness as well as the word of judgment, that the one who speaks is truly an Other speaking to us and not some part of ourselves.

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[1] Brunner remarks, Ibid., p. 395, that both oppositions, i.e., the opposition against Pharisaical moralism and the opposition against mystical religiousness, were embodied in one word by Luther, viz., "works righteousness." It seems to me there is no better word than this one to summarize what Brunner himself has in mind.

[2] Ibid., pp. 394-395.

[3] Ibid., p. 395.

[4] Ibid., p. 396.

> In the last analysis, therefore, mysticism is the self-justification of man. It is no wonder that only faith is capable of breaking through its magic, i.e., the faith which reveals self-justification as an illusion since it proclaims the justification of the sinner by the holy, gracious God. Between these two, therefore, there can be no bond. They constitute the last, highest opposition. It is either the self-justification of man from his own divine depths or the justification by the saving God of the one who is lost and who calls from the depths. Either mysticism or the Word.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 399.

Chapter III

Having reexamined Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher, I am now in a position to carry out the program of evaluation which was outlined earlier.[1] This will be done in two steps. In this chapter I shall consider the relationship of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher to Brunner's own theology. It will be my thesis that a relationship can be seen between these two both formally and materially. Moreover, as might be expected from the fact that Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher is not unambiguously negative, this relationship is not unambiguously negative. The relationship between the theology of Brunner and his critique of Schleiermacher will give rise to certain observations concerning the nature of Brunner's attempt to provide a theology which overcomes the faults in Schleiermacher's theology as seen by Brunner and as presented in the preceding summary of his critique. The second step of evaluation will take place in the next chapter where I shall deal with the validity of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher as an interpretation of Schleiermacher and with the effects that this critique might have. There it will be my thesis that despite the reservations which must be expressed concerning Brunner's critique,

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[1] See above, Chapter I, pp. 31-32.

Brunner's critique is essentially correct. While this judgment does place certain restrictions upon the legitimate use which may be made of Schleiermacher, it does not mean that contemporary theologians should abandon all use of Schleiermacher.

My program to discuss in this chapter the relationship of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher to "Brunner's own theology" presupposes a familiarity with Brunner's own theology. In view of the range and amount of Brunner's writings as well as the continually growing body of secondary material, this is no small presupposition. In view of the importance of this presupposition for this dissertation, it would seem unwise to assume that all readers have a complete knowledge of Brunner's theology. Moreover, I fear the common opinion of Brunner is entirely too simple, taking little account of the complexities of his thought.[1] Certainly the conclusion that Brunner reacted in purely negative fashion to Schleiermacher needs to be considerably modified as I shall point out.[2] For these reasons it seems appropriate to present some introduction to Brunner's theology despite the virtual impossibility of doing justice to Brunner's thought within this limited scope. A brief historical survey of the development of Brunner's theology will provide such an introduction as well as establish in what sense we may speak of Brunner's "theology," i.e., a relatively stable theological position which persisted through the various changes of emphasis.[1]

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[1] A parallel remark is made by Daniel D. Williams, "Brunner and Barth on Philosophy," The Journal of Religion, XXVII, No. 4 (October, 1947), 242. "Brunner's writing has a deceptive smoothness and simplicity on the surface. Underneath there is a dialectical restlessness and a continuous subtle movement. . . . If we are to understand Brunner, it is important to try to enter into the dialectical movement of his thought, which gives life to his formal conclusions."

[2] Not everyone, of course, has made the mistake of concluding this. See, e.g., Carl Y. Ehrhart, "The Conception of *Imago Dei* in the Thought of Emil Brunner" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1954), p. 501.

The period from 1914-1918 may be identified as Brunner's "pre-critical" period.[2] Under the direction of his teacher, Leonhard Ragaz,[3] Brunner attacked the problem of religious epistemology because "the problem of religious knowledge is the modern manifestation of the age old question of the truth of religion."[4] Both Kant and Schleiermacher had made too radical a distinction between faith and knowledge.[5] Despite the considerable service which these two men had done, therefore, in breaking the easy identification of faith and knowledge which had been made by orthodoxy, the radical separation which these men had made could not be tolerated. Brunner found his answer in an understanding of religion and of the religious consciousness which was strikingly similar to that of Schleiermacher.[1] Here, in the realm of the ineffable, is the relationship between faith and knowledge which we only begin to disclose in symbol, i.e., "the language of the inexpressible,"[2] "the language of life."[3] By virtue of this Schleiermacherian presupposition, Brunner "created the possibility of devising an independent theory of religious knowledge."[4] The subject of this religious consciousness and religious knowledge is the free spiritual person who knows himself to be both a part of nature, i.e., to be subject to natural causality, and beyond nature inasmuch as he feels himself bound by norms.[1] These norms or values, which are objectively valid, form the content of the religious experience and are independent of the "needs" of the subject.[2] In fact, "religious knowledge is the knowledge of a superworld which is implicitly contained in the consciousness of ethical norms."[3] Even such a hasty sketch as this indicates both the similarities and dissimilarities which existed between Brunner and Schleiermacher at this early stage. Both had a strain of practical mysticism at their base and both identified an inner experience as the point at which the religious subject and object become one. But even at this time Brunner was already conscious of the danger of subjectivizing this whole position, a danger which he saw fulfilled in Schleiermacher.[4] The reference to law and norm is Brunner's first attempt to guard against any such subjectivism.

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[1] The division which is made in this historical survey has been borrowed, with minor revision, from Yrjö Salakka, Person und Offenbarung in der Theologie Emil Brunners während der Jahre 1914-1937 (Helsinki: Luther Agricola Gesellschaft, 1960). The same division, again with minor modifications, is also employed by Roman Roessler, Person und Glaube: Der Personalismus der Gottesbeziehung bei Emil Brunner (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1965).

[2] Salakka, op. cit., pp. 34-52.

[3] Emil Brunner, "A Spiritual Autobiography," The Japan Christian Quarterly, XXI, No. 3 (July, 1955), 241. Brunner writes, "As a pupil and under Ragaz's auspicies I wrote my first book, Das Symbolische (1913), at the age of 23."

[4] Das Symbolische, p. 1.

[5] Ibid., pp. 2-6.

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[1] Ibid., p. 6. It is necessary, says Brunner, to find "an independent theory of religious knowledge. We do not wish to degenerate to an unlimited subjectivism and so we do not begin with Kant's grounding in reason. Nor do we wish to do violence to living, unique, pure religion and so we must try both to understand its 'knowledge,' i.e., its expression of being, from within and not from an external point of view and to differentiate true from false. Both postulates are fulfilled when we succeed in finding within the religious consciousness its own ingredients which, in the same manner as the statements of logic and ethics, are 'evident,' i.e., are immediately and underivably valid."

[2] Ibid., p. 37.

[3] Ibid., p. 87.

[4] Salakka, op. cit., p. 40.

The years 1919-1920 are years of transition for Brunner during which it became apparent that the earlier synthesis of mystical-subjective experience borrowed from Schleiermacher and of ethical objectivism borrowed from Kant was disintegrating.[1] The battle against a false intellectualism, which had begun in 1914,[2] continued during this period. The intellect leaves man cold,[3] robbing the beauty of life of its most delicate fragrance.[4] And again it is the human personality in whose name this battle is conducted.[5] But the emphasis of Brunner's comments about personality seems to be shifting during this period, for the kernal of personality is not even partially in feeling or aesthetic experience, but in the fact that the personal self finds non-personal, superpersonal objective truth and is determined by it.[6]

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[1] Das Symbolische, p. 13. It will be noted that from the very start of his career Brunner insisted on the closest possible connection between personality and transcendent norm or law. Our personality consists in the fact that we know ourselves responsible because we are addressed.

[2] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[3] Ibid., p. 49.

[4] Ibid., p. 50, n. 1.

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[1] Three of Brunner's works are of primary importance during this transitional period. They are, Denken und Erleben; "'Der Römerbrief' von Karl Barth," Kirchenblatt fur die reformierte Schweiz, XXXIV, No. 8 (February, 1919), 29-32; and, "Das Elend der Theologie," Kirchenblatt für die reformierte Schweiz, XXXV, Nos. 50, 51 (December, 1920), 197-199, 201-203.

[2] Das Symbolische, pp. iii, 34f., 76ff., and esp. 126ff.

[3] Denken und Erleben, pp. 8, 26.

[4] Ibid., pp. 10, 25.

[5] Ibid., pp. 27-28. "'The highest good of the children of earth is personality.' It is the source of deep truth as well as of the creative act. Only the personal is fruitful; out of personal life comes all true art, all living morality and religion."

[6] Ibid., pp. 28-30. See also, "'Der Römerbrief' von Karl Barth," where Brunner welcomes what he takes to be a call to do battle against modern psychologism and subjectivism. While this provides additional evidence that Brunner was becoming as aware of the danger of subjectivism as of the danger of objectivism or intellectualism, it raises questions about the accuracy of Brunner's interpretation of the first edition of Der Römerbrief. Salakka, op. cit., p. 58, n. 25, points out that the first edition of Der Römerbrief may not have been as clear in its opposition to psychologism and

Salakka remarks that the largely unstated background of this attempt to avoid both objectivism and subjectivism is "a genuine theological perception of God's spiritual kingdom dominated by God's absolute domination, where the claim of the human self and its independence must give way before the sovereign will of God."[1] This new development of Brunner's thinking was finally given form in a programatic essay with the rather ominous title, "The Misery of Theology." According to this essay, theology must combat four evils: (1) causalism with its mechanistic interpretation of the world, (2) the methodology of intuitive feeling with its irrationalism, (3) subjectivistic psychologism, and (4) immanental evolutionary historicism.[2]

During his "dialectical period,"[3] 1921-1928, Brunner waged a continued battle against the dangers identified in

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subjectivism as Brunner imagined it to be. Thus, during this period, 1919-1920, Brunner may well have been more "Barthian" than Barth himself.

[1] Salakka, op. cit., p. 56.

[2] "Das Elend der Theologie," esp. 198-199, 201-203. This programatic essay shows, I think, that the differences between Brunner and Barth which finally exploded in 1934 were present, in some measure, from the beginning. Barth was concerned with the contrast between the immanence of religious experience and the absolute other-sidedness of God, leading him to emphasize the qualitative difference between God and man. Brunner, on the other hand, was concerned with the contrast between the spiritual and the psychical, leading him to the problem of religious knowledge. The two concerns are not necessarily the same. On this point, see, Salakka, op. cit., p. 60.

[3] Salakka, op. cit., pp. 62-136.

"Das Elend der Theologie," or, as he now put it, against "psychologism and intellectualism, mysticism and gnosticism, pietism and orthodoxy, moralism and metaphysics,"[1] "against the liberalistic cultural protestantism, against the romantic subjectivism, against all experiential theology, in short--against all forms of immanental religion."[2] This many sided battle gradually became focused in Brunner's battle with Schleiermacher and therefore the previous chapter is, in fact, a statement of Brunner's concern during this period.[3] But even in the midst of the mighty "Nein!" which was being spoken against one misunderstanding of Christian faith after another, Brunner was beginning to formulate a theological answer to the several problems which he had raised as a philosopher concerned with religious epistemology. Again and again we meet the phrase, "Verbum est principium primum."[1] While this was not formulated comprehensively enough to preclude misunderstanding and criticism,[2] it did offer a basis upon which Brunner could build as shown, for example, in his ability to move from the norm-responsibility framework of his very first book[3] to the Wort-Antwort framework of this period[4] to the full I-Thou personalism which finally emerged in 1938.[5]

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[1] EEG, p. 129.

[2] Roessler, op. cit., p. 20.

[3] Brunner's work during this period is not exhausted, of course, in his conflict with Schleiermacher even though it is focused in that conflict. The total bibliography of Brunner during this period is staggering, but even a listing of the chief works gives some indication of the scope of Brunner's activity. Among the works which have already been introduced are, Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube (1921, 1923); Die Mystik und das Wort (1924, 1928); "Das Grundproblem der Philosophie bei Kant und Kierkegaard" (1924); Philosophie und Offenbarung, "Gesetz und Offenbarung," "Geschichte oder Offenbarung?" (1925); Die Absolutheit Jesu (1926); Der Mittler, Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie (1927). In addition to these, I should mention, Emil Brunner, Die Grenzen der Humanität (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922); and, Reformation und Romantik (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1925).

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[1] E.g., title page of Die Mystik.

[2] E.g., Wilhelm Bartelheimer, Schleiermacher und die gegenwärtige Schleiermacherkritik: Eine Untersuchung über den Subjektivismus (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1931), esp. pp. 114-131. Bartelheimer accuses Brunner of reducing God and his revelation to a super-rational, supernatural, irrational thing by his concentration on such "external categories" as law, norm, meaning, absolute idea, absolute truth. In part, Bartelheimer's argument is based on fiction (e.g., on p. 122 Bartelheimer makes a key reference to Die Mystik, p. 245, and offers a quotation which is simply not to be found on or near p. 245 of Die Mystik), in part, on misinterpretation of Brunner (e.g., on p. 119 Bartelheimer quotes Die Mystik, p. 232; Brunner says there that it is God who is the law and norm of our life and, therefore, contradiction of this norm must be seen as sin, separation, and rebellion, but Bartelheimer makes this read that God is norm and law, i.e., with the connotation that God is totally defined by norm and law), and, in part, on the fact that Brunner had not yet fully developed the personalism implicit in the call-response framework. But the fact that Brunner had not fully developed his position does not excuse Bartelheimer, because Brunner had already made a firm start in the direction of personalism. See, especially, Philosophie und Offenbarung, pp. 26-28, 50-52; EEG, p. 125; and, The Theology of Crisis, pp. 30-34, 54-55.

[3] Das Symbolische.

[4] See Chapter II as the fuller exposition of this period.

[5] Emil Brunner, Wahrheit als Begegnung (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1938). See, Salakka, op. cit., pp. 89-93,

Thus, while the theme of responsibility to God's call may have been clarified with time and while this theme may have been expressed in different terminology, this theme does persist from beginning to end, providing Brunner with a key for the understanding of personality, faith, revelation, truth, and reality.[1] I shall return to these items shortly when investigating the material relationship between Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher and Brunner's own theology.

It seems fairly natural that, as time passed, Brunner should develop some of the more constructive proposals which were implicit in his position even during and before his dialectical period.[2] A purely negative position or concentration on the negative aspects of a position does not answer such questions as "How is revelation possible?" or "What relation to historical existence shall we predicate of such concepts as faith and redemption?" The shift to a more constructive theology may be dated, in Brunner's case, from the publication of his article, "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie,"

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for an account of the first movement of Brunner toward the I-Thou framework of Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber.

[1] Theodore A. Gill, "Emil Brunner as Teacher and Preacher," in Kegley, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-321, suggests, without fully developing the point, that the notion of responsibility is the one key which holds together not only Brunner's theology, but also holds together his theology and his life work as teacher and preacher.

[2] Each of the other dialectical theologians made a similar movement from a basically critical period to a period of more constructive formulation. Thus, the fact of such a shift is not peculiar to Brunner.

in 1929.[1] Brunner now saw the necessity of dealing with "theological anthropology," i.e., the consideration of man as the receptor of revelation. He became more concerned to express clearly "both the transcendental character of the object of revelation and the existential character of the knowledge of faith."[2] In "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," Brunner stated that theology has not one, but two tasks. The first task of theology is to be at the service of the church and the proclamation of the Word, helping to ascertain and to support right doctrine. This is "dogmatic theology."[3] But this first and essential task of theology is not separable from a second task since the meaning of scripture occurs not in a vacuum, but in the sphere of history.[4] Since "the gospel does not come to a man who knows and has absolutely nothing of God,"[5] it is the second task of theology "to show that man can understand himself correctly only in faith and that only through the Word of God does he receive what he secretly wishes."[1] This second task of theology which attacks man at the Anknüpfungspunkt, i.e., the "point of contact" which the Word of God itself creates in man so that man might receive the Word,[2] is called "eristic theology."[3] A fuller exposition of this material will follow shortly, but even this brief introduction should be sufficient to illustrate several remarks. First, by proposing a program of eristic theology, Brunner was opening himself to all sorts of misunderstanding.[4] The most immediate result was the parting of Karl Barth and Brunner in the well known debate of 1934-1935.[5]

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[1] Emil Brunner, "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," Zwischen den Zeiten, VII, Heft 3 (1929), 255-276. Salakka, op. cit., pp. 137-185, designates the period from 1929 on as Brunner's "eristic period." Properly understood, this appellation is reasonably accurate. But the considerable possibility of making an excessively narrow interpretation of this term is so easily realized that I have decided not to use it as a general label.

[2] Roessler, op. cit., p. 26.

[3] "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," 255. This "first task" is largely a restatement of the program outlined in, "Das Elend der Theologie."

[4] "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," 255. The remainder of the article, 255-276, is given to the exposition of this second task of theology.

[5] Ibid., 262.

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[1] Ibid., 261.

[2] Ibid., 262.

[3] Ibid., 260.

[4] Brunner did try to minimize the danger of misunderstanding (Ibid., 262) by specifically denying pelagianism since pelagianism does not see the Anknüpfungspunkt as something essentially negative and as something which is specifically created by God and (Ibid., 258) by specifically rejecting the term "apologetics" since this term implies that theology must justify itself at the court of reason whereas eristic theology is theologia ad hominem, i.e., theology which makes an attack on man and his reason, claiming them for itself but never defending itself before them. See also, The Theology of Crisis, pp. 5-6, where "apologetics" is rejected for the same reason.

[5] The principal materials involved in this debate are, Emil Brunner, Natur und Gnade: Zum Gespräch mit Karl Barth (1. Aufl.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934), (2. Aufl.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1935), (2. Aufl.; Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1938); and, Karl Barth, Nein!, Bd. 14 von Theologische Existenz heute (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1934).

Barth was concerned lest Brunner should reopen the door to the natural theology and unbroken continuity between God and man which both men had earlier opposed. More recently, similar fears and accusations have been expressed by Van Til[1] and Schrotenboer.[2] Second, however, the program of eristic theology must be seen as a logical development in Brunner's continuing concern with the problems of religious epistemology and man's responsibility. The program of eristic theology with its various concomitants is a logical step in Brunner's clarification of his answer to these problems. Finite man knows the transcendent God only when the transcendent God reveals himself to man, but when this revelation does occur, it occurs for historical man. Furthermore, man is responsible, i.e., able to respond to God's call, because God makes him responsible. Theology must try to help all men to understand this responsibility. Eristic theology is directed towards those who, for whatever reason, have not acknowledged this responsibility. When the full personalism of this dialogue was finally begun in 1938, it was merely the next logical step in Brunner's clarification of his answer to these problems.

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[1] Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1946).

[2] P. G. Schrotenboer, A New Apolegetics: An Analysis and Appraisal of the Eristic Theology of Emil Brunner (Kampen: J. H. Hok, 1955), pp. 215-216. "Our investigation compels us to doubt seriously whether Brunner has succeeded to any extensive degree to present a Biblical apologetics. On the contrary, we are forced to conclude that in his struggle, with the spirit of the times he has himself imbibed from the same cup as his contemporaries."

Having made this brief examination of the development of Brunner's theology and of the unity of that development, I am now in a position to resume my consideration of the relationship of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher to Brunner's own theology.[1] My analysis will show that both formal and material connections can be pointed out between these two items.

Brunner could hardly have justified the time and effort which he devoted to his critique of Schleiermacher unless he considered it essential to his task as a theologian. That he did consider it essential is clearly explained in some of his work. According to Brunner, his critique of Schleiermacher was the most important task which confronted him in his function as a dogmatic theologian. Some explanation of Brunner's concept of theology will make clear the meaning of this assertion.

"Theology has its meaning and possibility only within the church."[1] It is based on the church's proclamation which it serves. This does not mean that "proclamation is possible because of theology, but theology because of proclamation."[2] Proclamation is independent of theology, temporally and logically prior to it.[3] Ultimately, of course, both proclamation and theology have their origin and ground in divine revelation, in the Word of God, in Jesus Christ.[4] But theology is not to be identified with proclamation despite their close connection. In and of itself, the church is not primarily interested in theology, but in proclamation.[5] But "the greatest distress, the most severe sickness which can befall the church is the adulteration (Verfälschung) of its proclamation. . . . For just as the truth of its proclamation is the life of the church, so the falsification of its proclamation is its death."[6] It is the task of theology to combat any misunderstanding or falsification of the church's proclamation. "Theology is the care of the truth of the proclamation of the church."[1] The nature and function of theology is determined by the various attacks which are made on the proclamation of the church, on the kerygma. Thus, theology must be rational, conceptual, and scientific *because* the attacks on the church's proclamation are rational, conceptual, and scientific.[2] In fact, the history of the church and of theology shows that there was a theological task long before there was scientific theology.[3] Or, in relation to the abstract conceptuality of theology, what seem to be hair-splitting distinctions from the point of view of the proclamation of the church actually concern nothing less than the being or non-being of the church, e.g., the iota in the controversy between *homoousios* and *homoiousios*.[4]

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[1] In order to make the subject manageable, I shall deal only with that period of Brunner's thought which follows his first less critical flirtation with a Schleiermacherian religious consciousness, i.e., the period since about 1919. This limitation has the systematic justification that while Brunner did offer some criticism of Schleiermacher during his earliest period, this early criticism was not the comprehensive criticism which was made later and which has been presented in this dissertation.

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[1] Emil Brunner, "Theologie und Kirche," Zwischen den Zeiten, VIII, Heft 5 (1930), 404. This analysis of the basis of theology and the following description of dogmatic theology is based largely on the article to which this footnote refers. Much of the same material is repeated, however, in the "Prolegomena" section of, Emil Brunner, Dogmatik, Bd. I: Die christliche Lehre von Gott (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1946), pp. 3-118. (E.T., pp. 3-113.)

[2] "Theologie und Kirche," 397.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 398.

[5] Ibid., 411.

[6] Ibid., 404. The fact that the purveyor of error may do it in the name of the church or that he himself may be a good man, a good Christian, perhaps even a martyr, makes

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no difference; it is his false doctrine which destroys the church. It might also be noted in the context of this discussion that Brunner, *Ibid*., 401-402, defines the church *both* as the bearer of the message of proclamation *and* as the community of believers. In this way he hopes to avoid both the possibility of a "private" religion and the possibility of the "Catholic" definition of the Christian as one who believes correct doctrine.

[1] *Ibid*., 404.

[2] *Ibid*., 411-419.

[3] *Ibid*., 411. One recalls, e.g., that the theology of Luther was largely occasional rather than systematic or scientific, i.e., it was directed against particular misunderstandings as they arose rather than deliberately worked out in its entirety with all interconnections clearly shown.

[4] *Ibid*., 416. Frequently this "hair-splitting" is

When, in defense of the proclamation of the church, theology does engage in reflection, the result is the formation of dogma. "Historically and actually, dogma is nothing other than the denial of false doctrine."[1] Dogma and kerygma must not be confused, of course, for one believes the Word of God, not dogma.[2] Theology, therefore, reflecting upon the proclamation of the church because of the attacks which have been made upon it and producing dogma to guard against these attacks, may be described as the medicine for the sickness of the church[3] or the policeman who curbs the violence of the aggressor,[4] but the product of its work, viz., dogma, is not to be confused with that which it serves, viz., kerygma, any more than the disease which a medicine attacks is to be confused with the health which the medicine seeks to restore.

Now the misunderstandings against which theology must stand guard may arise either within the church or outside of it, i.e., as direct corruptions of church proclamation

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attacked with the phrase "rabies theologica," but Brunner, Ibid., 406, takes it rather as an indication of the seriousness with which the church takes the theological struggle, a struggle which has to do with the health and disease of the church, i.e., with the life and death of the church.

[1] Ibid., 407.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 405.

[4] Ibid., 406.

or as independent positions which prevent the proper hearing of the proclamation. For this reason, there are two complementary branches of theology which are directed against the two sources of misunderstanding. They are, as was stated above, dogmatic theology and eristic theology.[1]

Dogmatic theology is concerned with the direct corruptions of the church's proclamation. In one form or another, this corruption has usually sought to remove the boundary between the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and human thought and history. The form of the falsification changes from age to age, but the kernal always remains the same; it is the establishment of continuity between God and man where none exists.[2] Historically, theology has confronted such errors as Pelagianism, Sabellianism, and Arianism, as well as the orthodox confusion of the divine Word and the human word.[3] In all of these cases the importance of faith, the church, and its proclamation were not subjected to direct attack even though the intellectualizing of them may have had that effect.[4] More recently, however, there has arisen a new heresy which attacks the proclamation itself by attempting to psychologize and to historicize that proclamation.[1] "The religious consciousness, the depth of the ground of reason in man, the general history of religion, the religious intuition remain as the content of the Christian words faith, Holy Spirit, Word of God, and finally Jesus Christ and his cross become the highest religious symbol."[2] Thus, dogmatic theology has, at present a dual task.

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[1] Later, Brunner added still another branch of theology, viz., "missionary theology." See, Dogmatik, I, pp. 109-111. (E.T., pp. 101-103.) I have omitted any consideration of this third type at this point because, it seems to me, it can be accounted for as a logical extension of eristic theology into the missionary enterprise.

[2] "Theologie und Kirche," 405.

[3] Ibid., 404-405.

[4] Ibid., 407.

> On the one hand, it has to rescue the sense of wonder of the message of Jesus Christ, the Son of God and son of man, from all modernizing, humanizing, psychologizing, historicizing weakenings and new interpretations of the biblical use of language and to present it again in its total strangeness and offensiveness; on the other hand, the struggle must be waged against the orthodox confusion of dogma and kerygma, of the Word of God and theological reflection about the Word of God.[3]

But in addition to this "first and essential task"[4] of theology, viz., dogmatic theology, there is a second task which cannot be separated from the first. Since the Word of God comes to men who are already at a particular place in a particular manner, theology must also concern itself with the opinions of these men which might prevent them from properly hearing the gospel.[5] This is the task of eristic theology. More specifically, but sill in general terms, the task of eristic theology is to make the obstreperous reason of man to be obedient, thereby internally freeing and completing reason.[1] In refusing to let reason be its own master, eristic theology demonstrates to man that he "can understand himself correctly only in faith and that only through the Word of God does he receive what he secretly wishes."[2] Thus, it is the proper task of eristic theology "to teach man to understand his own quest for God," to help him see "the duality of his existence, the contradiction whose proper name is sin."[3] Still more specifically, eristic theology combats such enemies of faith as idealism[4] and cynical naturalism.[5] In actual practice, of course, eristic theology attacks concrete instances of misunderstanding in individual men rather than treating them abstractly as we have done here.[6]

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[1] Ibid., 407-410.

[2] Ibid., 408.

[3] Ibid., 409.

[4] "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," 255.

[5] Ibid., 255-256.

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[1] *Ibid.*, 257-258, 260. Reason may interpret this act as opposition rather than as freeing and completion, but it is, in fact, not unequivocal opposition to reason. Otherwise, faith would have to be described as blind faith, as *sacrificium intellectus*.

[2] *Ibid.*, 261.

[3] *Ibid.*, 262.

[4] *Ibid.*, 263-265.

[5] *Ibid.*, 265-266.

[6] *Ibid.*, 266. Lest there be any misunderstanding, it should be noted that, in actual practice, dogmatic theology also deals with concrete instances rather than with abstract or hypothetical cases. As we shall see, this is

It should be clear, by this time, how dogmatic theology and eristic theology are related to one another. Because the proclamation of the church, e.g., in the sermon, is the proclamation of a kerygma to men, theology must guard against misunderstanding at all stages of the process. Dogmatic theology, from its side, is more concerned about speaking directly of the subject matter which is proclaimed, about freeing the subject matter from error so that it might speak for itself. Eristic theology, from its side, is more concerned to relieve the man who is being addressed of any illusions that he might have which would prevent him from hearing the proclamation. Both types of theology are essential since proclamation always proclaims something to someone. But neither type of theology is proclamation; both always stand at the service of the proclamation in which they are grounded.[1]

We are now in a position to understand why the critique of Schleiermacher had such urgency for Brunner. Schleiermacher, in Brunner's opinion, was one of those who stood within the church and corrupted its proclamation. As such, his error could not be tolerated any more than any other error could be tolerated. Schleiermacher's misunderstanding, however, was no ordinary misunderstanding. The complete psychologizing of faith which Brunner thought he detected in

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why Brunner attaked Schleiermacher's theology rather than "psychologism" or "historicism."

[1] *Ibid*., 269-270, 274-275.

Schleiermacher "leads to a complete destruction of the evangelical concept of truth. . . . This false doctrine is the most dangerous, the most dissolutive of all."[1] Other classical heresies which dissolved the paradoxical nature of the proclamation were at least oriented toward the truth which was proclaimed, but the psychologizing and historicizing of Schleiermacher seeks to remove the very foundations of proclamation.[2] The attack of Schleiermacher is the beginning of the end, the beginning of the process which, if carried to its logical and inevitable conclusion, ends in the dissolution of the church into a general cultural movement.[3] Schleiermacher is, of course, not the only person who proclaimed this "modern religion,"[4] but he differs from all others in the greater clarity and consistency of his thinking.[5] For this reason, the position which Schleiermacher proclaimed and, to that extent, Schleiermacher himself, become the chief evils which contemporary dogmatic theology as the guardian of the kerygma which is proclaimed, must combat. The struggle with Schleiermacher is nothing less than a struggle for the life or death of faith, the church, and its proclamation.

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[1] "Theologie und Kirche," 408.

[2] Ibid., 408-409.

[3] Ibid., 409.

[4] Die Mystik, p. 6. While Schleiermacher "is not the greatest representative of the modern religion, still less its creator," he is "one of the greatest factors in this spiritual process."

[5] Ibid., p. 9.

Just as Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher bears a formal relationship to his work as a whole inasmuch as it is the chief task which confronts him as a dogmatic theologian at the present point in church history, so his critique bears a material relationship to the rest of his work inasmuch as much of Brunner's own theology is formulated to overcome the precise problem or problems which he thought he saw inherent in Schleiermacher's position. The mystical-identity-philosophical system of Schleiermacher had completely subjectivized and historicized religion thereby demonstrating its incompatibility with Christian faith. The basic dualism of divine and human had to be protected against this reductive monism. Brunner's task, therefore, was to present a theology which did not psychologize, subjectivize, or historicize faith.

The first step in this process was the differentiation of religion and (Christian) faith.[1] Religion seeks the boundary of life which gives life its meaning, but "religion itself remains throughout on this side of this boundary as a psychological-historical phenomenon."[1] Religion is the human attempt, whether it be in the form of psychologism or intellectualism, mysticism or gnosticism, pietism or orthodoxy, moralism or metaphysics," to reach the divine.[2] As such, of course, religion is not totally in error. What religion attains is a "perverted, distorted, fragmentary" knowledge, but it is a "perverted, distorted, fragmentary knowledge of God."[3] Indeed, the religious quest is one facet of the Anknüpfungspunkt. But in contrast to faith, "religion is a heathen word."[4] Faith--and that always means Christian faith--"is oriented not toward experience, not toward man, but toward God."[5] Unlike the religion whose end is itself,[6] faith "does not believe in itself, but in something which is beyond itself. It is what it is by virtue of the fact that it points to that which it is not."[7]

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[1] Brunner is not quite consistent in making a sharp distinction between these words, but I think the ambivalence is one of usage and not one of content. E.g., in Die Grenzen der Humanität, p. 4, Brunner speaks of religion "at its low point" and religion "at its high point," using the word "religion" for both. But he always seems committed to the notion that there is a "psychological-historical" quest of man which is ambiguous at best and that this religious quest is contrasted with Christian faith which is not an experience.

The problems which are manifested in Schleiermacher's theology and which Brunner tried to overcome can be accounted for on this basis. That is to say, it is because religion is a human historical phenomenon that it is prone to error.[1] On the one hand, since religion is a human experience, it is always prone to subjectivism or psychologism. Moreover, since the "modern" age is characterized by the "tendency to internality," this danger has been realized quite frequently.[2] So much are we confronted by the realization of this danger, in fact, that "we have great difficulty in even understanding the possibility of another ideal."[3] The "pious emotions" of Schleiermacher,[4] the "value judgments" of Ritschl,[5] and the pragmatic American psychology of religion[6] are all examples of this psychologism which reduces the spiritual to the immanent.[7] On the other hand, since religion is an item of human knowledge, it is also always prone to the danger of intellectualism. Intellectualism may take the form of orthodox reduction of divine truth to particular human words[1] or of rationalistic subordination of religion to philosophy or culture.[2] Now these various errors are, in fact, misunderstandings of the truth, for religion should not be totally divorced from either human experience and history or from human knowledge.

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[1] Die Grenzen der Humanität, p. 14.

[2] EEG, p. 129.

[3] Emil Brunner, Die Christusbotschaft im Kampf mit den Religionen (Stuttgart und Basel: Evang. Missionsverlag, 1931), p. 11. Brunner ties this conclusion in with Romans 1.

[4] Die Grenzen der Humanität, p. 21.

[5] Ibid., p. 7. See also, EEG, p. 127.

[6] Die Grenzen der Humanität, p. 23.

[7] Ibid., p. 26. Much the same distinction is drawn in the opening pages of Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie, pp. 3-8. (E.T., pp. 11-21.)

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[1] To the extent that faith is a concern of humans, it too is prone to the same errors. Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, it is the task of dogmatic theology to stand guard at this precise point. But faith, since it is not *merely* a human phenomenon, is not necessarily caught in the same predicament as religion. Faith can avoid both subjectivism and objectivism.

[2] *EEG*, pp. 6-7.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 34.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 38.

[5] *Ibid*., pp. 39-40.

[6] *Ibid*., pp. 40-41.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 41.

Brunner's understanding of faith arises, then, as his answer to the problem of how the misunderstandings of religion can be avoided. But it would be manifestly impossible to present a full account of Brunner's view of faith since this would, in fact, involve a presentation of his complete theology. Such a task is appropriate to several dissertations, not to one small section of one chapter of one dissertation. Nevertheless, the logical development of this dissertation forces me to attempt just that. As a working compromise between the necessity and the absurdity of the task, I shall attempt to expound Brunner's position by examining the presupposition, the structure, and the actuality of faith. While this division is not drawn directly from Brunner, it is, I hope, not too unfair to his position and it does have the merit of enabling us to see, in relatively short compass, how Brunner's own theology, as an exposition of man's responsibility, is his attempt to avoid the various errors which threstened the proclamation of the church and which he had identified, above all, in his examination of Schleiermacher.

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[1] Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie, pp. 13-15. (E.T., pp. 31-36.)

[2] Ibid., pp. 15-17. (E.T., pp. 36-40.)

Faith does have a presupposition. Since the Word of God comes to men who are already at a particular place in a particular manner,[1] since the church always proclaims something to someone,[2] there must be some point of contact, some Anknüpfungspunkt which can be of service to the Word of God. The question of the Anknüpfungspunkt, therefore, is "a practical extension of the church, a question which arises and is understandable only on the basis of the action of the church, on the basis of proclamation."[3] It is "the question of the connection between the 'natural man' and the Word of God, therefore, the anthropological question; put theologically, it is, for us, the question of the possibility and permissibility of the action of the church."[4] But this

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[1] "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," 255.

[2] Emil Brunner, "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt' als Problem der Theologie," Zwischen den Zeiten, X (1932), 508-509.

[3] Ibid., 505. The practical concern of Brunner, i.e., his concern for man's responsibility, is shown quite clearly when he says, Ibid., 529, "The question of the Anknüpfungspunkt is completely understandable and pressing only for him who serves the church as evangelist, as missionary, as pastor or as teacher of religion." Virtually the same words are repeated near the start of Die Christusbotschaft im Kampf mit den Religionen, pp. 2-3.

[4] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 506.

Anknüpfungspunkt, this continuity between man and the Word of God is not an undialectical continuity such as Brunner identified in Schleiermacher. Two formulas, taken together, express the situation. First, "the proclamation of the gospel does not occur, cannot and should not occur *except in a definite continuity* with the general-human and, in particular, with a presupposed general-religious understanding."[1] But second, "the gospel cannot be proclaimed except *as the complete breaking-through of this continuity*."[2] Thus, while the gospel uses man's *Vorverständnis* as a point of entry, it immediately corrects it, indeed, negates it.[3] Now it does little good to identify this *Anknüpfungspunkt*, which stands at the service of the Word of God, as "the whole man" for this is both true and inane. Moreover, it fails to account for the discontinuity as well as for the continuity.[4] Our task is to account for that which the natural man brings with him *and* that which he receives in faith.

The term which expresses both the continuity and the discontinuity, "which expresses both the form and the content of the personal being which is created by God but which has become sinful" is "*imago Dei*."[1] The *imago Dei* or God-relationship "is not something which is added to the essence of man, but it is: his humanity. The image is the same as being in the Word of God and this is true humanity."[2] To say that man is created in the image of God means, first, that man is "over against" God as a reflection[3] or a diaphragm.[4] For this reason it is wrong to imagine that the *imago Dei* or *Anknüpfungspunkt* implies something "natural" in man which exists apart from God's grace and which, therefore, provides some continuity between God and man of the sort that was present in Schleiermacher; even the *imago Dei* is due to God's grace of creation and grace of preservation.[5] But neither is man "*truncus et lapis*."[6] Therefore, to say that man is created in the image of God means, second, that "God creates for himself a person as a counterpart for himself,"[1] "a dependent-independent being."[2] "All creatures have been created by the Word of God; but man has not only been created by the Word, but for the Word and precisely therein is the image of God."[3] That is to say, man stands coram Deo, i.e., before God with the responsibility of responding to God's claim. Man's Antwort to God's Wort may be the right or the wrong answer, but man can never escape the fact that he is answerable or responsible.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 510.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, 514.

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[1] *Ibid*., 519.

[2] *Ibid*., 520.

[3] Emil Brunner, *Das Wort Gottes und der moderne Mensch* (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1947), p. 16. (E.T., p. 13.)

[4] *EEG*, p. 96. In this same strain, Brunner suggests that man is an "echo" of God in "The Christian Doctrine of Man," (mimeographed by Research Department of Universal Christian Council for Life and Work; December, 1935), p. 4. But for some reason this figure was dropped by the time this draft was published as "*The Christian Understanding of Man* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938).

[5] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 520-521.

[6] *Ibid*., 526.

Unfortunately, however, the imago Dei, man's creation in relationship to God, as it was created by God, no longer remains as it was created because sin has entered the picture. Brunner is quite insistent, on the one hand, that sin has completely changed the imago Dei.[5] He has no desire to permit any monistic obscuration of the difference between God and man. "By sin the nature of man, not merely something in his nature, is changed and perverted."[6] But, on the other hand, while sin upsets or disturbs (verkehren, zerstören) the imago Dei, it does not absolutely negate it.[1] Since "sin is possible only as the reversal" of the divine image, man always stands "before God, either positively as a believer or negatively as a sinner, but never outside of this God-relationship."[2] Even as sinner, man continues to be man rather than mere animal, i.e., he continues to stand "always in the answerability which is the substance of his humanity."[3] There always remains some residue (Rest) of the imago Dei which is identical with our humanitas.[4] These two seemingly contradictory assertions about the imago Dei are brought together in the distinction between the formal aspect and the material aspect of the imago Dei.[5] Although this distinction was introduced at least as early as 1932,[6] it was not fully systematized until later. The formal aspect of the *imago Dei* is man's reason, "the formal presupposition of faith,. . .the *conditio sine qua non*."[1] Defined more closely, the formal aspect of the *imago Dei* or man's reason means his "freedom and capacity for the Word," his ability to be addressed and to speak in return.[2] In this early article, the material aspect of the *imago Dei* is treated more by implication than by explication. The material aspect seems to refer to the "moral" content of the formal aspect. But while Brunner does say that this content has been lost in sin and that "the whole man is: sinner,"[3] he does not make it quite clear here that the formal aspect actually is totally devoid of content.[4] Both concepts and their relationship were clarified in the controversy with Barth. The formal aspect of the *imago Dei* is man's *humanum*, i.e., that which distinguishes man from the rest of creation, his being-subject, his capacity for speech, his responsibility.[5] But the material aspect, the actual positive human and personal response to God in love is completely lost in sin.

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[1] Wahrheit als Begegnung, p. 38. (E.T., p. 52.)

[2] Wahrheit als Begegnung, p. 38. (E.T., p. 53.)

[3] Emil Brunner, Gott und Mensch: Vier Untersuchungen über das personhafte Sein (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1930), p. 55. (E.T., p. 114.)

[4] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 522.

[5] E.g., Emil Brunner, Der Mensch im Widerspruch: Die christliche Lehre vom wahren und vom wirklichen Menschen (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1937), pp. 129, 292-293. (E.T., pp. 136, 288.) See also, Der Mittler, p. 364, (E.T., p. 404), and, Wahrheit als Begegnung, pp. 98-99, (E.T., p. 129).

[6] Der Mensch im Widerspruch, p. 130. (E.T., p. 137.)

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[1] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 520.

[2] Ibid., 522.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 520.

[5] Even though this distinction is now firmly attached to Brunner's name, it should be noted that he was not the first to propose it. Both Alexander von Oettingen and Martin Kähler had proposed a similar distinction and since Brunner criticized them in Der Mensch im Widerspruch, pp. 528-529, (E.T., pp. 511-512), it must be assumed that he was familiar with their work. Rather than the mere distinction, Brunner's contribution would seem to be in the attempt to conceive the formal and material as aspects of the one image set within a single unified structure of human existence. See, Ehrhart, op. cit., pp. 308-309.

[6] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt.'"

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[1] *Ibid*., 514.

[2] *Ibid*., 522.

[3] *Ibid*., 523.

[4] This failure contributed greatly to the misunderstanding between Brunner and Barth several years later.

[5] *Natur und Gnade*, 1. Aufl., pp. 9-10.

> We distinguish categorically: formally the image is not touched in the least. . .materially the image is completely lost. . . . Man is still, as before, person, yet he is an anti-personal person, not truly person; for true personal being is being in love, according to the divine determination, and therefore being determined for fellowship with the fellow creature based on fellowship with the Creator. This quid of personal being is made negative by sin, while the quod of personal being, humanum in general, constitutes everyone, including the sinner.[1]

When Brunner refers to the formal-material distinction as a categorical, i.e., logical rather than metaphysical, one, he means that the formal and material are two aspects of the one unified imago Dei, not two images. In both aspects man is related to God. Formally, man is responsible being who must answer yes or no[2] and materially he is responding being who has, in fact, answered no.

This exposition of the imago Dei and the Anknüpfungspunkt should enable us to understand faith which comes to this man who stands in contradiction between creation and sin. Faith comes to man where he really is, i.e., to man who cannot save himself.[3] But this faith which is "God's work and gift" to the man who cannot save himself really does come for it comes as God's "personal act."[1] "That faith has reality in actu and there alone means that it is always completed only as self-determination in being-determined."[2] "Faith is re-sponsio, answer to God's Word."[3] In this re-sponsio, this self-determination in being-determined, God's act meets man's decision.[4] Now since this faith comes to the man who stands in contradiction and since it is his relationship with God that man contradicts, faith is the call to a new life in the love of God, to personal communion with Christ.[5] Just as faith is the giving and receiving of true and real existence, so it is the giving and receiving of true and real knowledge. Once again, the incapacity of man to initiate any self-salvation means that God must initiate faith and this he does in his revelation.[6] Moreover, faith is act in that the knowledge of faith becomes man's own new knowledge.[1] Since faith comes to the man who stands in contradiction and since it is the truth about himself that man contradicts, faith is the call to man to acknowledge his responsibility[2] and his community with God in Christ.[3] Thus, the structure of faith as new existence and new truth corresponds to the presuppositions of faith which indicated man's contradiction to his own created existence and truth.

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[1] Ibid., p. 11.

[2] This same theme of responsibility continues through most of Brunner's writings. E.g., Der Mensch im Widerspruch, p. 38, (E.T., p. 50), "Responsibility is not an attribute; it is the 'substance' of human existence."

[3] Emil Brunner, Vom Werk des heiligen Geistes (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1935), p. 23.

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[1] Emil Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf einer protestantisch-theologischen Ethik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932), p. 144. (E.T., p. 160.)

[2] Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, p. 145. (E.T., p. 161.)

[3] Vom Werk des heiligen Geistes, p. 43.

[4] Emil Brunner, "Schicksal und Freiheit in christlicher Sicht," Neue Schweizer Rundschau, N.F. V (1938), 530, 539.

[5] Emil Brunner, Offenbarung und Vernunft: Die Lehre von der christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1941), p. 117. (E.T., pp. 117-118.)

[6] Philosophie und Offenbarung, p. 21.

Having analyzed the structure of faith and discovered both the reality and the truth of faith, I must be quick to note that this does not indicate two faiths or even two parallel acts of faith. There is one act of faith which, viewed from God's side, is his Word and, viewed from man's side, is obedience-in-trust (Vertrauensgehorsam). "The Word alone makes it possible to bring God's will before man in such a way that man becomes a person and that man can 'react,' can answer in a personal way, i.e., by decision."[4] "Pistis, obedience-in-trust, is the personal answer of self-giving to the Word of God in which the divine self-giving first reaches its goal and in which, therefore, real community arises between God and man."[1] Because the act of faith is one act in which man acknowledges the real ground and truth of his existence, the truth of faith dare never be conceived as a body of data which one believes _after_ one has faith.[2] Faith, for Brunner, then, is the reestablishment of personal community between God and man as a result of God's gracious gift of his Word to us which we are able to receive because God has already created us in his image. In this fashion Brunner wishes to avoid both a false subjectivism and a false objectivism while preserving both grace and human responsibility.

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[1] Offenbarung und Vernunft, p. 413. (E.T., p. 418.) "Without this rational self-activity or appropriation no faith arises. . . . Without this mental, rational self-activity the Word of God cannot be understood; without it no faith arises. Reason is the conditio sine qua non of faith."

[2] Gott und Mensch, p. 55, (E.T., p. 115); Der Mensch im Widerspruch, pp. 508-509, (E.T., pp. 486-487); Wahrheit als Begegnung, pp. 64-66, (E.T., pp. 87-90).

[3] Wahrheit als Begegnung, pp. 66-67. (E.T., pp. 90-91.)

[4] Wahrheit als Begegnung, p. 50. (E.T., pp. 67-68.)

In view of the basically negative view of dogmatic theology, i.e., dogmatic theology is concerned with identifying erroneous attacks on the church's proclamation and with showing how and why these errors are to be rejected, which Brunner proposes, it seems appropriate to move on now and investigate the success of his own theology. Has he, in fact, managed to formulate dogma which guards against and overcomes the errors which he identified in the tradition, above all in Schleiermacher? That is to say, has Brunner's dogmatic theology done what he says a dogmatic theology should do?[1] It would seem fair to begin my answer to this question at the point which Brunner himself suggests. In criticizing Schleiermacher's theology, Brunner asserts that the four points of "creation, sinful fall, reconciliation, and final redemption" form a set of criteria on the basis of which one can determine whether or not a theology is genuinely Christian.[2] Even though a theology may "look" Christian, it is "wholly and completely non-Chrisitan" if it fails to be thoroughly Christian in dealing with these four points of the faith.[3] My first thesis will be that Brunner has indeed met his own criteria for upholding the Christian faith at these four cardinal points.

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[1] _Wahrheit als Begegnung_, p. 51. (E.T., p. 69.)

[2] _Wahrheit als Begegnung_, pp. 37-38. (E.T., pp. 51-52.)

Brunner criticized Schleiermacher for his unwillingness to ascribe attributes to God the Creator and for his lack of distinction between God and the world in a firm doctrine of creation with the result that the world is absorbed by the divine and that God has no sovereignty over the world. Where the Christian faith speaks of an unbridgeable gulf and discontinuity, Schleiermacher speaks of a smooth transition and continuity.[1] According to Brunner, the fact that the Word of God takes human speech into its service means that we must speak about God despite the acknowledged inadequacy of human speech in relation to this object. "The revelation, the stooping down, the self-sacrifice of God, the condescension of the divine love means that, in spite of the freedom of God, we have been given, by him himself, something definite to say about God."[2] The notion that one should not ascribe attributes to God comes from the philosophical concern for unqualified being,[3] from the "hellenization of Christian thought"[4] and not from the concern of Christian theology. It must be admitted that the attributes which the Christian theologian ascribes to God do not indicate God's "nature," but only his nature as it is related to different particular aspects of the created world.[5] All of this is said as "an article of faith, and that means, a statement based upon revelation."[1] "The basis of all Christian articles of faith is the Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ."[2] For this reason, i.e., because of the revelation in Jesus Christ, we must speak of a doctrine of creation.[3] This "Christocentric" doctrine of creation differs from all mythological or philosophical doctrines or scientific cosmogonies by declaring that "God in, and through, the Logos, the Son, has created the world."[4] This doctrine of creation arises because we know God as the sovereign Lord who claims us. "In Jesus Christ we meet him who addresses us as absolute Lord, and therefore as the Creator of all things: 'I, thy Lord, the Creator.'"[5] Other assertions about the doctrine of creation, e.g., creation ex nihilo[6] and the independence-in-dependence of creation,[7]

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[1] In answering this question I shall rely primarily on the various volumes of Brunner's Dogmatik. This choice is made for two reasons. First, these volumes are the place where Brunner tried to formulate his theology most systematically and most comprehensively. This is the place, therefore, where the answer to Schleiermacher should be most clear. Second, however, by examining these volumes I shall be able to determine whether Brunner's study of Schleiermacher's theology was as significant and as formative as he thought it was. That is to say, by examining Brunner's later works I shall be able to determine whether the concerns formed in the early works and in conversation with Schleiermacher are lasting concerns to which Brunner addresses himself throughout his work.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 336.

[3] Ibid., p. 337.

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[1] See above, Chapter II, pp. 146-148.

[2] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 513.

[3] Dogmatik, I, pp. 255-262. (E.T., pp. 241-246.)

[4] Dogmatik, I, p. 258. (E.T., p. 243.)

[5] Dogmatik, I, p. 263. (E.T., p. 247.) But on the same page Brunner does proceed to say something about God's nature. After asserting that God's nature is "that which God makes known to us of his revelation about himself, about the mystery of his person, about what he is 'in himself,'" he goes on to say that "God in himself is the Holy One;

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that is his nature, his sovereignty and freedom from the world, the fact that he is in no way conditioned by the world, that in himself he is wholly self-sufficient."

[1] Emil Brunner, Dogmatik, Bd. II: Die christliche Lehre von Schöpfung und Erlösung (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1950), p. 6. (E.T., p. 5.)

[2] Dogmatik, II, p. 7. (E.T., p. 6.) See also, Vom Werk des heiligen Geistes, pp. 5-6; and, Philosophie und Offenbarung, pp. 14-15.

[3] Dogmatik, II, pp. 5-8. (E.T., pp. 5-7.)

[4] Dogmatik, II, p. 9. (E.T., p. 8.)

[5] Dogmatik, II, p. 10. (E.T., p. 9.) Italics mine.

[6] Dogmatik, II, pp. 11-15. (E.T., pp. 9-12.)

[7] Dogmatik, II, pp. 24-26. (E.T., pp. 19-21.)

are all developed out of the revelation in Christ where the doctrine of creation "comes to man as a personal summons."[1]

In discussing sin and the fall, Brunner criticized Schleiermacher for resolving the paradox of existence which is emphasized rather than resolved by the Christian doctrine of sin and for doing away with the notions of the wrath of God and of punishment which, for the Christian, stand guard over any merely subjective or monistic interpretation.[2] Brunner, for his part, insists on a "strictly Christocentric basis of the doctrine of the fall."[3] The doctrine of a fall is necessary to understand sin which is necessary to understand the New Testament message of redemption.[4] Sin is this total act of the whole man who was created by God, this apostasy, this rebellion against the personal God, this falling away from that which God gave and established.[5] But to speak of sin as fall is not really to explain sin or even to offer a comprehensive doctrine of sin, but merely to admit that "at this point we have reached the limit of our knowledge."[6] Now, having fallen, between this fallen man and

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[1] Dogmatik, II, p. 10. (E.T., p. 8.)

[2] See above, Chapter II, pp. 148-150.

[3] Dogmatik, II, p. 103. (E.T., p. 90.)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Dogmatik, II, pp. 103-115. (E.T., pp. 90-100.)

[6] Dogmatik, II, p. 117. (E.T., p. 101.)

God "stands his guilt, guilt which man cannot remove."[1] That is to say, the break which occurs in sin is not merely subjective, but has an objective reality. "To the sinful man, God is present as the holy God who allows the disobedient man to feel his resistance. The scripture calls this resistance the wrath of God."[2] Because of the objective reality of sin and guilt, therefore, any lessing of the discontinuity in the direction of monism is precluded.

In discussing reconciliation, Brunner criticized Schleiermacher for his dynamistic, naturalistic, historicistic interpretation of the reconciliation effected through Christ and for his reduction of Jesus to the level of the perfect man. Despite the seeming Christocentrism of the _Glaubenslehre_, Schleiermacher really proclaimed a doctrine of _infusio gratiae_.[3] Brunner contends that, in Christ, God does for sinful man what sinful man cannot possibly do for himself, viz., he forgives him, he really forgives him.

> Forgiveness as revelation is simply that intervention on the part of God which fundamentally changes the human situation which man himself cannot possibly alter. Forgiveness, then, is an historical event, something which man cannot achieve or know by his own efforts. Forgiveness is then perceived to be that which sinful man cannot pronounce for himself; it is a verdict which must be pronounced by God.[4]

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[1] _Dogmatik_, II, p. 124. (E.T., p. 107.)

[2] _Dogmatik_, II, p. 136. (E.T., p. 118.)

[3] See above, Chapter II, pp. 150-153.

[4] _Dogmatik_, II, p. 347. (E.T., p. 294.)

From man's point of view, God's forgiveness comes as the justification by faith of the sinner. "God declares the sinner righteous; that is what justification means."[1] In saying this Brunner again emphasizes the discontinuity between even God and the justified man, the precise thing that he accused Schleiermacher of minimizing or eliminating. In relation to Jesus as the Christ, Brunner admits that the conclusion, "*vere Deus, vere homo*," is, ultimately, as much of a mystery as it is a judgment of faith.[2] But having made this admission, Brunner, unlike Schleiermacher, does use this formula to speak of the "incarnation" where "the Eternal Son of God meets us in the man, Jesus."[3] For the believer, there is no alternative to the affirmation of the "simple, yet profoundly mysterious truth" of the doctrine of the two natures.[4]

> Because he reveals God to us, as no human being could reveal him, because he reconciles us to God, as no human being could reconcile us to God, because he makes us trustful servants of God, as no human being could do, we know that we must confess him to be the God-Mam, we must confess him as the one who is not only True Man, but at the same time--whether we understand it or not--True God.[5]

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[1] Emil Brunner, *Dogmatik*, Bd. III: *Die christliche Lehre von der Kirche vom Glauben und von der Vollendung* (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1960), p. 232. (E.T., p. 200.)

[2] *Dogmatik*, II, pp. 375-386. (E.T., pp. 322-329.)

[3] *Dogmatik*, II, p. 413. (E.T., p. 350.)

[4] *Dogmatik*, II, p. 423. (E.T., p. 357.)

[5] *Dogmatik*, II, p. 400. (E.T., p. 340.)

In discussing final redemption, Brunner criticized Schleiermacher for precluding the possibility of eschatology as a result of his consistent historicism.[1] For Brunner, "Christian hope is not only the last chapter of theological doctrine; it is itself the goal to which the Christian faith reaches forward. It is what faith intends, what is at stake in faith."[2] The hope, moreover, which is unconditionally united with faith is not an act of human consciousness, but is distinguished from "mere human hopes" by virtue of its ground and content, viz., the revelation in Christ.[3] In the revelation in Christ we become aware of our "eschatological existence," i.e., "an existence that points beyond itself, an existence conscious of its own incompleteness."[4] As surely as "God's final intention is not the life destroyed in the death of the cross, not the divinity concealed under the disgrace of the gallows, but the divine life in its form of glory,"[5] so certain is it that God's self-revelation in love "only reaches its goal by dissolving this form of the world and transforming the world into the form of glory."[6]

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[1] See above, Chapter II, p. 153.

[2] Dogmatik, III, p. 387. (E.T., p. 346.)

[3] Dogmatik, III, p. 380. (E.T., p. 339.)

[4] Dogmatik, III, p. 382. (E.T., p. 342.) See also, Vom Werk des heiligen Geistes, pp. 58-73.

[5] Dogmatik, III, p. 383. (E.T., p. 343.)

[6] Dogmatik, III, p. 385. (E.T., p. 344.) But the fact that faith "intends" something more does not mean that

So even though Brunner later shows considerable hesitation about details,[1] he does insist on the necessary consummation of faith which is, in some sense, not yet realized.[2]

But considering the success of Brunner's own theology on the basis of criteria which Brunner himself has selected may or may not be the best procedure. To allow one party in a confrontation to be judge of the merits of both parties is not necessarily the best way to ascertain truth. Indeed, in this case, a more impartial consideration of the theologies of Schleiermacher and Brunner suggests an underlying parallel between them which indicates that the relationship between the theology of Schleiermacher and the theology of Brunner is not adequately described as one of simple opposition

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the "new life" is "completely hidden." Rather, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit does now dwell within us, we can already see its first fruits. See, Vom Werk des heiligen Geistes, pp. 53-55.

[1] E.g., Dogmatik, III, p. 444. (E.T., p. 397.) When confronted by the demand for some detail of the parousia, Brunner writes, "It belongs to the character of the Final Event that its character as event is unimaginable. We shall then do best to stick to the New Testament symbols, knowing that they are symbols, and knowing, at the same time, that we need symbols."

[2] On the contemporary theological scene, the possible ways of interpreting eschatological statements are not exhausted in the discussion of the eschatologies of Schleiermacher and Brunner. If Schleiermacher and Brunner are taken as representatives of a type of interpretation, there is at least one other major type of interpretation extant. While this is not directly relevant to the consideration of the confrontation between Schleiermacher and Brunner, it is important enough that some comments are in order. For a discussion of this other type of interpretation, see the appendix of this dissertation.

despite the fact the Brunner concluded his most extensive consideration of Schleiermacher's theology with the simple alternative, "_either_ mysticism _or_ the Word." I shall proceed in two steps. The first step will be the identification of this "underlying parallel" and the illustration of it in the theology of each man. The second step will be an attempt to determine the relationship between these two theologies in the light of this parallel.

One cannot help but notice that it is one of the goals of both theologians to construct a theology which avoids any irrevocable discontinuity, above all, any irrevocable discontinuity between the categories one employs in theology and the categories one employs in the remainder of life. Exactly what this means in the case of each man and his theology will best be understood by considering several examples.

In Schleiermacher's theology, the desire to avoid any irrevocable discontinuity manifests itself as an open drive for a continuity which can be seen at almost every point. But this observation is, to a considerable extent, a repetition of what Brunner himself said about this theology.[1] When dealing with theology itself, for example,

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[1] Actually, it is not _mere_ repetition of what Brunner said because a different significance may be ascribed to this continuity. Whereas Brunner took it to mean that Christian faith had been lost and sold out in the process, I do not think this is the only possible interpretation. Another possible interpretation will be suggested in the final chapter.

Schleiermacher's passion for continuity can be seen in the close connection which he posits between theology and the very seat of religion, i.e., the religious self-consciousness. Just as Christ presented his religious self-consciousness through speech,[1] so our religious emotions, like all other modifications of self-consciousness, seek outward expression.[2] Christian doctrines, then, "are accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech."[3] Theology is a reflection of and upon the religious self-consciousness.[4] Above all, it is not a superfluous activity which may or may not be preached depending on the whim of the individual or even on the circumstances external to piety as would be the case with Brunner. For Schleiermacher, piety must be theological.[5] Still other examples of Schleiermacher's desire for continuity can be seen in his subjection of the Christian religion, along with all other religions and all other areas of life, to the conditions of history, viz., to relativity,[1] and in what might be termed his "naturalization of the supernatural."[2] Thus, the doctrine of the two natures of Christ is naturalized by explaining his divinity as the perfection of his humanity which he shares with all other, i.e., as the realization of a possibility inherent within human nature.[3] Faith is naturalized by explaining it as the effect of the naturally mediated influence of Christ.[4] The act of faith, the moment when faith may be said really to begin is naturalized by explaining it as the movement over the boundary line between the "outer" church and the "inner" church.[5] For Schleiermacher, then, there is no ununderstandable or unbridgeable discontinuity between piety and the theological expression of piety, between faith and history, between faith and unfaith, between God and man. The desire to avoid any irrevocable discontinuity has resulted, in this case, in transitions which are so smooth that they approach philosophical monism.

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[1] Glaubenslehre, #15:2.

[2] Ibid., #15:1.

[3] Ibid., #15:thesis.

[4] Such a short statement does not, of course, give any indication of the complexities of the relationship between theology and piety. Recall Brunner's discussion of the problem which was given above, Chapter II, pp. 71-75, 85-86. See also, Mehl, op. cit., Chapter I, and R. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 137-148. But Niebuhr, I think, despite pp. 141-144, ignores many of the difficulties of the subject.

[5] R. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 140. For Schleiermacher, theology exists "solely on account of the reality and urgency of its own subject matter."

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[1] Reden, Speech V. It is important to remember, of course, that Schleiermacher drew no distinction between piety and religion parallel to that which Brunner draws between faith and religion. For Brunner, religion is human and is, therefore, relative, but faith is not relative because its object is not relative. But for Schleiermacher, piety, i.e., Christian piety, as a concrete embodiment of religion, is not essentially different than any other piety, e.g., Jewish piety. See, Glaubenslehre, ##7-12. See also, above, Chapter II, pp. 96-97.

[2] Briefe, II, pp. 322-323. "I know nothing of an opposition between natural and supernatural. . . . Everything is natural in one sense and supernatural in another."

[3] See above, Chapter II, pp. 91-93. See also, Briefe, II, p. 323. "The fact that the Son of God became man must itself be natural in a higher sense." See also, Glaubenslehre, #13.

[4] See above, Chapter II, pp. 91-100.

[5] Glaubenslehre, ##115:2, 148:2.

By this point in the dissertation, however, by no means should it be startling to observe that Schleiermacher tried to avoid extreme discontinuity between various parts of his theological system. But to suggest that a similar assertion can be made about Brunner may be surprising in view of his strong reproach of Schleiermacher at precisely this point and, therefore, his own desire to avoid the continuity upon which he looked askance in Schleiermacher. Brunner himself gives the first indication that he too may wish to avoid at least the most irrevocable discontinuity. In 1962, he wrote,

> My opposition to Schleiermacher is just as sharp today as it was in my book, Die Mystik und das Wort. I have nothing further in common with him than that I would not want any more than he to see an open chasm between theology and philosophy, with the uneducated believers on one side and the scientifically educated unbelievers on the other.[1]

But this one thing which Brunner suggests may be more indicative than Brunner admits. Indeed, Brunner's conviction that "faith does not stand unequivocally over against philosophy"[2] eventually led him to call for "Christian philosophy."[1] Moreover, Brunner indicates that a Christian theology differs from a Christian philosophy _only_ by virtue of a different subject matter,[2] leading one to wonder whether there might not indeed be a good deal of positive connection between philosophy and theology. The whole program of eristic theology as _theologia ad hominem_[3] implies that the thought categories of the natural man, the man of unfaith, have a rather strong propadeutic value for faith.[4] Nor is Brunner's desire to avoid extreme discontinuity limited to the relationship between philosophy and theology. At the very heart of Brunner's theology with its concern for the responsibility of man stand the notions of the _Anknüpfungspunkt_[5] and the _imago_

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[1] Kegley, op. cit., pp. 341-342.

[2] Philosophie und Offenbarung, p. 45. See also, "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," 256-258.

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[1] _Offenbarung und Vernunft_, pp. 355, 369-391. (E.T., pp. 360, 374-396.)

[2] _Offenbarung und Vernunft_, p. 385. (E.T., p. 390.)

[3] "Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie," 258-259.

[4] Konrad, _op. cit._, 192-216, indicates that Brunner employed his own version of "the critical philosophy," showing more reliance on it than even he realized (_Ibid._, 206). Certainly Konrad is not without support. One of the probable reasons that she drew this conclusion is Brunner's rather frequent reference to Kant for support when using the notion of radical evil. See, e.g., _Philosophie und Offenbarung_, pp. 10-11; and, _The Theology of Crisis_, p. 14. In the latter place, Brunner says that "only a Christian can be truly critical, and only he who is truly critical can be Christian. The principle of true Christianity and of true criticism are identical."

[5] See above, this chapter, pp. 177-180, 193-194.

Dei with its formal aspect which is not destroyed by sin.[1] Thus, in offering a theological explanation of man's responsibility it would seem that Brunner also has attempted to preclude the most extreme discontinuity between the man of unfaith and the man of faith. Despite Brunner's assertion that the formal aspect of the imago Dei has no positive content[2] and that it too is a matter of God's grace,[3] one cannot help but wonder to what extent the dike which he erected against Schleiermacher has been punctured by the first small leak which, in time, may lead to the erosion of much careful work.[4]

The indication that there is a parallel between the theology of Schleiermacher and the theology of Brunner is not, by itself, however, an especially helpful assertion.

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[1] See above, this chapter, pp. 194-199.

[2] As Brunner explains, Natur und Gnade, 2. Aufl., p. 49, "everything formal is self-evidently something material," including the formal aspect of the imago Dei. The point, however, is that the correct content has been exchanged for an incorrect content, i.e., man answers "no" instead of "yes," i.e., man is sinner.

[3] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 520-521.

[4] In making this statement I do not now wish to pass judgment on either the advisability or desirability of Brunner's position, but merely to point out a possible consequence of that position. On the other hand, one certainly cannot go so far as to support the frequent Dutch conclusion about Brunner, viz., that Brunner shows no essential differences from Schleiermacher and the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Attila Szekeres, De Structuur van Emil Brunners Theologie (Utrecht: H. J. Smits, 1952), p. 98. Brunner is accused of synergism supported by a "radical biblical criticism" which permits him to reject unwanted parts of scripture.

Indeed, by itself this assertion would be much more misleading than it would be helpful. I must still attempt to state the meaning of this parallel and, thereby, to determine more precisely the relationship between these two theologies. Upon closer analysis it can be seen that the parallel between the thought of Brunner and the thought of Schleiermacher cannot be reduced to identity. Rather, the parallel is a highly dialectical one. While neither man wishes to have what I have termed an "irrevocable discontinuity," this does not mean that both men offer the same solution to the problem of avoiding this discontinuity. Schleiermacher avoids the problem by positing one all inclusive system so that there is,[1] finally, a (positive) continuity between God and man, a continuity which is a part of man's very nature.[2] But the continuity of which Brunner speaks is a much more limited continuity; there is a continuity between philosophy and theology, between the man of unfaith and the man of faith, but this is always a continuity *within* the realm of man which is irrevocably discontinuous with the realm of God. Thus, Brunner wishes to speak of the Lord God Creator, of the sinful fall, of the two natures of Christ, of an end of history *while also* speaking about the *Anknüpfungspunkt*, about the *imago Dei* with its formal aspect which is not effaced by sin, about the not altogether negative relationship between philosophy and theology. Now the relationship between the theology of Brunner and the theology of Schleiermacher, i.e., the sense in which Brunner tries to "overcome" Schleiermacher, is directly parallel to his solution to the continuity-discontinuity problem. That is to say, on the one hand Brunner agrees with Schleiermacher and wishes to preserve

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[1] See above, this chapter, pp. 211-214.

[2] This system with its continuity is what Brunner called the "mystical-identity-philosophical system" of Schleiermacher. But Brunner is not alone in believing that Schleiermacher's thought does comprise a system and a closed system at that. Albert Reble, "Schleiermachers Denkstruktur," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N.F. XVII (1936), 254-272, makes a rather careful analysis of Schleiermacher's thought and sees in it so much organization that he is finally able to reduce his findings to a diagram. After asserting that the individual is "an unreal appearance" when considered in isolation and that it is valued "only as a sparkling bubble in the sea of the whole" (Ibid., 256), Reble works his way to the conclusion that Schleiermacher's maturest thought can be pictured as "two ellipses intertwined in one another" (Ibid., 268). The sphere of Geist is structured around these two ellipses (Ibid., 271). The one ellipse has the poles of organization and symbolization; the other ellipse has the poles of identity and individuality. Identical organization is identified as the sphere of the state; individual organization as the sphere of society; identical symbolization as

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the sphere of science; individual symbolization as the sphere of religion. The result can be shown in this diagram:



his valuable insights and, on the other hand, Brunner disagrees with Schleiermacher and wishes to destroy the error which is contained in Schleiermacher's theology.[1] This was clear already in the 1920s. Rationalism, subjectivism, historicism, and orthodoxy all do have their partial truths which faith also affirms.[2] But in affirming the whole truth, faith overcomes the error contained in the merely partial truth. Schleiermacher is correct, for example, in his knowledge, which he shares with other idealistic philosophers, that history has direction, that it is hastening toward a goal.[3] Brunner, therefore, did not say an unqualified "no" to Schleiermacher at this point.[4] Instead, he tried to acknowledge those parts of Schleiermacher's thought which were partial truths and which, despite the fact that they were embodied in an intolerable system along with many other material conclusions that were also intolerable from a Christian point of view, needed to be remembered by the Christian thinker. The fact that Brunner's theology shows a certain parallel to that of Schleiermacher does not, therefore, automatically mean that Brunner failed in his attempt to overcome Schleiermacher. What it does indicate is the dialectical nature of Brunner's response to the theology of Schleiermacher.

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[1] It would seem that R. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., has misrepresented or misunderstood Brunner's critique of and response to Schleiermacher. For Niebuhr, Brunner is the author of "the most violently adverse interpretation of the theology of this father of modern Protestantism" (Ibid., p. 7) and, along with Karl Barth, the author of a tradition which precludes any real encounter with Schleiermacher (Ibid., p. 8). Let it stand as one of the conclusions of this dissertation that Brunner (and Barth too) is not as simple in his response to Schleiermacher as he has been pictured.

[2] See, Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie, whose very outline indicates that Brunner does not undialectically condemn these various errors and misunderstandings.

[3] Der Mittler, p. 18. (E.T., p. 37.)

[4] Karl Barth, Theology and Church, p. 199, also indicates his refusal to give a final and unequivocal response to Schleiermacher. "Schleiermacher is a force with which one cannot expect to come to terms at a first or second or third attempt. I should like to have this summary of his thought accepted not as my 'settlement' with him; but in expectation of further attempts at understanding him, as an interim accounting of the present state of my debate with him. I believe that I am in agreement with my friend

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Emil Brunner when I consider our common controversy with this man as a running battle. I would continue it as such." Now in view of Barth's review of the first edition of Die Mystik und das Wort where Barth indicates that the scope of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher greatly enhanced the possibility that Brunner would remain with it as his own "settlement," this 1926 lecture of Barth in Theology and Chunch may or may not be completely serious. In any case, it is correct.

Chapter IV

In all probability, the dialogue between Brunner and Schleiermacher will be remembered at least as much as one stage in the history of Schleiermacher interpretation as it will be remembered as one stage in the development of Brunner's own theology. In view of this and in light of the presupposition with which this dissertation began, viz., that theology must always be responsible for its past, it is important that I make some evaluation of the relationship in which Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher stands to Schleiermacher and, therefore, to Schleiermacher study. In this chapter, therefore, I shall attempt to evaluate the validity of Brunner's critique as an interpretation of Schleiermacher and to determine what effect it might have on contemporary theology, i.e., on the use which contemporary theologians make of Schleiermacher.

Any evaluation of the validity of Brunner's critique should begin with a firm awareness of the scope of that critique. At this point, a brief review of facts which have already been presented will renew this awareness. Protestant theology, at the conclusion of the nineteenth century, found itself confronted by problems for which it had no answers.[1] When World War I broke upon mankind, dragging one nation after another into the conflict, protestant theology found itself pushed beyond the point where tolerant repetition was a realistic possibility. The liberal attitude which characterized protestant theology simply could not account for the chaos which reigned nor could it offer any hope for recovery from this desperate situation. In this situation, theological restatement became both necessary and possible. It became necessary because mankind, caught in the war and its aftermath, could no longer endure the hiatus between theological pronouncements and reality. The liberal theology had proclaimed its confidence in the innate goodness of man and the inevitability of his self-betterment. But these proclamations had a hollow ring in the aftermath of war. It became possible because, in this situation where old answers, indeed, old questions, had collapsed, there was nothing more which could be lost if the attempt at restatement also failed. This was the situation in which Brunner found himself along with the other theologians of the day. Upon investigation, Brunner concluded that the recently discredited theology was merely a pejorative restatement of what Schleiermacher had said long before and had said much better.[1] Since Schleiermacher was the father of this theology in the sense that he had presented its essence in the clearest and most convincing manner possible and since no theological movement since Schleiermacher, including the Ritschlian theology, had offered any real alternative to or basic modification of Schleiermacher, Brunner decided that the place to begin the examination of what had gone wrong was with Schleiermacher. But, and this is important to remember, Brunner did not offer a critique of Schleiermacher as a man or as a preacher or as a teacher, but of Schleiermacher as a protestant theologian, i.e., of Schleiermacher's theology. To use Brunner's words, the goal of his critique is systematic rather than biographical or historical. Thus, for example, it would not be a legitimate critique of Brunner's conclusion that Schleiermacher's theology, as a whole, is unchristian to point out that Schleiermacher worshipped and led worship regularly. On the other hand, it would be legitimate to question whether Brunner is justified in making such a clean distinction between thought and life, i.e., to question Brunner's methodological exclusion of all non-systematic writings. Beyond this, it is, of course, quite legitimate to inquire whether Brunner has interpreted the material with which he does deal with integrity and with insight. In asking the question of the validity of Brunner's critique, then, I am asking the latter questions and am not examining Brunner's critique as an interpretation of Schleiermacher the man. It will be my thesis that despite the various reservations which can and must be raised concerning Brunner's critique, his critique of Schleiermacher's theology is essentially correct. I shall begin by delineating my reservations about Brunner's critique, concentrating first on Brunner's approach to the problem and second on the accuracy of Brunner's interpretation. After this, I shall indicate why I still think that Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher's theology is essentially correct.

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[1] For unspecified reasons Brunner says this crisis became especially acute about the year 1900. The Theology of Crisis, p. 7.

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[1] Even though he did not, Brunner could have appealed directly to Schleiermacher for support of his decision to consider Schleiermacher's theology instead of the more recent statements of the "liberal" theology. In Kurze Darstellung, #83, Schleiermacher states that "the more a historical career is occupied in /the process of/ diffusion, --so that the inward life-unity, in proportion to the degree of the extension, appears more and more exclusively in contact with other forces, --in the same proportion do these forces, also, participate in the individual states which present themselves; so that the peculiar and essential character of the object is presented to view in the purest manner only in those states which are of the earliest occurrence."

One of the key tools which Brunner uses in his theological writing is typology. That is to say, various phenomena are grouped together by virtue of the common characteristics which they display, these common characteristics being a certain type which is intended to aid our understanding of the particular phenomena involved. Thus, for example, one can identify the characteristics which are common to various examples of rationalism or intellectualism or subjectivism or any one of numerous other types of thought and life. Now without a doubt, some sort of analysis and classification of data is necessary if knowledge is to be learned and transmitted, but the danger of permitting the generalization or type to dictate the meaning of the individual is ever present. In quite a few cases Brunner has fallen victim to this danger. Thus, he identifies the doctrine of the imago Dei as "the center of the biblical doctrine of man"[1] despite the fact that many other interpreters are able to deal with the same material while saying very little about the doctrine of the imago Dei.[2] While Brunner would never claim that his theology is a mere exegesis of biblical pronouncements and that his theology reflects, therefore, the Bible on a one to one basis, it would seem that here is a case where his theology has, in fact, permitted or forced him to overestimate the role which the doctrine of the imago Dei as he interprets it plays in the biblical literature. This is just one example of Brunner's tendency to oversimplify scripture and to make it much more monolithic than it really is. But scripture is not the only victim of this tendency to permit the type to dominate the individual. Philosophies and theologies with which Brunner deals also suffer the same fate on occasion, for not only do Brunner's rather firm types tend to obscure the logical and historical transitions between ideas,[1] but they tend to become Procrustean beds into which individuals are fitted.[2] For example, Brunner writes that for fifteen hundred years the Roman Catholic church has followed and still is following Irenaeus' solution to the problem of the *imago Dei*.[3] At another place he concludes that "the entire reformation struggle centered on the understanding of the third article, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit."[4] Mysticism, which is the practice of union of the self with God, a union in which the identity of the self completely disappears, is so interpreted that any individual thinker who demonstrates the slightest mystical tendency tends, in Brunner's writing, to become a full fledged mystic, i.e., one who, whether he realizes it or not, wishes to submerge the self into the whole. Or to be an identity-philosopher means that one is a German idealist which means, ultimately, that one is like Hegel. These are examples, then, of how Brunner sometimes permits his types, despite their usefulness and even necessity, to determine his view of individuals. Typology has, on occasion, replaced careful analysis and reasoned argument.

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[1] Der Mensch im Widerspruch, p. 400. (E.T., p. 387.)

[2] Millar Burrows, An Outline of Biblical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946), devotes an entire chapter to the biblical conception of man, but mentions the notion of imago Dei in only one sentence (Ibid., p. 141). Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, trans. Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), writes almost two hundred pages, pp. 185-352, on the theology of Paul without referring to this notion once despite the fact that Paul himself uses it several times.

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[1] Williams, *op. cit.*, 242-243.

[2] Ernst Neubauer, "Die Theologie der 'Krisis' und des 'Wortes,'" *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, N.F. VII (1926), 16. Neubauer says this is particularly true with the words "mystic" and "word."

[3] *Der Mensch im Widerspruch*, p. 83. (E.T., p. 93.) But not all Roman Catholics are willing to accept Brunner's understanding of Roman Catholic doctrine. See, e.g., Lorenz Volken, *Der Glaube bei Emil Brunner* (Freiburg: Paulusverlag, 1947), pp. 199-206; and, Hermann Volk, *Emil Brunners Lehre von dem Sünder* (Munster: Regensberg, 1950), pp. 226-243.

[4] *Vom Werk des heiligen Geistes*, p. 7.

Brunner offers his critique, we learned, as a purely systematic one, i.e., as a critique of Schleiermacher's ideas or theology apart from any biographical or historical considerations. But this part of Brunner's methodology would seem to be as ambiguous as Brunner's use of typology, i.e., while it is helpful and even necessary, it also has dangers and, sometimes, these dangers are realized. Without attempting to solve the problem of how it is that we appropriate ideas from the past, I think Brunner is safe in holding that once an idea is proclaimed it possesses a certain independence of the person who proclamied it. But it may be questioned whether this idea, when repeated independently of its author, is, in fact, the same idea. It may or may not be the same idea, but it does not seem obvious to me that it automatically is the same. Yet, in saying that Schleiermacher's theology should be considered apart from the life and person of Schleiermacher, Brunner seems to be assuming just this.[1] From a purely theoretical point of view, such an approach can hardly be precluded from the start. But from a practical point of view, this separation of theology and theologian opens up the possibility of reading later developments back into Schleiermacher. Thus, Brunner occasionally admits that Schleiermacher himself did not draw logical consequences of his own thought which were later drawn and that Schleiermacher even specifically rejected certain conclusions which, from a logical point of view, should have been drawn.[2] But after making this concession, Brunner goes on to treat these logical conclusions as if they had, in fact, been drawn by Schleiermacher.[3]

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[1] One of the first exchanges that took place between Brunner and other theologians included this very point. See, Horst Stephan, "Der neue Kampf um Schleiermacher"; Emil Brunner, "Geschichte oder Offenbarung?" and, Horst Stephan, "Antwort auf Brunners Entgegnung," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N.F. VI (1925), 278-285. Stephan contended that not only is Schleiermacher a part of his age in terms of which he must be understood, but that Brunner is also a part of his age and that his own position, therefore, is not as genuinely "systematic" as he imagines ("Der neue Kampf um Schleiermacher, 178-181). Brunner replied that "putting the best possible interpretation on everything" is a laudable goal for the historian, but not for the theologian who is concerned with the purity of doctrine (Geschichte oder Offenbarung?," 266). But Stephan remained unconvinced ("Antwort auf Brunners Entgegnung," 278-280). Stephan, it seems to me, was quite right in raising the question of methodology. But he was also quite wrong in imagining that he was offering a serious criticism of Brunner's position when he asked Brunner ("Der neue Kampf um Schleiermacher," 185) how it was that the Reden was able to produce new life, e.g., in Claus Harms and Neander.

[2] E.g., Die Mystik, p. 185.

[3] An example of this would be Brunner's conclusion

This procedure raises serious questions about the extent to which the object of Brunner's critique is, in fact, the theology of Schleiermacher. Moreover, to exclude material such as the sermons as a matter of principle, as Brunner does, may, in Schleiermacer's case at least, be excluding one of the chief sources for counterargument. If there is the close connection between theology and proclamation which Schleiermacher contends,[1] then there would seem to be reason for including them rather than excluding them. Brunner's reason for excluding them, viz., the indifference of Schleiermacher to any one symbol vis-a-vis another,[2] by itself offers no basis on which to declare the symbols of the Dialektik, the Reden, the Ethik, and the Glaubenslehre any more significant than the symbols of the sermons.[3] It is improbable that Brunner would have portrayed Schleiermacher

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that the significance of Christ for the Christian community must decrease with the passing of time. See above, Chapter II, pp. 94-96.

[1] Glaubenslehre, #15.

[2] See above, Chapter II, pp. 36-38.

[3] Brunner's argument could just as easily be used to justify an exclusion of the systematic works from a consideration of Schleiermacher's theology based on his sermons. If all symbols are truly indifferent, then there is no reason, other than arbitrary choice, to select one set of symbols vis-a-vis another set. This is precisely what Paul Schütz did in his book, Säkulare Religion: Eine Studie über ihre Erscheinung in der Gegenwart und ihre Idee bei Schleiermacher und Blumhardt d. J. (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932), pp. 102-156, with results that were predictably different than those of Brunner.

as univocally as he did if he had not excluded the sermons on principle.[1]

Beyond these criticisms of Brunner's methodology, his critique of Schleiermacher's theology must be criticized for what can only be described as a tone which is often rather presumptuous.[2] On the one hand, I have reference to Brunner's approach to his subject. Brunner was doubtless correct in believing that the theological situation of the 1920s required a confrontation with Schleiermacher and that this confrontation had to be supported by massive and detailed analysis. But one may easily wonder if Brunner's Auseinandersetzung was the very best way in which to make this confrontation. Because of the massive and rather general nature of his critique, Brunner understandably gave the false impression that he found absolutely nothing good, i.e., nothing Christian, in Schleiermacher's theology.[3] Perhaps if Brunner had showed a bit more restraint in his critique of Schleiermacher, not only would his criticism have been less open to misunderstanding and Brunner himself less liable to reproach, but his critique may well have accomplished more and have been of longer duration than it was.[1] On the other hand, I have reference to the fact that the rather exuberant attack which Brunner made on Schleiermacher made Brunner appear rather presumptuous in other directions. Thus, for example, even though Brunner is certainly not a biblicist and his theology is not a mere repetition of biblical phrases, the tone of his critique sometimes forces him to write as if he was a bibliolater of the first order. At one place Brunner writes that "God himself speaks his Word which is identical with the Word of scripture."[2] And with alarming frequency Brunner writes as if his Christocentrism had suddenly been exchanged for an *a priori* starting point from which statements are drawn in purely deductive fashion. Brunner writes, for example, that "the coming of God *must* mean his coming

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[1] Wilhelm Dilthey may be taken as a representative of the opposite point of view, viz., that the proper way to understand Schleiermacher's thought is to approach it biographically. In, Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers, Bd. I, heraus. von Hermann Mulert (2. Aufl.; Berlin: Vereinigung wissenschaftlicher Verlager, 1922), p. xv, he writes that "the philosophy of Kant can be understood fully without any close consideration of his person and of his life, but Schleiermacher's importance, his view of the world, and his works need a thorough biographical presentation for their proper understanding."

[2] It is conceded at the outset that this criticism is much more subjective than the former ones.

[3] As I indicated in the previous chapter, despite the strong comments which Brunner made about Schleiermacher, he

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did not mean to imply either that Schleiermacher himself was unchristian or that his theology was totally worthless.

[1] This observation is not wholly original. A similar note was struck at the very start of the period by Karl Barth, "Brunners Schleiermacherbuch," 54-56.

[2] *Die Mystik*, p. 192. Italics mine. How this sentence of Brunner is interpreted depends, of course, on the meaning given to the word "Word" in the phrase "Word of scripture."

in the Word."[1] It is entirely possible that if Brunner had been somewhat more circumspect in his critique of Schleiermacher, he would not have been forced to establish or defend his own position with such extreme statements.[2]

It is also necessary to express some reservations about Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher as an interpretation of Schleiermacher. This will be done in three ways, but all three ways lead back to the same basic question, viz., "Was Schleiermacher as unambiguous or monolithic as Brunner portrays him?" My thesis will be that he was not that unambiguous and that reservations must be expressed, therefore, concerning Brunner's description of Schleiermacher's theological system as one of mysticism, of subjectivism, and, indeed, his identification of that theology as a system.

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[1] *Der Mittler*, p. 264. (E.T., p. 296.) Italics mine. But nowhere is this clearer than in *Die Mystik* where e.g., Brunner writes: "Soll es. . .geben, so muss es. . . ." (210); "Es musste, sollte es. . .sein,. . . ." (210, 211, three times); "Und es musste, da. . .sein,. . . ." (211); "Es musste. . ., weil es. . . ." (211); ". . .weil es nur als das. . ., die Botschart. . .ist. . . ." (215); "Soll es. . .geben, so kann. . .nur. . .er folgen." (237); "Sonst wäre er ja nicht Gott." (238).

[2] It is also due to this presumptuous character of Brunner's approach to the problem that Stephan, despite Brunner's declaration that his reliance on the critical philosophy is only propadeutic, thinks he detects something more. Stephan remarks that Brunner "actually. . .fights not only in the name of the reformation-biblical gospel against the theology of Schleiermacher, but also in the name of Kant (and, to be sure, Kant as understood by Brunner) against the philosopher Schleiermacher." What right, asks Stephan, has Brunner to assume that the critical philosophy is *the* philosophy with which the gospel should be presented? See, Horst Stephan, "Antwort auf Brunners Entgegnung," 280. This question cannot be dismissed as unimportant. Indeed, Brunner himself later put a similar question to Bultmann concerning the latter's use of Heidegger. See, Emil Brunner, "Theologie und Ontologie--oder die Theologie am Scheidewege," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, N.F. XII (1931), 111-122.

If Brunner is correct, then the theology of Schleiermacher can be summed up in the "mysticism," remembering, of course, that this means that mysticism which is the reverse side of an identity-philosophy. Now it seems unlikely that an entire century of theological activity could have been spun off a position which was that simple. If Schleiermacher's theology and religion are mystical, i.e., if they are their own goal, how is one to account for the ethical activism, even social gospel, which comes to the surface again and again in the sermons.[1] And in the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher indicates quite clearly that prayer, necessary as it is, is no substitute for work on the part of the Christian.[2] Here are cases where Schleiermacher's religion would not seem to be its own end, its own goal. Now this does not mean that Brunner is necessarily mistaken in saying that Schleiermacher's theology is "mystical." After all, the massive amount of evidence which Brunner presented cannot simply be wished out of existence. But it does mean that Schleiermacher, especially the "contemporary" Schleiermacher, is probably not as unambiguously simple as Brunner contends.

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[1] E.g., S.W., III:3, pp. 62-63, 103, 348, 352-355, 390-391, 620, 754-755; and S.W., III:5, pp. 127-128, 407. See also, Johannes Bauer, Schleiermacher als patriotischer Prediger: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nationalen Erhebung von hundert Jahren (Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1908). Bauer points out that Schleiermacher felt free to differ with and to criticize not only Napoleon and the French (which might have been expected as a visceral reaction), but his own sovereign, Friedrich, as well.

[2] Glaubenslehre, #147:2. "This view of the case meets another objection to the doctrine of the hearing of prayer, namely, that it is fitted to depress the activity of believers, or, to express it more fully, that if we believe in the hearing of prayer we are certain to separate 'praying' from 'working' and substitute prayer for work all through. Over

Similar reservation must be expressed concerning Brunner's conclusion that Schleiermacher is purely subjective. Again, Brunner would seem to be pointing in the right direction, but the problem is one of the nature and degree of Schleiermacher's subjectivism. According to Brunner, Schleiermacher's subjectivism stems from the fact that the point of indifference is ultimately identified as a point within the self, viz., Gefühl, and that everything one says about religion is an exegesis of that point. Several interpreters, not without some justification, have called Brunner

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against the formula 'pray, and thou needs not work' is set (if the hearing of prayer be denied) the other, 'work, and leave no time for prayer.' We are bound to reject both views, for, according to the explanation just given, right prayer only arises when we are engaged in the activities that go to fulfill our Christian vocation. Thus every true moment of prayer cannot destroy action without being itself destroyed; on the other hand, the presentiment expressed in such prayer as originates otherwise is bound to be purely arbitrary, and can carry with it no certainty whatever that it is in harmony with the ruling activity of Christ. No more can action destroy prayer, for action of such a kind could not be directed upon the Kingdom of God. The agent is readily satisfied with what he himself can achieve; and such action could give no guarantee of its being under the influence of Christ's rule."

to task at this point. Wilhelm Bartelheimer, writing shortly after Brunner, felt that Schleiermacher's methodology, while it is subjective as it is handled by Schleiermacher, is not necessarily subjective. Bartelheimer concludes that. . .

> the theological subjectivism of Schleiermacher is not to be sought in the methodological procedure, but in the theological thinking itself, in its principles, not in the departure from the subject, from the religious self-consciousness, but in the condition of this self-consciousness, in the manner of thinking about God and the world and the self.[1]

More recently, Gustav-Adolf Krapf and Paul F. Mehl have indicated that Schleiermacher is much more dialectical, i.e., dialectical in the sense of the Platonic dialogue, in his epistemology than Brunner ever hinted.[2] According to these men, Gefühl represents Schleiermacher's solution to the problem of avoiding the extreme of idealism and realism.[3] But even if the limitations of Bartelheimer,

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[1] Bartelheimer, op. cit., p. 83. It must be noted as an indication of the amount of evidence which Brunner does have in his favor that Bartelheimer, in the crucial seven and one-half pages preceding this conclusion, quotes Schleiermacher only three times: once from a sermon, once from the Sendschreiben, and once from the Glaubenslehre. For another interpreter who adopts much the same position as Bartelheimer in the midst of Brunner's writing, see, Georg Wobbermin, Schleiermacher und Ritschl in ihrer Bedeutung für die heutige theologische Lage und Aufgabe (Tubingen: J. C. Mohr, 1927), p. 24.

[2] Gustaf-Adolf Krapf, "Platonic Dialectics and Schleiermacher's Thought" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1953); and, Mehl, op. cit.

[3] This would then parallel Brunner's own solution to the problem in the form of personalism and truth as encounter.

Krapf, and Mehl are accepted, this does not necessarily mean a rejection of Brunner's description of Schleiermacher as subjective. For even though Gefühl is meant to point beyond itself to that point where all opposition is overcome, its object is not necessarily identical with the living God who revealed himself in Christ. As Bartelheimer suggests, the living God is reduced, in Schleiermacher's theology, to "a product of human abstraction, a subjective object of thought, a dead fixed principle of the world."[1] Christian faith, with its insistence on separation between God and man as well as community, can only view this as subjectivism. Moreover, it cannot be said that Brunner is totally unaware of the fact that Gefühl points beyond itself to something else, viz., das Universum. In so far as das Universum, the objective counterpart to Gefühl, is, in the final analysis, a presupposition posited by the self, Brunner is correct in accusing Schleiermacher of subjectivism. Despite the fact that Brunner presents enough evidence to support his conclusion, therefore, the reservations which have been expressed indicate that perhaps he shows undue haste in concluding that Schleiermacher is subjective. The manner in which Brunner presents his evidence and makes his conclusion gives little indication of the complex nature of Schleiermacher's thought or of the lengths to which Schleiermacher went in his attempt to avoid subjectivism.

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[1] Bartelheimer, op. cit., p. 88. Bartelheimer makes the insightful observation that Schleiermacher presents us with a violation of the first two commandments at least as much as he presents us with subjectivism. But Brunner could doubtless respond that the worship of a false, i.e., self-made god is merely the height of subjectivism.

Brunner's conclusion about Schleiermacher, however, is not merely that Schleiermacher was mystical, i.e., had a mystical-identity-philosophy, and subjective, but that all of this was fused by Schleiermacher into a system which exerts its controlling influence on all parts of his thought. This system, moreover, is thoroughly unsuited as a vehicle for Christian theological statements. Just as this is Brunner's most general conclusion, the need for reservation becomes most acute at this point. As before, the reservations are needed not because Brunner was totally incorrect, but so that the truth of his position may not be overlooked because of his failure to acknowledge the complexities of Schleiermacher's thought. It will be recalled that, according to Brunner, Schleiermacher's theology is dominated by a mystical-identity-philosophical system but that occasionally there is a disturbance (Störung) where some element of genuine Christian faith attempts, usually with considerable lack of success, to break through the system. The person and work of Christ is the place where this disturbance becomes greatest, but even here Brunner felt forced to conclude that "Christ is no more than a disturbance, the cause of a slight deformation of his theological system of doctrine."[1] Now the evidence which Brunner presents to demonstrate the presence and influence of this system in Schleiermacher's theology is too strong to be put aside, much less wished out of existence.[2] But when this position is stated as strongly as Brunner states it, there seems to be little basis on which to account for those "disturbances." Surely it must be granted that Schleiermacher did not employ the rich and varied terminology of a Luther or a Paul in speaking of Christ, but does that mean that paragraph 11 of the Glaubenslehre, for example, is adequately described when it is identified as a disturbance in the introduction of the Glaubenslehre or that the notion of Christ's "infinite power" a mere inconsistency in an otherwise dynamic scheme?[3] In short, while agreeing with Brunner that Schleiermacher's theology is presented in the closest connection with a system which is unsuitable for the presentation of the Christian faith, I should want to be much more hesitant in claiming an unequivocal victory for this system at all points.[1] Schleiermacher's theology is much more complex and the war between the system and Christian faith is much less one-sided than Brunner's presentation would indicate. Schleiermacher presents a good illustration of the problem at one point in the Kurze Darstellung when he remarks that "the opponents of Christianity ever and again assign themselves the task of explaining Crhistianity wholly out of that which was previously given and, to be sure, not always as a progress or improvement."[2] Now the problem is whether Schleiermacher means that it would be permissible to explain Christianity on the basis of what has gone before if only we remember that it is a progress and an improvement over its antedecents or that Christianity cannot, under any circumstances, be totally accounted for on the basis of what has gone before. Schleiermacher's words, so it seems, permit either interpretation. Here again, then, at the most basic level of Brunner's critique, it seems that Brunner would have profited by being somewhat more open to Schleiermacher and less ready to reduce his research to an unequivocal conclusion. A more restrained statement of the same conclusion would not only have been a more honest confrontation of the "contemporary" Schleiermacher, but it would doubtless have been more helpful since its more balanced judgment would have predisposed others to take it more seriously.

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[1] Die Mystik, p. 196.

[2] In the final analysis, I think, this is what both R. R. Niebuhr and Terrence Tice have done. But Brunner himself must bear part of the blame for this since the truth of his conclusion is camouflaged by lack of restraint.

[3] Hermann Süskind, Christentum und Geschichte, pp. 196-197, feels that precisely at the point of the absoluteness of Christ both the Christian element and the system become so strong that one can only speak of "an irreconcilable opposition." Both are so strong that it is misleading to describe either as a "disturbance" of the other. At this point I agree with Süskind more than with Brunner.

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[1] This is particularly true as Schleiermacher moved toward the end of his career. See, Fernand Menegoz, Das Gebetsproblem im Anschluss an Schleiermachers Predigten und Glaubenslehre (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1911), pp. 16-17. Menegoz thinks that Schleiermacher gradually moved away from a "romantic-pantheistic" position toward a "specifically Christian" one.

[2] Kurze Darstellung, #143:explanation.

One final word needs to be added to these reservations about Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher's theology. My main criticism of Brunner's critique as an interpretation of Schleiermacher has been that Brunner portrayed Schleiermacher in too unambiguous and monolithic fashion. On the face of it, there would seem to be a certain discontinuity, even contradiction, between this conclusion and the conclusion of Chapter III, viz., that Brunner did not react in purely negative fashion to Schleiermacher and that he did, in fact, suggest that there were valuable elements in Schleiermacher's theology which needed to be retained. This problem arises largely as a result of Brunner's style rather than as a result of what he actually said. One gets the impression, particularly in the works of the 1920s, that Brunner shouts at the top of his voice what it is that is wrong with Schleiermacher's theology while barely whispering what it is that is valuable in Schleiermacher's theology and needs to be retained. From a strictly logical point of view, one has not really understood Brunner's critique until both elements have been perceived. This is why Brunner, despite his criticism of Schleiermacher, does share some things with him.[1] But the problem is that theologians, like all human beings, do not always react in the appropriate way, i.e., by careful and logical analysis in this case. It is not surprising that at least some of Brunner's successors have heard Brunner's shouting but have failed to perceive his whispering. The logical conclusion of this failure is illustrated by Schrotenboer who concludes that after Brunner had uttered a mighty and unrelieved "no" against Schleiermacher, he then went back on his word and illogically accepted a good deal of that which he had just rejected.[2] But Schrotenboer failed to notice the dialectical nature of Brunner's critique from the very beginning. My reservations about Brunner's critique as an interpretation of Schleiermacher, therefore, are much more, though not exclusively, reservations about his style than about what he actually said. But inasmuch as his style is so overpowering and has opened wide the possibility of misinterpretation, these reservations needed to be offered in an effort to correct some of the misinterpretation and to guard against it in the future.

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[1] It is precisely the "disturbances" of Schleiermacher's system which Brunner finds most valuable and retains in his own thought. In defense of Schleiermacher, it must be said that these disturbances exist not because he failed to recognize their rather questionable relationship to other things that he said, but because he insisted on retaining them in spite of their questionable relationship. In defense of Brunner, it must be said that those elements of Schleiermacher's thought which Brunner retains, e.g., the notion of movement in history, are not retained in the context of Schleiermacher's system.

[2] Schrotenboer, op. cit., p. 216. "We are forced to conclude that in his /Brunner's/ struggle, with the spirit of the times he has himself imbibed from the same cup as his contemporaries. He does not stand apart from the stream of modern thought, calling it back to the fountainhead of truth, namely, the God of the Bible, but he is himself influenced strongly by the Zeitgeist."

Despite the reservations which must be expressed concerning Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher as an interpretation of Schleiermacher, but remembering the truly dialectical nature of Brunner's response to Schleiermacher, I conclude that Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher is essentially valid. Now it would be almost impossible as well as redundant to present again all that Brunner said about Schleiermacher accompanied by the evidence for its validity. Instead of such a comprehensive but impractical approach, I shall merely highlight the most significant results of Brunner's critique.

At the most basic level, Brunner's conclusion about Schleiermacher is that Schleiermacher's theology is dominated by a (mystical-identity-philosophical) system which is unsuitable for discussion of the Christian faith. Its unsuitability lies in the fact that it seeks to establish continuity between the divine and the human whereas the Christian faith proclaims the reality of a gulf as wide that only God can bridge it. In saying that I affirm this conclusion the reservations made above in connection with the discussion of Schleiermacher's mysticism and subjectivism as well as the conflict between the system and faith must be remembered. Beyond these reservations, there has been a certain advance since Brunner in determining Schleiermacher's philosophical position. The most significant works in this connection are two rather recent dissertations in English, those of Krapf and Mehl, which develop motifs suggested by Odebrecht. Krapf, with Mehl relying upon him, has taught us that the identity-philosophy of Schleiermacher cannot be adequately understood as a mere reproduction of German idealism, in general, or of Schelling in particular. According to Krapf, Schleiermacher is philosophically much closer to Plato than he is to Schelling. But the significant thing for this dissertation is that Krapf has not disestablished the conclusion that there is at the basis of Schleiermacher's position a presupposed unity of the opposites which confront us in thought and life. Rather, his own careful analysis of the Dialektik supports this conclusion.[1] Now this should not be a startling conclusion since Schleiermacher himself asserted that the scientific character of dogmatics demands that dogma be expressed in the form of some current and scientific philosophy.[2] For Schleiermacher, this current and scientific philosophy was, in the last analysis, an identity-philosophy. Being the systematic thinker that he was, Schleiermacher permitted this underlying philosophy to pervade every corner of his thought. In one sense, of course, this has been one of Schleiermacher's chief contributions to theology inasmuch as the systematic structure of his dogmatics still constitues a goal worthy of emulation. But the Christian theologian desires that his theology be systematic not primarily because precise logic is his goal, but primarily because he wants the content of his theology to be as lucid as possible. The final criterion for judging the worth of a theology, therefore, is not its systematic coherence even though this is not unimportant, but its faithfulness to the content of the Christian faith. Now if the Christian faith takes the Christ event seriously as the establishment by God's grace alone of community between God and man where such community did not previously exist, then a philosophical system which has a presupposed continuity between God and man at its foundation would seem highly unsuited for explication of the Christian faith. To the extent, therefore, that the philosophy in terms of which Schleiermacher proposes to discuss the Christian faith has a presupposed continuity at its basis, it must be judged unsuitable for Christian theological work. Brunner is quite right, then, in asserting that nothing less than the nature of faith is at stake here. Either faith is, primarily, a continuation of nature in which case an identity-philosophy is quite appropriate for the discussion of faith or faith is, primarily, a break with nature in which case an identity-philosophy is quite inappropriate for the discussion of faith.

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[1] It is impossible for me to offer here a precise and detailed estimate of Schleiermacher's philosophical foundations. I would refer the reader, however, to the dissertation of Krapf which does just this and from which I have distilled the immediately preceding sentences.

[2] Kurze Darstellung, ##213-217.

In various areas of his thought, Schleiermacher's underlying philosophy has forced him into some rather undesirable consequences. Brunner has done a good job of emphasizing these consequences, so I shall merely recall two which are somewhat ironic in view of Schleiermacher's initial concerns. In his revolt against the rationalism and intellectualism which held sway in religious thought during the eighteenth century, Schleiermacher had emphasized, among other things, the significance of the individual and of history. The Monologen constitutes an almost unrelieved hymn to the individual.

> Only with difficulty and tardily does man reach the full knowledge of his individuality. He does not always dare to look toward it as his ideal, but prefers to turn his eyes upon the good which he possesses in common with humanity in general. Clinging to this common good with love and gratitude, he often doubts whether he should again separate his individual self from it.[1]

But Schleiermacher's identity-philosophy did not permit him to urge forever such individuality and to deplore the tendency to submerge the individual self in the whole. With increasing frequency, the individual self is submerged in some greater whole which is more real because it is less fragmentary. Sometimes this greater whole is the nation,[1] but more often it is das Universum itself.[2] Thus, Schleiermacher, because of the identity-philosophy's emphasis on continuity, wound up by sacrificing the very individuality which he set out to regain.[3] History did not fare much better. As was demonstrated in Chapter II, Schleiermacher's concern for presenting the Christian faith in historical categories led him to such consequences as the rather negative view of sin[4] and the lack of any eschatology.[5] But the underlying identity-philosophy finally forced Schleiermacher to present a picture of history itself which is so unambiguously progressive that not only does it rob ethical decision of all meaning, but it bears little resemblence to real highly ambiguous history.[6] As Jørgensen emphasizes, since Ethik deals with the whole historical process, i.e., "the complete unity of reason and nature,"[1] the "highest good" means the result of the process, whatever that happens to be, and not the object of dutiful decision.[2] To equate this optimistic evolutionary process with real history seems to be a highly problematic undertaking. Once again, therefore, Schleiermacher's underlying philosophy forced him to lose the very thing he was trying to regain. To the extent that Christian faith, then, is concerned about the individual who stands coram Deo and who must decide in the midst of real history, Brunner is correct in asserting that Schleiermacher's underlying philosophy is unsuitable for discussion of the Christian faith.

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[1] Monologen, S.W., III:1, p. 368. (E.T., p. 32.)

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[1] S.W., II:1, p. 230.

[2] See above, Chapter II, pp. 137-139.

[3] Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vol. I: Human Nature (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), p. 84, points out that the religious expression of this individuality also results in the loss of the individual. By substituting the "direct and unmediated experience of unity between the believer and God" for the reformation notion of "the person's unique relation of faith and responsibility to God," the individual is again lost because it now becomes indistinguishable from the divine into which it has been submerged.

[4] See above, Chapter II, pp. 102-110.

[5] Ibid., pp. 117-126.

[6] Ibid., pp. 126-137.

In view of the much greater force and documentation which Brunner devoted to his negative criticism of Schleiermacher as opposed to the force which he devoted to his praise of Schleiermacher, it might have been expected that Brunner's work would contribute to a decline in the study of Schleiermacher. While this did happen to some degree, the study of Schleiermacher never did disappear and, in more recent years, has been becoming more popular. As early as 1935, for example, Rudolf Odebrecht was able to write that "Schleiermacher research is not at an end, but has only scarcely begun. . . ."[1] We are confronted, therefore, with the problem of explaining how Schleiermacher's influence persisted, in spite of the basically unchristian nature of his underlying system, not only from Schleiermacher's death until Brunner's critique, but also since Brunner's critique. This brings us face to face with what must be the weakest link in the entire chain of comments which Brunner made about Schleiermacher. After adopting and maintaining a dialectical attitude toward Schleiermacher, admittedly giving greater emphasis to one side of the dialectic than to the other, Brunner offers a rather simple, almost unbelievable explanation of Schleiermacher's influence. According to Brunner, Schleiermacher is the patron saint of the age because he, more than anyone else, provides a definition of religion which can be of service to the "modern European."[2] This modern man or modern European is characterized by an "idealistic or naturalistic self-understanding."[3] That is to say, modern man wants everything reduced to an understandable level, i.e., to the level of nature, history, culture, and he wants to be reassured that this world is constantly progressing. This,

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[1] Jørgensen, op. cit., p. 75.

[2] Ibid., pp. 76-79.

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[1] Rudolf Odebrecht, "Das Gefüge des religiösen Bewusstseins bei Friedrich Schleiermacher," Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie, VIII (1934-1935), 301.

[2] Die Mystik, p. 392.

[3] Dogmatik, III, p. 248. (E.T., p. 215.)

Brunner concludes, is the exact service which Schleiermacher provides for modern man.[1] Not only does Schleiermacher's "mystical-identity-philosophical system" reduce everything to an understandable level and reassure modern man of the progressive betterment of his world, but it also provides the one basis on which modern man can seek to justify himself.[2] Now this may be a contributing reason to Schleiermacher's continuing popularity, but it seems highly unlikely that it is the sole and adequate explanation of the fact that theologians have continued to study Schleiermacher's thought for a century and a half. Indeed, it offers no justification for Brunner's own dialectical response to Schleiermacher. If Schleiermacher's thought is studied merely because he is a modern man, Brunner should have given the unqualifiedly negative reaction to Schleiermacher which many have imagined that he did give.

On the other hand, if Brunner's thesis is correct, i.e., if there is in fact a mystical-identity-philosophical system which undergirds and influences the whole of Schleiermacher's thought and which is unsuitable for the presentation of the Christian faith, then theologians dare hardly ignore Brunner's critique when confronting Schleiermacher. More concretely, the validity which was ascribed to Brunner's critique earlier in this present chapter renders impossible any indiscriminate or uncritical use of Schleiermacher's thought and also serves as a constant reminder of the danger of dissolving the paradoxical nature of faith by emphasizing one side or another of the dialectical answer which faith gives to most problems.

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[1] Die Mystik, pp. 392-394.

[2] See above, Chapter II, pp. 163-164.

"Indiscriminate or uncritical use of Schleiermacher's thought" means, in this context, using Schleiermacher's thought *without* being fully aware of the influence which the system exerts on all parts of Schleiermacher's thought and *without* making adjustments for that influence. This does not mean that Schleiermacher's thought is no longer of value for theology. But it does mean that the Christian theologian, trying to be faithful to God's revelation in Christ of his grace and our sin, cannot adopt Schleiermacher's system nor can he adopt even a minor "part" of Schleiermacher's thought *as long as* that part still functions as a part of the system in which Schleiermacher placed it. Merely adopting one part of Schleiermacher's thought while rejecting or ignoring the remainder does not necessarily satisfy this requirement, for, according to Brunner's critique, it is the system which led Schleiermacher to give each part the precise formulation which he did give it. Thus, to the degree that Schleiermacher's formulation of a notion is preserved, to that degree his system, i.e., the mystical-identity-philosophical system, is preserved.

Several examples should help to clarify this point. According to William Johnson's account of the relationship between Schleiermacher and Nygren, Nygren recognized Schleiermacher's "allegiance to a foreign philosophy of identity" and promptly rejected it.[1] But without trying to oversimplify Nygren, Schleiermacher, or Nygren's understanding and interpretation of Schleiermacher, one must wonder how free of this identity philosophy Nygren could be after proposing to borrow from Schleiermacher such notions as the grounding of all knowledge on the "idea of God" and the assignment of religion to its essential place in life.[2] In Schleiermacher's thought, at least, these notions are an integral part of the identity-philosophy. In the case of Nygren, moreover, it would seem that these notions have not been taken out of the context of identity-philosophy. To the extent that they have not, they serve as an example of the type of use of Schleiermacher which has been made illegitimate by Brunner's critique. Still another example of that borrowing from Schleiermacher which has now become highly questionable is to be found in R. R. Niebuhr's references to Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. After an analysis which takes no account of Kimmerle's differentiation between the hermeneutics of the earlier Schleiermacher and the hermeneutics of the later

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[1] Johnson, op. cit., p. 141.

[2] Ibid., pp. 133-150.

Schleiermacher,[1] Niebuhr remarks that there "are a number of affinities between Schleiermacher's idea of interpretation and the hermeneutics of contemporary theological existentialists."[2] But remembering Niebuhr's context[3] and his reference to Joachim Wach,[4] the clear implication is that Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is taken over as a part of his larger system, i.e., as part of his Ethik, i.e., as part of the mystical-identity-philosophical system. To what extent this may be true of the "contemporary theological existentialists" may be open to question, but Niebuhr himself seems willing to take over Schleiermacher's hermeneutics *in* Schleiermacher's context. On the other hand, Brunner offers numerous examples of a legitimate use of Schleiermacher's thought, i.e., legitimate in the light of Brunner's critique. According to Brunner, Schleiermacher's doctrine of the feeling of absolute dependence emphasizes the fact that "human existence always, and necessarily, consists in a relation with God," a fact of which we need constantly to be reminded.[1] But by also emphasizing the impassable gulf of sin, the total loss of the material imago Dei, the fact that apart from grace our relationship to God is a wrong relationship, Brunner has attempted to remove the notion of a relationship with God as the ground of humanity from the context of Schleiermacher's identity-philosophy. For the Christian theologian, then, standing on this side of Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher, it is no longer possible to go back to Schleiermacher de novo.[2] The only legitimate way to approach Schleiermacher's thought is to be conscious of Brunner's critique and, therefore, to insure that those concepts which we do borrow from Schleiermacher are effectively divorced from the identity-philosophy context in which he put them and in terms of which they were explained.

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[1] See Heinz Kimmerle's introduction in, Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik*, heraus. von Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: *Carl Winter*, 1959).

[2] R. R. Niebuhr, *op. cit*., p. 88, n. 25.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 77. Niebuhr'a analysis of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is presented as a concrete illustration of Schleiermacher's more general *Ethik*.

[4] Joachim Wach, *Das Verstehen: Grundzüge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Theorie im 19. Jahrhundert, Bd. I: Die grossen Systeme* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1926), p. 85, says that Schleiermacher's contribution to hermeneutical thought was to provide a philosophical basis for hermeneutical theory.

A second service of Brunner's critique is the warning it provides against any dissolution of the paradoxical or dialectical nature of faith and statements of faith. Christian faith proclaims a revelation from God to man, original sin and responsibility, that the believer is simul justus et peccator, that the believer hopes for what he possesses in faith, etc. According to Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher's identity-philosophy is a means for bringing together and uniting what faith places side by side without uniting just as his mysticism is a means for modern man to attempt the self-justification which faith declares a delusion. Brunner's identification of Schleiermacher's failure to maintain the paradoxical nature of faith and statements of faith stands, therefore, as a reminder of a danger which the theologian must ever seek to avoid. To give just one example, Brunner's critique should be of service in the contemporary discussion of the non-objectifiability of God.[1] Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher reminds us that, while the Christian must speak of God in his relation to man, i.e., must speak of God as he reveals himself, the Christian dare not employ such language in such a fashion that God becomes a mere function of humanity.[2]

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[1] Offenbarung und Vernunft, pp. 257-258. (E.T., pp. 260-261.

[2] This seems to be the assumption of both Mehl, op. cit., p. 1, and R. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 6-17. One is reminded of the word: "He who does not know his past is condemned to relive it."

But the reservation or limitation and the reminder which are implied in the acceptance of Brunner's critique do not mean that Schleiermacher must be employed only as an example of dangers to be avoided in theology. Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher has been misunderstood if it is imagined that it has made it impossible to treat Schleiermacher as a living partner in theological discussion. But it is altogether probable that the validity of Brunner's critique does mean that what contemporary theologians may legitimately borrow from Schleiermacher are his concerns and his questions rather than his precise answers which are generally formulated because of and in accordance with his philosophical foundations, i.e., the mystical-identity-philosophical system. Thus, theologians will legitimately look to Schleiermacher and be reminded of the importance of speaking of God in his relation to man, but they will not reduce God to the "whence" of something human. They will be reminded of the importance of seeing man in terms of his relation to God, but will not speak of that relation as if it were at the disposal of man. They will be reminded of the importance of the fact that the gospel is proclaimed to contemporary man, not first century man or even nineteenth century or early twentieth century man,[1] but they will not permit the gospel to be equated with the thought of modern man. They will be reminded of the importance of proclaiming the gospel so that modern man is not offended by its form, but they will not remove the offense of the gospel. At least Brunner's critique stands as a reminder that they should try to do these things. But after they have tried and failed, they will realize that they and their theologies, like all previous theologians, including Schleiermacher and Brunner, and their theologies, stand in need of God's grace and forgiveness if they are to be anything more than sinful men and the babblings of sinful men. And they will realize even this by God's grace.

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[1] An illustration of this is to be found in Helmut Gollwitzer, The Existence of God as Confessed by Faith, trans. James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1965), pp. 175-177. Although Gollwitzer does not mention Brunner's critique of Schleiermacher, the position from which Gollwitzer speaks is in agreement with Brunner.

[2] "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknüpfungspunkt,'" 512-513.

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[1] Seifert, op. cit., p. 200, writes, "Schleiermacher's permanent theme reads. . .'The faith of Christendom and of the modern man.'"

Appendix

Until this point the dissertation has proceeded upon the assumption that there were two possible views of the relationship between history and eschatology. On the one hand there has been the view of Schleiermacher which views the eschatological proclamations of faith as indications of a completion of history within history at the end of a constantly progressing historical process. On the other hand there has been the view of Brunner which views the eschatological proclamations of faith as indications of an end-history which does not lie within history as such but which represents the goal and completion of history which, in some sense, lies in the future. There has been good reason to proceed on the basis of a dialogue between these two views since the subject of this dissertation is the dialogue between Schleiermacher and Brunner. On the contemporary theological scene, of course, the choice is not limited to these two views or variations of them. In addition to the rather thorough historicizing of eschatology, represented by Schleiermacher, and the "Heilsgeschichte" view of eschatology which views eschatology as in some sense future, represented by Brunner, there is the so-called "existential interpretation" of eschatology as represented, among others, by Rudolf Bultmann. To deal with this third alternative in any responsible manner would demand at least the sort of detailed analysis which has been devoted to Schleiermacher's theology in Chapter II of this dissertation. Nevertheless, some preliminary comments seem to be in order concerning the nature and viability of this alternative for the contemporary theologian. But both because of the scope of this dissertation and the competence of the author as an interpreter of Bultmann's theology, the remarks which follow should be taken as nothing more than preliminary.

Bultmann's existential interpretation of eschatology is inextricably tied up with his general program of demythologization. According to Bultmann there are two ways in which one can be related to reality. One can be related to it as a spectator, as one who stands outside of it and attempts to view reality. But one can also be related to reality as a participant in the process, as one who recognizes that he and reality are mutually conditioning and that not merely in a natural sense. Now there are two ways of viewing history which correspond to these two ways of being related to reality. One can view history in the abstract fashion of a series of past events which constitute world-history. This is to view history in historisch fashion. But one can also view history as that which has meaning for me, as that in which I am existentially involved. This is to view history in geschichtlich fashion. Thus, the very same event or text from the past may be viewed in either *historisch* or *geschichtlich* fashion by different persons or even by the same person at different moments. True history, however, history as it should be is, of course, history viewed in *geschichtlich* fashion, viewed as my history. To view an event in *historisch* fashion actually transfers it from the realm of true history into the realm of natural science. *Historisch* statements, i.e., statements about a world-history which does not affect me, are mythological statements since they attempt to discuss a subject matter which does not effect me ontically. But *geschichtlich* statements, i.e., statements of an event's significance for me, are existential non-mythological statements since the subject matter does affect me ontically. Now the Christian faith's view of history is *geschichtlich*. Whether the language of statements of faith is *historisch* or *geschichtlich* does not affect the fact that their real significance is *geschichtlich*. Therefore, both because the real meaning of statements of faith is *geschichtlich* and because the modern man finds the mythology of *historisch* statements ununderstandable, one should demythologize all statements of faith which are not already cast in existential non-mythological language, i.e., one should translate all *historisch* statemants into their *geschichtlich* equivalent. Now eschatology, as one of the statements of faith, can be in either *historisch* or *geschichtlich* language. But since *historisch* language both confuses modern man and since it obscures the real meaning of the statement anyway, it is best to demythologize such statements by translating them into their geschichtlich equivalent. Traditionally, eschatological statements have been presented in the form of statements about the future outcome of world-history, as the consummation of a promise-fulfillment Heilsgeschichte view of salvation. But what they really mean to describe is not the end of world-history, but the fact that the grace of God in Christ puts an end to my sinful past and thereby gives me my future. Jesus Christ is the eschatological end of my old life and the beginning of a new life in grace. Beyond this faith has no interest.[1]

That Bultmann's "existential interpretation" of eschatology has considerable merit can hardly be denied. First, Bultmann clearly recognizes the problem that the delay of the parousia constitutes both for the New Testament itself and for contemporary theologians who would support some version of a Heilsgeschichte view of eschatology. Frequently this problem has been glossed over by those who would maintain some element of futurity in their view of eschatology. Second, Bultmann has considerable justification

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[1] The analysis in this rather lengthy paragraph was drawn principally from two sources. See, Rudolf Bultmann, "History of Salvation and History," Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. Schubert M. Ogden (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), pp. 226-240; and, Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

in calling for a demythologization of the gospel since, in fact, the gospel is constantly in need of demythologization in the sense that the world-view and language in which any generation necessarily expresses itself is somewhat changed from the world-view and language not only of the Bible, but even from that of the preceeding generation. Since faith itself desires to break through this "mythology," the church should always be engaged in the process of demythologization. But again, in practice, the church has frequently permitted one mythology to persist until large segments of the world had been alienated by it. The problem today, however, may well be not only that modern man finds the language and world-view of faith outdated, but that he finds the very center of the gospel, viz., that grace is given in Christ, to be mythological. It is to the credit of Bultmann, however, that he has stubbornly refused all attempts to demythologize this basic content of the gospel. As an apologetic program, therefore, I must wonder whether the program of demythologization is really what modern man demands or whether modern man does not demand some more radical program of dekerygmatization which faith cannot allow. Third, Bultmann seems quite insightful in suggesting that existential interpretation is the direction in which the gospel needs to be demythologized at the present moment. I should think that existential interpretation may indeed be an excellent tool to employ in proclaiming the gospel to contemporary man. But I am not sure that Bultmann always views existential interpretation as a "tool" which is indeed a remythologization into a commonly accepted mythology. There are times when Bultmann seems to flirt with the opinion that he has finally managed, by means of existential interpretation, to get rid of mythology once and for all. That existential interpretation may be an improvement in some respects and, to that extent, a better mythology I can allow. But that it is absolutely non-mythological I cannot accept.

But if Bultmann's program of demythologization has merit, it also raises several problems, at least in connection with eschatology. There are, first, the problems connected with exegesis. To a considerable degree, the strength of Bultmann's position arises from his knowledge of both history of religions and the material of the New Testament. Indeed, I suspect that any lasting criticism of Bultmann will have to proceed, to a large extent, on the basis of a new exegesis of the New Testament. Nevertheless, I shall make some preliminary suggestions. Existential interpretation, as a program for demythologization, is a presupposition. It may be better than some other presuppositions which have been used as a basis for interpretation or demythologization, but I doubt if it is the perfect hermeneutical tool. (Indeed, in saying, above, that I doubted the possibility of a completely non-mythological interpretation, I was also expressing my doubt concerning the possibility of a perfect hermeneutic, even a theoretical one.) That existential interpretation may not be as successful as Bultmann would hope may be seen, I think, in the fact that there frequently seems to be as much elimination as interpretation. Thus, in his Gifford lectures, after attempting to show how the existential interpretation of eschatology was begun in Paul and expanded in John, Bultmann finds himself forced to confess that. . .

> for both Paul and John the present time is a "time-between." For Paul: between the resurrection of Christ and His expected parousia at the end of the world. For John: between the glorification of Jesus through his crucifixion (which is at the same time his exaltation) and the end of the earthly life of the individual believer. But for both of them this "between" has not only chronological, but also essential, meaning. . . . The question is whether this meaning of the "time-between" could be retained; and that is at the same time the question whether the Pauline and Johannine understanding of the relation of history and eschatology could be retained. The answer is that it could not.[1]

This is a startling passage indeed in the midst of a presentation which claims to be an existential interpretation. But Bultmann's existential interpretation of eschatology presents us with problems in another direction which indicate that the Heilsgeschichte interpretation of eschatology may not be as "mythological" or as unrelated to ontic experience as Bultmann's analysis of it would indicate. To borrow Bultmann's terminology, the Heilsgeschichte interpretation of eschatology points to the ontological background (stated in cosmic terminology) of the ontic (existential) Christ event. Thus, it is not because faith is interested in speculation that it talks about end-history, but because God addresses me in Christ as my Lord and Saviour. And if he is truly my Lord and Saviour, then, in some sense, he must be Lord and Saviour of the reality in which I am. As Bultmann himself indicates, existential interpretation of an ontic event does not preclude an ontological background for that event; in fact, it presupposes it.[1] In the *Heilsgeschichte* view of eschatology which is admittedly mythological, faith is trying to emphasize the fact that it is not purely subjective. While Bultmann himself agrees that there is an objective background of faith, the program of existential interpretation seems unable to safeguard this aspect of faith as well as the *Heilsgeschichte* interpretation. But there is another reason which leads me to prefer the *Heilsgeschichte* type of interpretation of eschatology and this has to do with the ontic event which existential interpretation claims to be reflecting. Bultmann's claim that the Christ event is the end of the old man and the beginning of the new man seems to contain an incipient perfectionism which is not totally avoided by speaking of faith as an event of the moment. If the Christ event of the moment has any relation to the character of other events in the life of the Christian, then it would seem that Luther's _simul justus et peccator_ with its forward glance to a consummation that is, in some sense, future is more faithful to real life and history than a thoroughly existentialized eschatology which claims that the full meaning of dying and and rising again with Christ has been disclosed. There is reason to think, therefore, that in addition to the general tendency toward extreme individualism which seems to be inherent in the program of existential interpretation, the existential interpretation of eschatology produces an individual and a life which bears little relationship to real historical individuals and ambiguous life. This dissertation has shown how, in reference to Schleiermacher's eschatology, Brunner maintained the dialectical quality of life in history. I too, in reference to Bultmann's eschatology, would maintain the same thing. Because of this, the doctrines of justification and eschatology cannot be completely merged into one another. Because of this, I am not yet ready to abandon the _Heilsgeschichte_ view of eschatology to the realm of that mythology about which we can say nothing positive.

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[1] Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity, p. 49.

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[1] Hans Werner Bartsch, ed., *Kerygma und Mythos*, Bd. II (Hamburg: Herbert Reich, 1952), pp. 196-208.

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